Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)
Participants:
- The Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs
- John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
- Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State
Place: Geneva
Subject:
- Indo-Chin
Minister Casey called on the Secretary at 12:20 p.m. (April 25). He opened the conversation by saying that Mr. Eden, before leaving Paris for London the evening before, had conveyed to him the gist of his conversation with the Secretary late Saturday afternoon.1
The Secretary then read Casey the letter he had written M. Bidault on April 24 and Bidault’s reply.2 Casey asked that if Dien Bien Phu should fall, would the Secretary feel that the pressure of public opinion in France would force the French to “check in”. The Secretary then summarized his talk with Laniel Saturday night just before leaving for Geneva.3
Laniel had stated that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would in all probability cause the fall of the French Government and would mark the end of French resistance. It was therefore necessary that the United States take immediate action to prevent such a catastrophe. The Secretary said he had explained to Laniel that (1) the United States [Page 558] could not intervene without Congressional approval, (2) that Congressional leaders would not be willing to intervene in any event except in collaboration with the British and with the independence of the Associated States guaranteed, and (3) that the procedure of obtaining Congressional approval would take weeks, thus making it necessary that the French should hold on now at any cost. He further explained that he, the Secretary, did not yet know what the attitude of the British and Commonwealth nations would be. He realized that both the Australians and British were hampered by political difficulties at home, but he emphasized to Laniel that he would do everything possible to ensure that the French could count on at least two allies. He stated further that the purpose of his quick trips to London and Paris was to create fresh assets to offset the probable loss of Dien Bien Phu.
The Secretary emphasized to Casey that everything possible should be done to support Bidault and Laniel because in the event of the fall of their Government they would probably be succeeded by a Mendes France or some neutralist which might refuse an offer of intervention even if it could be made. The Secretary said that Admiral Radford thought that the fall of Dien Bien Phu might threaten a massacre of the French population which would make it extremely difficult for the French troops to withdraw. Casey expressed his own feeling that even should Britain and Australia agree to intervene, if they should do so without UN backing it would greatly antagonize Asian opinion. The Secretary explained that we would of course expect to rely upon Vietnamese troops which could probably be wielded into an effective fighting force under training by a man like General Van Fleet.
The Secretary stated that President Eisenhower had asked Admiral Radford to ask the British why they were willing to wait until one of their greatest assets, some 300,000 Vietnamese troops, had been destroyed before deciding to take collective action. Casey replied that it was the British fear that British and American intervention in Indo-China at this time would bring in the Communist Chinese and get us all embroiled in a war with Red China.
- For the memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden, Apr. 24, see volume xiii.↩
- The text of Secretary Dulles’ letter of Apr. 24 to Foreign Minister Bidault was transmitted to the Department in telegram Dulte 1 from Geneva, Apr. 24; Bidault’s reply of Apr. 24 was transmitted from Paris to the Secretary in telegram 121 to Geneva (telegram 4058 to the Department of State), Apr. 24. For the texts of both documents, see ibid.↩
- For an account of the Dulles–Laniel conversation, see telegram Dulte 17 from Paris, Apr. 24, ibid.↩