396.1 GE/4–2754: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva1

top secret

Tedul 14, Reference Secto 14, April 27.2 Wilson and Twining are handling Pleven’s request personally and doing everything possible. At present they feel only one of the three fields is feasible. Will have fuller report for you tomorrow.

[Page 589]

Bonnet visited me again this afternoon and renewed strong plea for action, suggesting possibility that joint declaration might be made without UK participation, in view of apparently strong concern of Australia and New Zealand. I told him it would be very difficult for the US to suggest such a thing but that if such suggestion came from Australia or New Zealand, or both, it would certainly deserve our careful attention.

The above should be considered against the background of Dillon’s 4089, repeated niact Geneva 134.3 I am sure that Dillon’s estimate is correct and that this matter will be raised with you at Geneva if it has not already been brought up. I would be very grateful for your views.

Smith
  1. Drafted by the Acting Secretary. Repeated to Paris as telegram 3850 and to Saigon as telegram 2092.
  2. In telegram Secto 14 from Geneva, Apr. 27, not printed, Secretary Dulles informed the Acting Secretary that he concurred with “Dillon’s and Norstad’s recommendations and hope immediate favorable reply can be given Pleven’s request with maximum implementation undertaken as quickly as possible.” (396.1 GE/4–2754) In telegram 4085 from Paris, Apr. 26, not printed, Ambassador Dillon reported that Defense Minister Pleven had that evening entered a request with General Norstad for U.S. assistance in airfield construction in Indochina and for additional U.S. transport aircraft and crews. Dillon and Norstad recommended that the requests be granted for political and psychological reasons. (751G.00/4–2654)
  3. In telegram 4089 from Paris (Apr. 27, in volume xiii), Ambassador Dillon, with respect to Pleven’s request for military assistance, stated he believed that the Laniel government was making every effort to hold at Dien Bien Phu for at least three weeks in the hope that the United States would be able to overcome internal political problems and to find constitutional means of providing military assistance to France in Indochina. (751G.00/4–2754)