Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files

United States Delegation Position Paper

confidential
US/A/3379

[Paris,] November 12, 1951.

Admission of New Members

the problem

The question of the admission of new members and related matters will be considered by the General Assembly under several agenda items. The Fourth Committee has on its agenda the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council, an issue which directly involves the question of Italian membership in the United Nations (see position paper SD/A/C.4/90).¹ Furthermore, Peru has submitted an item for the supplementary agenda of the Assembly entitled “Admission of New Members: Right of Candidate States to Present Proof of the Conditions Required under Article 4 of the Charter” (A/1887 Rev. 1) and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have also requested the inclusion on the supplementary agenda of an item called “Admission of New Members” (A/1899). These items will in all probability be taken up by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. In connection with the membership question, arrangements providing for non-member participation in the General Assembly may arise if the present membership stalemate continues.

What should be the position of the United States concerning the question of the admission of new members and possible arrangements for non-member participation in the General Assembly?

recommendations

1. The United States Delegation should indicate that the United States continues to support strongly the admission of the nine qualified applicants, the admission of which has been blocked by the Soviet veto; and that the United States looks forward to the time when other countries which are qualified for membership but which have not yet applied will also be admitted.

2. At the same time, the Delegation should take the position that there are reasons for handling the question of Italy’s admission as a special case in view of Italy’s role as a state administering a trust territory under the United Nations. The Delegation should, if practicable, arrange for consideration of the question of Italian membership by the Fourth Committee at the beginning of the session under the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council, and should sponsor or support a resolution in that Committee by which the General Assembly would request the Security Council to reconsider Italy’s application as a special case. If this course does not appear feasible, the United States may support Security Council reconsideration of Italy’s application as a special case without prior consideration in the Assembly. If one of these courses is decided upon, the Delegation should seek to have the Ad Hoc Political Committee delay consideration of the membership question until separate action is taken on Italy.

Before deciding on either of these steps, the Delegation should consult closely with other United Nations Members, particularly the United Kingdom and France, and with Italy. Neither course should be pursued by the Delegation unless agreed to by the Italian Government.

3. If Security Council reconsideration of other applications should follow reconsideration of Italy’s application, the United States should support the admission of the non-Soviet applicants and oppose the admission of the Soviet applicants to whose admission the United States objects on Charter grounds. The United States should not accept a Soviet omnibus proposal requiring our consent to the admission of one or more Soviet applicants in return for Soviet agreement to admit Italy and possibly other non-Soviet applicants and should consult the Department if such a proposal is made.

4. The United States Delegation should indicate its willingness to consider any proposal to achieve the admission of qualified states which can reasonably be found to be consistent with the Charter. However, the Delegation should point out the basic Charter difficulties in the plans which have recently been proposed by Italy and Peru, and should vote against these plans unless they have the strong support of the majority of United Nations Members, in which case the Delegation should consult the Department.

5. If efforts to obtain the admission of Italy fail, the United States Delegation should support an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter to give Italy full voting rights in the Trusteeship Council provided this course is desired by the Italians (see position paper, SD/A/C.4/90), and should also consult with the Italians and with other United Nations Members with a view to exploring the possibility of giving Italy the right to participate in the main committees of the General Assembly if the Italians want such participation. The present assumption is that such participation in the committees would be without vote. The Delegation may also support such arrangements for other qualified applicants if they are interested.

comment

1. The United States has consistently expressed the view that the objective of a universal United Nations membership should be achieved as rapidly as states meet the qualifications for membership under the Charter. It has supported, and continues to support strongly, the admission of the nine non-Soviet applicants, (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal), which the overwhelming majority of United Nations Members considers qualified but which have been excluded from membership by the veto of the Soviet Union. It looks forward to the time when other countries qualified for membership will also be admitted. The United States has declared that it does not intend to permit its vote in the Security Council to prevent the admission to membership of any applicant which has received seven affirmative votes in the Security Council and has repeatedly requested the Soviet Union to refrain from exercising its veto over membership applications.

The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the admission of the five Soviet applicants (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, “Mongolian People’s Republic” and Rumania) because of its strong objections to their admission on Charter grounds. Almost all the members of the Security Council and the General Assembly have likewise been unable to support their admission. These applicants have been giving at least moral support to the aggression in Korea. Some have engaged in aggressive acts in the Balkans. Three of them have flouted the recommendations of the Assembly with respect to peace treaty obligations on human rights and have disregarded the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on their peaceful settlement obligations under these same treaties. One applicant, Outer Mongolia, has never demonstrated that it has the capacity to play the normal role of a state in the international community.

The Security Council has not reconsidered the pending applications since 1949 because it has been evident that reconsideration would achieve no useful purpose. The United States favors reconsideration of the applications of qualified candidates by the Security Council whenever there is a reasonable chance of favorable action. However, general reconsideration at this time would almost certainly result in the usual Soviet vetoes and perhaps in another Soviet omnibus proposal which the United States could not accept.

2. At the same time, the United States believes that there are reasons for reconsideration of Italy’s application as a separate case. In addition to possessing the full qualifications for admission, Italy has trusteeship responsibilities which it cannot effectively discharge without full voting participation in the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. The United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, recently reaffirmed “its determination to make every effort to secure Italy’s membership in the United Nations,” and the President has stated that we “intend to keep on working for the admission of Italy.” Although the Soviet Union has indicated that it will agree to Italy’s admission only if Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania are admitted and if Italy withdraws from NATO, conditions unacceptable to the United States, it is believed that there is still an outside chance that the Soviet Union might not veto if the case is handled effectively as a special case. At the same time, it must be realized that, as Italian representatives have pointed out, another Soviet veto might have unfortunate repercussions within Italy in that it would highlight our impotence to obtain its admission.

The Fourth Committee has on its agenda the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council. In the case of Italy, full participation in the Council could be achieved only through membership in the United Nations or through an amendment to Article 86 of the Charter. Since United Nations membership is obviously the only fully satisfactory solution, a proposal could appropriately be made in the Fourth Committee that steps be taken at once in the Security Council to admit Italy to United Nations membership, It could be argued that, above and beyond the declarations of the General Assembly since 1947 that Italy is fully qualified for admission, the General Assembly has granted, and Italy has accepted, special United Nations responsibilities in connection with the operation of the trusteeship system. Italy is seriously handicapped in discharging these responsibilities if it does not have full voting participation in the Trusteeship Council, in the General Assembly, under whose general supervision the Trusteeship Council operates, and perhaps in other United Nations bodies. If this plan does not appear feasible, the Security Council might reconsider Italy’s application as a special case without prior General Assembly action. Whichever of the above procedures may be decided upon should be taken early in the session before discussion of the general membership question arises in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, in order not to prejudice efforts to handle Italy as a special case. Early action would also be desirable to permit other steps to be taken if the Soviet Union should block Italy’s admission.

Before deciding on one of the above courses, consultation with other United Nations members and with Italy is necessary. Italy may prefer that neither course be taken. If Italy should persist in opposing Security Council reconsideration, the Delegation should not insist upon either of the above courses.

3. If the Italian application should be dealt with separately in the Security Council, it is probable that reconsideration of other applications will follow. In this event, the United States should, of course, give strong support to the admission of the non-Soviet applicants and oppose the admission of the Soviet applicants to whose admission the United States objects on Charter grounds. It should not accept a Soviet omnibus proposal requiring our consent to the admission of one or more Soviet applicants in return for Soviet agreement to admit Italy and possibly other non-Soviet applicants, and should consult the Department in the event that such a proposal is made.

4. Plans to circumvent the Soviet veto of membership applications have recently been proposed by Italy and Peru, and will undobutedly be considered by the Assembly in connection with Italy’s application and the general membership question. These plans are likely to receive the strong support of Latin American and other countries. However, in the opinion of the United States, the proposals present basic Charter difficulties, difficulties which have prevented us from making similar proposals in the past. While the United States is in full sympathy with the objectives of these plans and is willing to consider proposals to achieve the admission of the qualified applicants which can reasonably be found to be consistent with the Charter, it is believed that the effect of endorsement of the proposals of Italy or Peru would be to disregard our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of Italy, as pointed out in an Aide-Mémoire handed to the Secretary at Ottawa, maintains that since the Soviet Union has never questioned Italy’s qualifications for membership, its vetoes of Security Council recommendations to admit Italy are null and void; and that the General Assembly should therefore disregard the Soviet vetoes and consider action to admit Italy. Aside from the practical consideration that the Soviet Union could again raise the question of Italian membership in the Security Council and advance alleged Charter grounds, we see basic Charter difficulties in the action suggested. In an advisory opinion of March 3, 1950, the International Court of Justice concluded that under the Charter, the General Assembly cannot admit a state to membership when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission either because of the failure of a candidate to obtain the required majority or because of the negative vote of a permanent member. Further, while there is no doubt that the Soviet vetoes of Italy’s application have not been based on Charter grounds and have not been in accordance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 28, 1948, it does not follow, and the Court has never suggested, that these vetoes are therefore null and void. Nor does it follow that the General Assembly can take action implying that these vetoes are ineffective.

With respect to the Peruvian agenda item, this probably involves a plan Belaunde (Peru) discussed earlier with USUN under which the General Assembly would request that applicants be permitted to present to the Security Council proof of their qualifications for membership. If there was then a threat of a veto, the Assembly would request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to the value of the proof. Assuming a favorable opinion by the Court, the Security Council, in Belaunde’s opinion, would have to apply strictly the sense of Article 4 and no member could veto the application.

The United States would certainly have no objection to the suggestion that a candidate be permitted to present its own case for admission. Such a procedure would sharpen the issues involved and place the onus squarely on the USSR. However, there are two basic difficulties in the proposal for an advisory opinion of the court. First, since an advisory opinion is not binding, a permanent member could still veto. Second, it is very doubtful that the Court would consider itself competent to determine whether an applicant is qualified, since the Court itself has previously stated that of the factors to be taken into account in considering conditions laid down in Article 4, “no relevant political factor—that is to say, none connected with the conditions of admission—is excluded.”

Argentina appears to be studying a proposal under which the General Assembly would request the Security Council to reconsider in a spirit of compromise the various applications and submit them to the General Assembly for the will of the majority of the United Nations Members. Apparently, it is also studying a procedural maneuver analogous to that for overriding a double veto. (See memorandum of conversation US/A/3332.)² If this proposal contemplates referral of applications to the Assembly without Security Council recommendations thereon, the plan would be inconsistent with Article 4 of the Charter. With regard to the procedural maneuver, the President of the Security Council could hardly declare that a Security Council decision on a membership application is procedural in view of the fact that a decision on membership has always been assumed to be substantive. This step would go far beyond what the United States or other permanent members have ever conceived and might even open the way to practical elimination of the veto from decisions to which it has incontestably applied, a result which would be unacceptable to any permanent member, including the United States.

5. The question of an amendment to Article 86 to give Italy membership in the Trusteeship Council in the event that it is not admitted to the United Nations is dealt with in detail in the position paper on the question of the full participation of Italy in the work of the Trusteeship Council (SD/A/C.4/90).

If Italy is not admitted to the United Nations, the General Assembly may consider some arrangement for participation by Italy in the General Assembly, presumably without the right to vote, pending its admission to membership. Such an arrangement might also be considered for other interested qualified applicants whose admission has been blocked by the Soviet veto. Italy has thus far indicated no desire for this privilege which it apparently regards as “second class membership.” However, it may be that Italy might become interested if efforts to obtain its admission fail and if a concrete proposal is presented.

There are various possible alternatives. Arrangements under which non-member states qualified for admission might be permitted to participate in the committees:

(1) The Assembly might adopt a resolution providing that, upon specific request therefor by a non-member state, the Assembly might grant the state a general privilege of participating, presumably without voting rights, in committees on which all members are represented. Participation might include speaking under the same rules as members on any matter before the committee, and of making proposals on matters of substance but not of procedure. More limited participation might involve the presentation of views on the substance of each item when expressly permitted by the committee.

(2) The Assembly might adopt a general resolution authorizing the committees to grant participation in their proceedings by non-member states, leaving the exact scope of participation to be determined by the committee in each case.

(3) As an alternative to any general arrangement, the United States might, more liberally than heretofore, support in each committee the grant of participation in that committee to a non-member state in the discussion of particular matters in which the state was interested.

The Delegation will note that representatives or observers participating under such provisions in proceedings taking place in the United States would not be entitled to full diplomatic privileges and immunities, which, under the Headquarters Agreement, are available only to representatives of Members.

1. Doc. SD/A/C.4/90, October 19, 1951 is not printed. See Doc. SD/A/C.4/90/Rev. 1, November 14, p. 383.
2. This is a memorandum of a conversation on October 11 between John C. Dreier, U.S. representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, and Rodolfo Muñoz, Acting Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations, at New York, not printed. Dreier went to Paris as a member of the U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff and Muñoz as Vice-Chairman of the Argentine Delegation.