Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/7–550: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

top secret
priority

Washington, July 8, 1950—4 p. m.

117. London for Ambassador Douglas. Urtel 49, July 5.¹ Fol is State–Defense agreed message being sent Mr. Howard by Munitions Board.

“This is a State–Defense message for Mr. Howard.

We agreed special significance our tone and attitude during Copenhagen MPSB mtg which is first NAT gathering since Korean affair broke (London’s tel 110 Jul 6²) and that fol shld be used as guidance.

A. We must dispel feeling in Eur which followed initial relief over our vigorous action in Korea that we may now become overcommitted in Far East and overlook continued primary importance Eur in struggle against communism. With this in mind you shld take every opportunity to indicate that as result Korean situation US leadership will be even more vigorous and confident, with a view to instilling resolve translate immed MPSB work from necessary initial phase of plans and theory into one of concrete accomplishments. While we realize broad accomplishments depend on work other NAT agencies we feel PWS’s reports for mtg overstress these obstacles to further progress. We feel you shld emphasize urgent need for MPSB do all possible find ways and means quickly and economically to fulfill requirements for necessary weapons and equipment and move ahead in fruitful areas, even if limited, where immed progress is possible. We shld be careful that discussion of current production programs be such that it cannot be construed as either direct or indirect acceptance of present level def expenditures all NAT nations as ceilings. Keynote shld be need for greater effort by all. You shld indicate that US is ready to do its full part in cooperative effort.

B. Re specific European fear that Korea will have adverse effect on MDA Title one programs³ you may unofficially indicate that Exec Branch Govt does not anticipate any overall cutback in MDAP for Eur and in fact if anything some strengthening of it may be result of Korean incident.

C. FYI only. US position re MDAP deliveries to Title I countries is that we shld be careful avoid making commitments which we cannot keep; therefore we must recognize that time of end item deliveries to Title one countries may be affected. Too soon yet be sure of this and extent thereof.

D. We must be careful avoid taking attitudes which cld encourage our Eur Allies to relax their own efforts in belief that US ‘now thoroughlv alarmed’ and will make entire addl finan and econ effort required to build up collective security.”

Please pass Bonesteel, Breithut and Vass.⁴

Acheson

1. Telegram from Douglas, not printed, in which he expressed concern over the pessimistic note he sensed in reading the documents prepared for the NAT MPSB meeting scheduled for July 12. He suggested that in view of the heightened consciousness in Europe of the importance of mutual defense resulting from the Korean affair (see volume vii), the MPSB meeting “might provide opportunity for US leadership to ginger up NATO.” (740.5/7–550)
2. Telegram concerning the MPSB meeting in Copenhagen, not printed; 740.5/7–650.
3. Programs involving NATO nations. Greece and Turkey were referred to as Title II countries, and Iran, the Philippines, Korea, and the general area of China were designated as Title III countries.
4. Laurence C. Vass of the Office of European Regional Affairs. Vass and Breithut were scheduled to attend the MPSB meeting.