The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil
In informing Neves de Fontoura foregoing, you shd emphasize representations which we made to Defense that, in Dept’s judgment, Braz Govt was sincere its desire send sizeable ground force Korea and that primary purpose Mission was to prepare public opinion for this move. It appears therefore inherent in situation that failure of Braz [Page 1198] to take such action subsequent visit of Mission wld have most unfav repercussions. In my judgment, therefore, Mission shd only be sent if Vargas Admin intends to make every effort obtain public and Congress support. You shd also remind Neves my understanding that it will be made clear that Braz Mission wld not be fact-finding body and wld be announced as having been formed for purpose of study various ways in which Braz cld contribute to support UN operations Korea.
In view importance Braz participation Korea,3 for both material and psychological reasons, and if you believe it wld be helpful, you may desire raise with Neves question whether both of you shd at proper moment discuss matter with Vargas personally.
Believe receipt by you of Vargas personal assurances this matter important and that Pres Truman’s direct communication Vargas this subj provides you logical basis this suggestion. [Miller.]
- Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, in Japan; U.S. Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, in Korea.↩
- Neither printed.↩
- In a memorandum to the Consultant to the Secretary (Pawley), dated May 31, 1951, commenting on Mr. Pawley’s suggestion that a special commission be despatched to Latin America for the purpose of stimulating offers of ground forces for Korea, Mr. Miller stated in part the following: “In my opinion, the key to the question in South America is Brazil and I believe that if Brazil contributes troops, the chances are that one or more of the other countries will follow suit.” (795B.5/5–3151)↩