In connection with the general condition of United States-Argentine
relations and with special reference to the positions to be taken by
the two countries at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the
American Republics,4 to be held in
Washington beginning March 26, 1951, it was considered desirable by
Assistant Secretary Miller5 to convey certain thoughts and considerations to
President Juan Perón. Inasmuch as former Ambassador Messersmith, a
person who has had a sympathetic and understanding attitude towards
Argentina’s problems, who has had a long and cordial friendship with
President Perón and who has spoken and can speak to the President
with great frankness, was proceeding to Argentina, Mr. Miller
requested him to approach the President. In the letters referred to,
Mr. Miller provided certain background information in addition to
discussions held in Washington.
The reporting officer, in connection with this matter and the three
enclosures, observes that the attitudes and comments made by
President Perón are, by and large, quite favorable to an
understanding of the position of the United States. This reported
attitude is not reflected in other facets of Argentine life,
including the Administration press, the attitude and statements of
his ministers and advisers. A condition previously noted still
exists, namely, that it is difficult to determine whether to believe
the President, who speaks in private, or to judge from the acts of
the press and the government, which speak and act in public. His
apparent unwillingness to face up in public or to condition the
people of Argentina to realities is of paramount importance. It is
believed that following this introduction by Mr. Messersmith
Assistant Secretary Miller, during his projected visit the first
days of March 1951, will find it desirable to endeavor to obtain
precise and categoric definitions of President Perón’s stand.
Enclosure 3
Memorandum
During a conversation which I had the privilege of having with
President Perón on Friday afternoon, February 9, I conveyed to
him the following thoughts and observations which Assistant
Secretary of State Miller had asked me to convey to the
President with respect to the attitudes of the State Department
on the Conference to be held in March of the Foreign Ministers
of the American States.8 I said that
naturally the thinking of the State Department was still in a
preliminary stage as it was preparing for the Conference in
collaboration with other Departments and Agencies of the United
States Government, and that final conclusions on many points
would only be formulated in the period before the Conference
began. Assistant Secretary of State Miller, however, felt that
it might be interesting to President Perón to have the thoughts
of the Department as formulated so far.
[Page 1081]
1. The United States Government intends firmly to pursue its
policy of friendship towards Argentina. There are obstacles and
sources of friction on each side, but the United States
Government is of the firm opinion that through patience and
mutual understanding such obstacles and sources of friction can
be minimized and eventually overcome.
2. The United States Government does not intend in any way to use
the forthcoming Conference of Foreign Ministers to place
Argentina in any embarrassing position but, on the contrary,
hopes to facilitate in the ways within its power the most
complete cooperation on the part of the Argentine
government.
3. The United States Government strongly hopes that each
delegation at the Conference will be able to understand the
problems and views of the other delegations so as to reduce the
possibilities of misunderstanding which may be inherent in the
situation.
4. To facilitate the long-term approximation between the two
governments and countries, the United States Government realizes
that it will be necessary on its part to keep working on the
elimination of the historic prejudices and misconceptions which
exist against Argentina in the United States, and that
conversely it realizes that its success in this effort will
depend so largely on a similar attitude and action on the part
of the Argentine government in eliminating such prejudices and
misconceptions in the Argentine against the United States. The
increasing disposition of the American press to meet Argentina
half way is shown by the favorable reaction in the American
press to such conciliatory gestures as the release of
Balbin.9
5. The United States Government is keeping the people of the
United States fully informed on all phases of its policy with
respect to the extremely critical world situation in which it
and we all find ourselves, and has made and is making every
possible effort to make the fundamental facts of the world
situation and their significance for the United States and the
Western world completely clear so that public opinion is
prepared for and ready to support the acts of the Government.
The United States Government hopes that President Perón and the
Argentine government will take more definite steps to align
themselves publicly and unequivocally with the Western Powers in
the present conflict, and prepare public opinion in the
Argentine for such definite and unequivocal attitudes on the
part of the Argentine government. References to the Third
Position10 are not
understood in the United States and lead to confusion there as
to the real [Page 1082] attitude
of President Perón and the Argentine government and tend towards
alienating public opinion in the United States. With the
position of President Perón and of the Argentine government so
strong internally as it now undoubtedly is, it is difficult to
understand why a more unequivocal stand should not be taken and
why Argentine public opinion should not be more adequately
prepared.
6. As concerns the Conference of Foreign Ministers, the United
States Government is aware that Argentina has difficult internal
political and constitutional problems with regard to the
question of military cooperation outside of the hemisphere, and
in this respect the United States Government has full
understanding and is prepared to ease as much as possible
Argentina’s share at the Conference.
7. The United States Government does not have presently in mind
discussing at the Conference or raising in any way for
discussion at the Conference, anything which will add to the
commitments which the various countries of the Americas have
already solemnly assumed under the Rio Treaty11 and the United Nations Charter.12 What
the United States believes should and must be considered is the
implementation of the commitments already solemnly undertaken by
all the governments concerned. Because of the overwhelming
importance of the situation which we all have to face, and of
the issues which are at stake, and of the Conference taking
clearly defined decisions, we hope that everyone will understand
in all of the American countries the necessity of having the
Conference do more than speech making or passing equivocal
half-hearted or inadequate resolutions or measures. Public
opinion throughout the free world will not be impressed if the
Conference produces merely empty phrases and does not show a
solid determination on the part of all of the American states to
resist Communist aggression.
8. The United States Government is of the opinion that the
Conference will make it clear that the armed forces of each
country can be committed outside of its national territory only
in accordance with the constitution and laws of each sovereign
country. Every country has this same problem and the discussions
in the United States Congress and in the press of the United
States indicate how fully and clearly it is understood and is
being examined. It is nevertheless obvious, in view of the world
crisis, that it is important to take as positive positions in
advance of actual aggression as the constitutional processes of
the various American states permit.
9. In connection with the political and military parts of the
agenda of the Conference, the United States hopes that the
Conference would, [Page 1083]
first of all, adopt a declaration reaffirming the solidarity of
the hemisphere and the declaration to resist aggression, and to
take cooperative measures towards this end. Such declaration
must be strong, unequivocal and adequate.
10. One of the objectives the United States will seek at the
Conference will be that the Ministers give broad policy
directives to the Inter-American Defense Board to undertake
plans to implement our treaty commitments and those of all the
American states with regard to hemisphere defense. These
directives of the Inter-American Defense Board would, of course,
be subject to the approval of the respective governments. In
this respect the United States Government is of the opinion that
hemisphere defense is not merely a passive concept, but includes
defense measures outside of the hemisphere. The action of each
government will depend on its constitutional processes.
11. With respect to the second item of the agenda of the
Conference, the United States plans for its part to place
emphasis on the control of subversive activities rather than
endeavoring to propose legal concepts which would be difficult
for some countries to comply with. Specifically, the United
States Government has no intention at this time of proposing to
or asking other countries to sever diplomatic relations with
Soviet Russia or to outlaw the Communist Party as neither of
these programs are in effect in the United States. The points on
which the United States Government believes it should
concentrate in its proposals will be such matters as control of
travel by subversive elements, protection of strategic
installations and such similar measures. The United States
Government believes that the Conference will discuss the
exchange of information, and on this point the planning of the
United States has not progressed very far at this date. It is
not, however, the present opinion of the United States that a
replica of the Committee for Political Defense13 which met
in Montevideo during the war should be recreated, and its
present thinking is that any multilateral consultation which may
be deemed necessary may probably be done within the framework of
the COAS. In this latter
respect, however, the thinking of the Department of State has
not progressed adequately and the matter is receiving
consideration.
12. With regard to the items on economic matters on the agenda of
the Conference, the United States has not been able to formulate
and conclude its planning. In view of the critical world
situation, the responsibilities which this situation places on
the United States and its economy and production, new agencies
having to do with wartime economic activities, have, as is well
known, been recently established. These agencies are proceeding
with their organization studies, planning and action. The
Department of State in its determination of its attitudes on
economic items which may arise during the Conference [Page 1084] and which can or
should be discussed in the interest of all, must coordinate its
planning with that of existing and new agencies having primary
responsibilities in these matters. By the time that the
Conference meets, or beforehand, it will have been possible for
the State Department to more clearly define the position of the
United States Government.
13. The United States Government believes that one objective
under the economic points of the agenda should be to provide for
the maximizing of the utilization and the most effective
distribution for the defense effort of critical materials. With
regard to price policies, it is hoped that whatever price
control policy is worked out within the United States Government
will take into account the need of consideration of the views of
other countries in trying to operate on the basis of agreement.
The United States Government has in mind very much the
procedures during the last war and certain frictions and wishes
to avoid such unnecessary frictions.
14. In the economic aspects of the agenda a point of special
interest to us as to the other American countries will be the
administration of the allocations and priorities programs in the
United States, which necessarily have to be set up to meet the
imperative needs of defense effort and production. In planning
for the Conference in this respect, the United States Government
and the Department of State have very much in mind the
experience and the problems of the last world war. It is a hope
of the United States Government to be able to work out a fair
and equitable administration of our allocations and priorities
programs and to have its allocations programs so administered as
to recognize the need, not only for maintaining a fair level of
economic activity in the American states, but also so far as the
imperative exigencies of the situation permit, a reasonable
level of economic expansion.
I informed President Perón that I considered it a privilege on
the part of the Department of State and Assistant Secretary of
State Miller to convey the foregoing to him. It would be
appreciated by him that these were preliminary thoughts of the
Department of State and that its final plans for the meeting had
not yet been made, as this was obviously impossible because of
the time-consuming nature of the consideration and discussions
which had to take place within the Government in order to
prepare for this important meeting. I said that I believed,
however, that the foregoing represented the thinking of the
Department of State at this time, I said that Assistant
Secretary of State Miller, as he knew, was planning to make a
short visit to several of the American countries before the
meeting, and around the end of February, and that he would
undoubtedly, when he arrived in Buenos Aires, and where the
President had been so kind as to indicate he would be glad to
see him, be able to elucidate on the foregoing [Page 1085] points and to discuss with the
President further thinking of the United States Government and
the Department of State with respect to the Conference, as it
had developed in the interval.
