740.5/7–1250
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Dean: The European reaction to the steps we are taking in Korea continues to be excellent. However, it is plain that we are in for a long hard job there, and as time goes on it is possible that [Page 131] some second-thoughts may develop among certain classes in the STAT countries. To keep up the moral “lift” that presently exists, I believe we should recognize the added importance of timely substantive achievements in the NAT organization. I shall be delighted to see Chuck Spofford arrive.
There are two areas for action within the NAT in which we—the United States—have been slow in facing the issues and moving. They concern the establishment within the mutual defense structure of specific command relationships in Europe, and American involvement therein, and the question of commitments of U.S. forces planned to be made available to NAT defense in case of an emergency. Until we are prepared to state our intentions more completely in regard to these two matters, perhaps to the extent of accepting command commitments both for planning and in case of war, and to indicate we intend to put some additional ground troops and perhaps tactical air on the continent in case of trouble, there will continue to be, I believe, slowness and hesitation on the part of the NATO to move forward towards the solution of several important problems. One specific result will be a continuation of the curious, unnecessary and somewhat detrimental schizophrenia which exists as between the NAT and Western Union.
There are three specific objectives which I feel we should be reaching for as rapidly as possible. They are in effect a chain of objectives which must be achieved progressively. They are:
- (1)
- Firstly, genuine merging of the military side of Western Union with the Western European Regional group of the NATO. This must be done to give real physical strength to this geographical area in implementation of the plans and command structure on which WU has made considerable progress. This physical strength requires full U.S. participation in the W.E. Regional group of the NATO.
- (2)
- Secondly, the correction of grievous deficiencies in the command and general staff setup of the French armed forces. All NAT planning must place great dependence on French forces, so something must be done to assure that there is established an adequate French high command capable of operating the French armed forces effectively in an emergency. When full U.S. participation in the W.E. Regional group takes place, and the French command deficiencies are corrected, it will then be possible to build real strength in Western Europe and the way will be paved for reaching our third objective.
- (3)
- The third objective is the utilization of the military potential of Germany.
Trying to put these matters together in a logical sequence, it seems to me that if we join up to the hilt in the WU–NAT Western European group, which implies a preparedness on our part to make the commitments I mentioned earlier regarding participation in command and in furnishing troops, we then provide the basis for tackling the delicate French problem. If we can persuade the French to put their [Page 132] military house in order—and they do—we then will have got the framework in which real Western European military strength can be developed. And when that has been substantially achieved and actual strength has been developed—and not until then—we will be in a position to consider the rearming of Western Germany.
All of this pattern, I believe, hinges on our taking the plunge regarding U.S. commitments. Recently I sent you a paper1 given to me by Field Marshal Montgomery in which he very emphatically stated his views on the urgent necessity of improving the real capabilities of W.U. In my letter1 to you at the time I pointed out that he had expressed personally to me his belief that, until an American is placed in an authoritative position within the command relationships in the Western European group in NATO, it is unlikely that any real military progress can be expected.
We must recognize that entering actively into the military planning and the command arrangements of Western Europe means ultimately placing a U.S. officer in a position of command there. Both the French and the British have repeatedly stated this as a prerequisite to successful military planning in Western Europe. George Perkins has told me of his feeling that our Joint Chiefs of Staff have been somewhat loath to face this issue. Perhaps they are motivated by a feeling of constitutional restraint and again perhaps they are really having difficulty in facing their own internal command arrangements under “Unification.” At any rate, I feel that they can no longer delay in taking a cold and objective look at the apparent need for us to accept our appropriate role militarily in the Western European Regional group of the NATO.
You might want to show a copy of this letter to Averell Harriman2 with the thought in mind that this may be the type of problem he can get his teeth into. Chuck Spofford would be interested too because I think he will find when he gets over here that much of his usefulness will depend on how vigorously the U.S. pushes ahead in its willingness to accept the onerous burdens of leadership as well as the easier ones, especially in the tense situation of the present. I recognize the difficulty in presenting this subject to Defense; however, I feel that we must work much more urgently to put reality into the NATO, and now seems to be the time to start.
You may consider that this letter should go directly into the waste paper basket. If so, I understand completely.