310.2/8–1751: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of Statehi
1069. Ref Deptel 1027, Aug. 16.1 Emb officer in recent conversations with Baeyens, director Fr [ FE?] affairs FonOff,2 and other FonOff officials dealing with FE affairs has raised question Fr attitude toward recognition Chi-Commie regime and its entry into UN. There has been no indication that Fr FonOff wld favor either of these two courses. However, there is such desperate casting around for solution in Indochina that, if Kaesong talks shld end successfully, there wld be considerable support in Fr polit circles for negotiations to settle all FE problems in hope that somehow a solution for the seemingly [Page 260] never-ending IC question might be found in this context. If such negotiations were begun, Fr might well tend to turn more to Brit position in FE largely in hope IC problem wld thus be solved. We do not find any illusions on this score among FonOff officials but polit pressure among all except Gaullists might well build up along these lines.
The foregoing stems in part from somewhat gloomy reaction toward IC itself. We are reliably informed that Le Tourneau accepted post Min Assoc States in new cabinet with greatest reluctance and only after much pressure, preferring be named Min Overseas France, post he held prior to formation Ministry Assoc States. Explanation is that no one sees solution for IC, where France continues pour out men and money, and that, while De Lattre has done excellent job, he continues ask for more men and money with no end in sight. Informant added for these reasons no one wanted serve as Min Assoc States.
It is our gen impression that not even FonOff officials dealing directly with problems, much less Fr officials in gen, have thought through all of various FE problems which might suddenly confront Fr Govt in event successful conclusion Kaesong talks. This, of course, stems in part from long period of elections and delay in formation new govt. In recent conversations with various FonOff officials, we have encountered little optimism with regard to outcome Korean armistice negotiations. There seems to be gen opinion that enemy may be marking time in preparation for new offensive and has no real desire for genuine armistice. One official points to reports (from Tokyo via Chi Govt sources) of build-up of Commie strength in planes and tanks and says this may presage all-out Commie attack at moment to be decided upon by latter. FonOff officials generally view Kaesong talks as part of Soviet peace offensive and as related to Japanese peace treaty conf. They suggest possibility talks may continue until outcome conf Becomes clear and then be broken off with Sov effort maintain maximum propaganda advantage. One official goes so far as to suggest as personal opinion, not based on any specific intelligence, possibility of Sov or Soviet-backed attack on Japan, if peace treaty signed at San Francisco. FonOff officials are not optimistic re possibilities polit settlement in FE, some of them pointing out that US position on Formosa prevents any settlement that problem and that Fr Govt has nothing to offer Commies in return for guarantee against intervention in IC.
Foregoing represents a gen composite of views of FonOff officials with whom we have discussed these questions and tendency on part of FonOff officials is to say that they are expressing their personal views rather than Fr Govt policy. The exception has been with respect to question of recognition Chi-Commie regime and its entry in the UN where Baeyens himself has specifically stated there has been no change [Page 261] in Fr Govt position re these questions and that he knows of no indications of possible change. As stated above, however, possibility must be considered of polit pressure building up for change Fr position in this regard in event Kaesong talks successfully concluded and negotiations begun for over-all FE settlement.
Sent Dept 1069, rptd info London 277.