320/1–1252: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)1
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Gadel 755. Re Membership (Delga 992, Jan 12): and Hyde-Popper telecon Jan 18.2
1. We have had difficulty in reaching firm position on attitude toward Sov Res on membership [in the Security Council] because of complex of interests and factors involved. On one hand, we strongly desire admission of Italy and other qualified applicants and we realize Sov Res appears offer only present hope their admission. On other hand, if we were to give benevolent abstention to Sov Res, we wld create new problems arising from fol considerations (over and above cur insistence since 1946 on treating each application separately on merits):
- a.
- We cld not adequately explain to Amer public why we gave tacit approval proposal involving admission Sov satellites, including Hungary, especially at this time.
- b.
- Sov omnibus Res omits ROK. How cld we give tacit approval to Res which includes MPR, shadowy “state” whose independent existence cannot be demonstrated, while Res omits state (ROK) functioning as independent entity under UN Comm Observation and fighting together with UN repel aggression against it? Failure include ROK wld have most serious effect in Korea.
- c.
- We attach great importance Japan’s admittance. Adoption Sov Res and SC approval Sov applicants wld deprive us future bargaining power re Japan and others we favor.
- d.
- If Sov Res approved by SC, there is risk some or all Sov applicants wld be admitted by GA either this or future sessions.
2. Conclusion we reach is that US must oppose Sov Res although we wld not cast veto but wld abstain if res obtained seven affirmative votes. Problem is to minimize adverse Ital reaction while opposing [Page 432] Res in way which cannot be misunderstood. Recent Del reports Neth, Greece, UK either opposed or disinclined support when coupled with expected Chi opposition and our own, indicate Res will not receive seven votes.
3. Del shld therefore inform other SC members US intends speak in SC in opposition Sov Res and plans vote against; in unlikely event Res receives seven votes we will abstain; US statement will make it clear in SC that if any such Res shld pass we wld insist in GA on case-by-case consideration in which we wld oppose applicants we believed unqualified.
4. UK and Fr shld be approached first for their reactions. Del shld then in frank explanation to Guidotti explain as appropriate reasons we are opposed to Sov Res. On basis Del’s best info re position other members SC, Del shld express view Guidotti that admission by means Sov Res is not feasible and that further consideration this possibility not worthwhile. Del shld make clear to Guidotti we have given most sympathetic consideration his views (Delga 799, Dec 22) but that for reasons he will understand we cannot give our tacit approval to proposition. Del shld leave no doubt in Guidotti’s mind that (1) we are opposed to Sov Res and (2) if as we anticipate Sov Res wld not obtain seven affirmative votes we wld cast negative vote.
5. Consult UK, Fr, Italy and others re desirability disposing of Sov Res by demanding separate vote on each applicant. If it appears desirable and feasible Del shld in its discretion seek to apply this procedure.
6. Re Fr Res we believe best tactic wld be favor early vote in SC on Fr Res unless Itals prefer latter not be put to vote. If USSR shld veto Fr Res solely on non-Charter grounds SC or GA cld request ICJ for opinion of effect of Sov negative vote (Gadel 473). Tactics shld be worked out in consultation Itals and other Dels. If Itals oppose putting Fr Res to vote Del shld report their views Dept.
7. No aspects membership question discussed during US–UK talks.3