Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

795.00/5–1454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Seoul, May 14, 1954—6 p.m.

1178. Repeated information Tokyo 698, priority Geneva 81. Geneva for Smith USDel; Department for the Secretary; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Geneva 74¹ received too late for appointment President today. Seeing him 11:30 tomorrow at which time plan stress points you suggest and to point out different from previous Plan B in that revision emphasizes broad general plan of elections North and South under UN supervision and leaves details of withdrawal Communist forces to subsequent drafting and offers best possible chance smoking Communists out.

Statements attributed to President in current issues Korean Republic and replies submitted to questions submitted by Reuters’ correspondent indicate rather intransigent attitude President and continuing reversion to general theory armistice was mistake, et cetera.

Reference Geneva 68,² second and third sentences. Reasons stated somewhat cryptic and if possible would appreciate amplification.

Reference Geneva 70,³ believe ROK Geneva delegation encouraging President stand firm, not to make further concessions and that US Geneva delegation concurs unwise to do so until Communists have agreed to UN supervision of elections both North and South.

Therefore think President believes we here are urging on him necessity further concessions which US Geneva delegation do not think necessary.

Reference last sentence Geneva 70 sub-division 1. What are further concessions referred to?

For your information approximately 4,000 polling places all Korea of which about 1,200 in North. In conversation Swedish General Mohn NNSC he believes UNCURK supervision either purely symbolic or would have to set up completely autonomous body several thousand men with own authority and communications system which could function North and South at least month both before and after elections. Even so in view local customs, et cetera, such supervision unlikely be effective in absence prior withdrawal Communist forces. He suggests possibility withdrawal both Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces to far North but we regard this as neither practical or acceptable.

Reference our 1155.⁴ At our suggestion Taylor, CG Eighth Army, has drafted further military comments and forwarded to Hull for transmittal Defense if approved.

For your own confidential use approximately half divisions on front North demilitarized zone are now North Korean in contrast approximately one-sixth at time armistice signed and movements continue.

Am trying keep situation here fluid as possible.

Dean will stay over until after Wilson visit which ends Seoul May 18.⁵

Briggs

1. Dated May 13, p. 264.
2. Same as telegram Secto 182, May 12, p. 257.
3. Dated May 12, not printed, it summarized the conversation described in Young’s memorandum of May 12, p. 256. It was sent to the Department of State as telegram Secto 187 (396.1 GE/5–1254).
4. Dated May 11, p. 244.
5. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson visited several Asian countries in the course of his trip, which dealt basically with questions of regional defense; for documentation, see volume xii.