Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

top secret

Geneva, April 25, 1954.

Participants:

• UK
  • Mr. Eden
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Caccia
• US
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Mr. MacArthur

Time: 10:15–11:00 p.m., April 25, 1954

Place: Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva

I sent word to the British Delegation that I would be glad to see Mr. Eden upon his arrival in Geneva this evening if he thought it would be useful. At 10 p.m. I received word that Mr. Eden had just arrived and would be very glad to see me. I called upon him in his quarters at the hotel Beau Rivage immediately thereafter.

Mr. Eden opened the conversation by saying he was very glad to bring me up to date on the results of his trip to London. He had met with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and the British Chiefs of Staff. He said he was afraid that the news which he had for me would not be exactly what I wanted to hear. However, he did have certain positive proposals to lay before me.

He then said that the British Chiefs of Staff were certain that air intervention at Dien Bien Phu would have no decisive effect on that battle; therefore, since such action would be ineffective, it would be a great mistake in terms of free world opinion to undertake it since nobody could foresee where it would lead. Mr. Eden added that until it is clear what kind of action can be undertaken, it seemed better to wait and be sure where we are headed. He said that under the British proposals, which he would give me, the Communists would be kept guessing as to what we would do if Geneva failed, since they knew already we were considering the possibility of united action. He then said, the UK position resulting from his trip to London was as follows:

1. The British would give the French all possible diplomatic support at Geneva to keep them firm with a view to reaching a satisfactory settlement on Indochina.

2. If such a settlement is reached, the UK will be willing to join with the US and other interested countries of Southeast Asia in guaranteeing that settlement.

3. The UK is prepared at once to study secretly with the US the military measures which might be undertaken to defend Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia if the French capitulate at Geneva.

Eden said that this latter US-UK exercise excluded Indochina but would deal with the remainder of the area. I asked Eden if the proposed US-UK secret study excluded all of Indochina or just Vietnam. He replied that it excluded all of Indochina. He went on to say that if the Geneva negotiations did not lead to a settlement the British would of course examine urgently with us what should be done about united action. Mr. Eden said that the British Government felt that the foregoing suggestions were not negative, but positive in character. This course of action in the British eyes was infinitely preferable to intervention in the present battle in Indochina. He repeated that under the British proposal the Communists would be kept guessing and might be led to be fairly reasonable since if they were not, and the conference failed, some other course of action might be adopted by the non-communist states with vital interests in Southeast Asia.

He said that he had two points to add in connection with the foregoing. The British had recently reassessed the situation in Malaya. They had at present 22 battalions (one third UK, one third Malaya, one third Ghurkas) and 100 thousand well armed and trained native policemen. If Indochina collapsed the British felt confident that the situation in Malaya would be in hand. He said there was no parallel between the situations in Indochina and Malaya.

I said to Eden that the British position was most disheartening. I was very skeptical that there was much in it for the French and I doubted that it would be sufficient to keep them in fight. It seemed to me that the prospects of French capitulation were increased in the light of the British position.

Mr. Eden replied “None of us in London believe that intervention in Indochina can do anything”. I repeated my belief that if the French did not have some hope that they would have new allies in the Indochina war that they would be unwilling to continue on themselves.

Mr. Eden said that he had stopped at Orly on his way to Geneva (to pick up Mrs. Eden) and had a brief meeting with Bidault. He said that he had outlined for Mr. Bidault in less detail the position of the British Government and had specifically told him that it was as follows:

1. The UK will give the French all possible diplomatic support at Geneva with a view to aid them reach a satisfactory settlement on Indochina.

2. If such a settlement is reached, the UK will be willing to join with the US and others in some form of guarantee for that settlement.

3. If Geneva fails, the UK will be prepared to join with others to examine urgently the situation to see what best should be done.

I said to Eden that I had some reservations myself about immediate air intervention at Dien Bien Phu because we did not believe Dien Bien Phu could be saved by it, and also because our responsibility would be engaged without a sound and adequate political basis for carrying on military action there. In other words, it would seem to involve us very deeply on an unsound basis. However, if we could not give the French some hope for future support, I did not believe that they would be able to stand the loss of Dien Bien Phu. In this connection, I thought it a serious error to write off the loss of all of Indochina and assume that the rest of Southeast Asia could be held. It would have a vital effect on Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia which was balanced precariously. Its long term result could lead to the loss of Japan. I said I believe the non-communist states having vital interests in the area, which certainly included Britain, should concert now to work out a joint defense and one which would at least attempt to hold the maximum part of Indochina. This would of course require assurances from the French that they would hold on and also a real guarantee from them regarding the full independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. I mentioned that in thinking about the problem of the defense of Southeast Asia, President Eisenhower had commented that to defend the area after the loss of Indochina with its 300 thousand native troops would make the task infinitely more difficult.

While it seemed manifestly impossible to intervene militarily in Indochina before the loss of Dien Bien Phu because of the necessary political arrangements which would have to be made, the French should feel that there was the real prospect of getting more support after the loss of Dien Bien Phu than they had had before. If they did not have such a feeling, I feared that they would throw up their hands in despair.

Mr. Eden said there was obviously a “gap” between the US and UK views but that the British Government had gone just as far as it possibly could. He mentioned that the British Chiefs of Staff looked forward to discussing the situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia with Radford in London on Monday with a view to getting a better understanding of the differing estimates.

I asked Eden whether the British envisaged a partition in Indochina. Mr. Eden replied that this was a possible course which might save a substantial part of the area. He then produced a staff study map of Indochina prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff which Lord Alexander had given him. The map indicated by red lines that virtually all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is under, or subject to, imminent Vietminh control. He said to clear Indochina up the British believe that a strong force must be committed to the Hanoi Delta and that it would have to work gradually outwardly in concentric circles. As it advances, the area it freed of Vietminh control would have to be consolidated by loyal and effective Indochinese administrators. The British believe that this was a “tremendous project involving lots of time and considerable ground forces”. I commented on a broken black line at about the seventeenth or eighteenth parallel which ran from the coast of Vietnam across to the border of Thailand. Mr. Eden indicated that this was a possible line of partition, although such a line might have to be bent a little to the south in Vietnam because of the strong control which the Vietminh had over one area on the coast through which this line ran. (Caccia subsequently confirmed that in a partition solution the UK is thinking about a partition of Vietnam and not also of Laos.)

Mr. Eden reiterated that the UK could give no commitment in advance of Geneva guaranteeing Indochina, or implying its defense. If no settlement were reached, the British would join with the allies to consider urgently what should be done. When he had explained the British position at Orly earlier in the evening, Bidault had not raised any question and had seemed resigned.

I said that I feared the French were being put in a position where they might go for what almost amounted to an unconditional surrender. Mr. Eden simply stated “We think this Indochina business is a very big operation in terms of soldiers, time, and commitments.” I said that there was no reason why we could not develop the Vietnam forces so that they matched in quality and spirit the Vietminh forces which were receiving infinitely less in the way of supplies. This would of course require real independence but that I felt was understood. To develop the Vietnam forces and a real spirit that they were fighting for their independence would take time. Mr. Eden replied that unfortunately the Vietminh forces seemed to have faith, whereas the Vietnam did not.

In conclusion, Mr. Eden said that he realized the British position was not what we would have wished, but that the position outlined was just as far as the UK Government felt it was possible to go.

1. Drafted by Dulles and MacArthur. Conversation was summarized in telegram Dulte 5 from Geneva, Apr. 25, not printed. (751G.5/4–2554) Text of telegram Dulte 5 is printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 388–389.