396.1 GE/6–1254: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
secret
Geneva
, June 12, 1954—1
p.m.
Secto 429. Department pass USUN as Geneva’s 16; repeated Usun 16. Urrutia called on Smith by appointment pursuant to instructions and exchanged views on Korean phase at Geneva and next steps. Following points were made:
- 1.
- Smith outlined proposed tactics for termination, along lines Secto 418.1 Urrutia agreed that this was reasonable and indicated he would support. He had some doubt, however, as to whether we could avoid an additional meeting if Communists asked for one but in any event he said if we have our position agreed, we could break off and issue declaration immediately following such further meeting. Urrutia stressed need for time to bring around public opinion in European and LA countries to recognize fundamental Communist responsibility for failure conference. He also expressed satisfaction with Spaak speech June 11, particularly since it emphasized we prepared to accept new UN commission not necessarily UNCURK, since latter generally discredited.
- 2.
- Smith outlined proposed declaration along lines Secto 424.2 Urrutia reacted favorably. He approved particularly idea that declaration would leave talks in the penumbral state, i.e., not necessarily adjourned with implication that if Communist accepted fundamental principles they could resume. He thought this would help us with Rhee [Page 368] since we could argue conference not fully broken off and therefore no action of other kind should be considered. He thought also it would help us postpone consideration of Korea in UN until Ninth session. In this connection, he suggested proposed report to UN should be addressed specifically to Ninth session. If we announced this intention it would make it easier for us to resist having Korea come up earlier, e.g., if GA meets to consider Thailand appeal.
- 3.
- Urrutia raised question paragraph 62 Korean Armistice Agreement. Smith confirmed that armistice is in effect perpetual and that armistice is really more than merely a military agreement. He said however that it is not necessarily desirable to emphasize this publicly since there are advantages in keeping Communists guessing as to what our intentions in Korea are. Smith expressed personal view that Rhee’s threats to march north are largely bluff.
- 4.
- Urrutia urged necessity for full consultations before Korea comes up in GA again and suggested desirability of having preliminary talks on this aspect take place here before 16 depart. He stressed particularly need for UK-US agreement on positions and timing UN consideration.
Smith