Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159

Briefing Memorandum for the Secretary of State, For Use at the Washington Tripartite Ministerial Talks, September 1951

secret
WFM T–10/3b

[Washington,] August 31, 1951.

Chinese Representation in the UN

problem

To reach an understanding with the UK and France concerning the handling of the Chinese representation question in the UN, and in particular at the coming session of the GA.¹

united states objective

To obtain UK-French agreement to support postponement of consideration of the Chinese representation issue in the GA and all other UN bodies in order to avoid any change in Chinese representation in UN bodies.

position of uk and france

Under the “moratorium” arrangement agreed upon last May, the U.S. and UK have jointly supported motions to postpone consideration of the Chinese representation issue. The UK bases its support of these motions on the Chinese Communist aggression. It has recently informed us that in the event of an armistice it would not “immediately” abandon the moratorium arrangement. However, UK statements of this position made under instructions at current UN meetings obviously contemplate early abandonment of postponement and support for the seating of the Chinese Communists if an armistice eventuates.

France, which has not recognized the Chinese Communists, has generally supported the U.S. position on the Chinese representation issue. However, this position has not appeared to be very firmly maintained and France might be strongly tempted to vote to admit the Chinese Communists if there were a prospect of a “Kaesong in Indochina”.

united states position to be presented to other governments

1. We consider it imperative that the Chinese Communists should not be seated in the UN and that National Government representatives continue to sit. The following are among the reasons for this position:

• a. The UK and France must be aware of the effect which the seating of the Chinese Communists in any UN body would have on the attitude of U.S. public opinion toward the UN and toward cooperation with countries supporting the Chinese Communists.
• b. Under the impact of the heavy sacrifices of the Korean war, the American people would find it hard to separate the elements of approval and disapproval from such issues as recognition and seating in the UN whatever the theoretical position. They would not understand any active effort to accommodate Peiping when that regime has required so much from us in resisting a brutal aggression.
• c. Willingness to discuss an armistice when the military situation is not favorable is no indication of any fundamental change in Chinese Communist aggressive policies; indications are quite the reverse.
• d. Seating the Chinese Communists in the near future would have the appearance of rewarding aggression and would lessen respect for the UN, would reduce the will to resist on the part of Southeast Asian states, and would substitute an unfriendly voice for a friendly one in the UN Councils.
• e. The Chinese Communists would hail their seating in the UN not as a means of helping the world community but as a political victory for their regime.
• f. Titoism is not necessarily produced by increased contact with the non-Soviet bloc but rather by internal dissensions within the Communist family.
• g. Indications are that the Chinese Communists would use their seat in the UN for accentuating tensions, not easing them. UK recognition, for example, has not led to any appreciable easing of Chinese-UK relations. …

2. A new public divergence of policy between the US, UK and France on this issue would be a serious development.

3. Because of the basic difference of views between the U.S. and the UK, it is essential that agreement be reached on some procedural device by which a vote on the substance can be avoided. Accordingly, the U.S. suggests that the three governments agree to continue a policy of postponement, leaving the delegates of the three Governments to the GA and other UN bodies to work out the necessary procedural steps to achieve this result.

4. The U.S. would oppose any attempt to link the question of Chinese representation in the UN with discussions regarding Korea.

If no armistice is included, the “moratorium” arrangement with the UK will presumably continue in effect. The UK is now apparently paving the way for a termination of it in case an armistice is concluded. An armistice would also lead to increased pressure in the GA by other UN members to seat the Chinese Communists.

In a resolution of December 14, 1950, the GA recommended inter alia that other UN bodies “take into account” the GA’s attitude on representation controversies. This resolution is likely to be an obstacle to the gradual acceptance, organ by organ, of the Chinese Communists. The UK has asked us to refrain from citing it in support of the joint postponement policy. We agreed to this up to the time of the GA. At the next GA the US and UK should agree upon the above postponement policy which would leave the representative of the National Government in the Chinese seat. If after such action has been taken by the GA the substance of this issue is put to the vote in other UN bodies, we shall argue strongly on the basis of the December 14 resolution that other bodies should be guided by the attitude of the GA (in which our views are more likely to prevail than in smaller bodies).

Some formula for continuance of the postponement policy is the only means of avoiding a sharp open divergence of attitude between ourselves and the UK. “Postponement” would have to mean, as before, that the representatives of the National Government would be seated.²

1. The Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in Paris on November 6.
2. A “Supplement” to this briefing memorandum incorporated the “Views of the Embassy in London on Probable British Attitudes on Subjects to be Discussed in the Washington Foreign Ministers’ Meetings”. It read in part: “The Foreign Secretary will probably express the hope that we would be willing to engage in multilateral talks with the Chinese Communists and, if real progress is made, we reaffirm our previous stand that we would not veto their UN membership.” (CFM Files, Lot M 88, Box 159)