The attached memorandum contains the summary of the main points
covered in the US–UK talks which General Bradley and I conducted
with Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder.
I attach also the summary notes made by Mr. Yost which cover the
matters in greater detail but which it is probably unnecessary for
you to take the time to read unless you wish to do so.3
The following are my conclusions concerning the utility of the talks,
the most important points which emerged, and the further steps along
the same lines which remain to be taken.
I. Utility of the Talks
These talks were the latest in a series of similar exploratory
conversations. The talks in 1947 and 1949 dealt with the Middle
East.4 The
talks in London in May of this year covered Europe, the Middle East
and the Far East including the Pacific area. The talks in London
resulted in a common conclusion concerning the identity of interest
of the U.S. and the U.K. generally throughout the world. The
corollary of this conclusion was the view that our policies should
be coordinated so far as possible. The talks just concluded in
Washington have carried this a step further. We have identified the
chief danger spots and have examined them in the light of the Korean
aggression. These talks did not reach the point of agreed common
plans of action in specific situations but laid the groundwork for
such joint planning.
II. Most Important Points Which
Emerged
It was clear that a principal British preoccupation was that the
United States should not become so committed in the Far East as to
weaken its ability to contribute to the defense of Europe and to the
Middle East. While we pointed to the importance of our strategic
interests in the Pacific area, it was common ground that at this
juncture we would both wish to avoid extensive commitment of forces
in the Far East. With this end in view we shared the opinion that in
so far as possible involvements with the Chinese Communists should
be localized. We pointed out, however, how difficult this might be
under certain circumstances. In our opinion the UK underestimates
the closeness of the Moscow–Peiping axis. They have not previously
appreciated the extent to which overt Chinese Communist aggression
would be another indication of an overall Soviet plan. Our
exposition
[Page 1659]
on this point
and especially in regard to Formosa gave the British considerable
satisfaction. The British told us that they would be unable to
defend Hong Kong against a full-scale communist attack. They pointed
to the serious military consequences of the loss of Hong Kong in
case of general conflict in the Far East but they did not suggest
that we would be in a position to give them support in any way which
would affect the military outcome. It seemed to me that they were in
a frame of mind to swallow the loss of Hong Kong without any
vigorous reaction. It was only under the pressure of questioning
that they finally admitted that this event might involve them in a
real state of war with the Chinese Communists. It was implicitly
understood that we did not expect their assistance in the defense of
Formosa.
Regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty, General Bradley gave them a very
frank description of the difficulties which the U.S. Joint Chiefs
had faced in considering the terms of a treaty but indicated that
their doubts had now been resolved and that it was merely a
preoccupation with the immediate problems of Korea which now delayed
moving forward to the conclusion of a treaty. General Bradley told
me privately that he thought it would be possible forthwith to reach
a sufficient degree of agreement between State and Defense to make
it possible to proceed with plans for international consultations
and the eventual peace conference.
The U.K. representatives at first shied away from a reiteration of
the previous understanding that they had the “primary
responsibility” in this area. A frank discussion, however, swept
away the semantic difficulty of defining the term “primary
responsibility” and they agreed that this was an area in which we
should look to them to take the initiative in regard to any steps
which needed to be carried out. At the same time they registered the
hope that we would study the question whether we could not give them
more support in case of need. It was interesting to me that both
Lord Tedder and General Bradley believed that the Israeli army would
be the most effective force south of Turkey which could be utilized
for delaying action.
The British placed the Berlin situation at the top of their list of
danger spots. Although they originally included Western Germany in
the same category (which led me to think that they might be arguing
here in favor of their general stand on German rearmament), they
[Page 1660]
later scaled down their
estimate on Western Germany and did not continue to press the
question of German rearmament when we pointed to the current
discussion of the High Commissioners on the matter of increasing the
German police.5
General Bradley and Lord Tedder were agreed that the Standing Group
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would in case of war be
the most suitable equivalent of the Combined Staff during World War
II.
III. Further Steps To Be
Taken
The last page of the attached Agreed Memorandum on the talks lists
eight actions to be recommended. The appropriate officers of the
Department will move forward with plans for the consideration and
implementation of these recommendations. It seems to me important
that we should move forward at once to the point of agreeing upon
detailed plans of action in case of further aggression by satellites
or by Soviet forces in the various situations indicated particularly
in points 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The situation is certainly sufficiently
critical to necessitate our being ready to act almost
instantaneously in the event of further Soviet aggression. It is
highly desirable that the action we take be joint or common action
with the U.K. It seems to me the time has passed for being content
with general statements about “common action” and “appeal to the
Security Council.” General Bradley did not hesitate to discuss the
question of the kind of machinery we would need as an equivalent to
the Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II; it would seem to me
that combined advance planning on detailed actions is equally
feasible and necessary. In this connection it may be worth noting
that Lord Tedder repeatedly pressed for frank exchange of
information between our military mission in Turkey and their
military attachés. He indicated that our officers are advising the
Turks on strategic plans but the British, while given a primary
responsibility in the area, are not told anything about this and are
ignorant of the Turkish strategy. For some reason which I could not
fathom, General Bradley persistently declined to commit himself to
closer cooperation on this point.
[Attachment]
Agreed United States–United Kingdom Memorandum
of Discussions on the Present World Situation6
top secret
[Washington, July 25,
1950.]
U.S./U.K. Discussions on
Present World Situation
1. Following is a summary of discussions held in Washington
between July 20 and July 24, between General Omar N. Bradley and
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, representing the United States, and
Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder representing the United
Kingdom. Mr. Charles W. Yost, Colonel L. K. Ladue, Mr. M. E.
Dening, Major General Redman and Captain R. D. Coleridge,
R.N.7 were also present.
Terms of Reference
2. The conversations were purely exploratory and involved no
commitments by governments. It was understood that there would
be no definitive or detailed discussion of areas in which third
parties have a primary interest.
far east
3. The U.K. representatives emphasized the importance which their
government attached to avoiding any further major involvement of
Western forces on the Asiatic mainland. They therefore expressed
the hope that any new conflicts which might break out in the Far
East might be localized and not be allowed to develop into
general war, either with the Soviet Union or with Communist
China. The U.S. representatives agreed as to the desirability of
this objective but pointed out certain possible cases of
aggression, as noted below, which it might be difficult or even
impossible to localize.
[Page 1662]
Chinese Communists
4. The U.K. representatives particularly stressed the advantages
of localizing any possible conflict between the U.S. or the U.K.
on the one hand and the Chinese communists on the other; first,
for the reason set forth in the preceding paragraph and, second,
in order that a possible gradual drift of the Chinese communist
regime away from Moscow might not be interrupted.
5. It was agreed that further study should be given by the U.S.
and the U.K. to the question whether an overt large-scale
involvement of the Chinese communists in Korea or a large-scale
Chinese communist attack on any other state or territory should,
as being indicative of a Soviet intention to force the issue, be
considered as raising the immediate question of general war.
Korea
6. The U.S. representatives stressed the political and military
importance of the contribution of ground forces to the campaign
in Korea by as large a number of nations as possible. They
pointed out, on the military side, that the campaign would
presumably last for some months and that it was important that,
when the counteroffensive was undertaken, it be carried out with
very strong forces in order that the North Korean army could be
destroyed to the maximum extent possible before our forces reach
the 38th parallel. The U.K. representatives declared that they
had not hitherto considered that any forces which they might be
able to contribute could reach the theatre of operations in time
to be used. In light, however, of the statement by the U.S.
representatives that the campaign would be long and that very
considerable land forces would be needed, they would represent
to London the points made by the U.S. representatives.
7. The U.S. representatives expressed the view that careful study
should be given to the question of the eventual solution of the
Korean problem, particularly what will happen when UN forces
reach the 38th parallel and what forces will remain in Korea
after the end of hostilities. They indicated that this would be
a question for consideration by the UN.
8. It appeared to be the view of both U.S. and U.K.
representatives, as an exception to the general proposition
stated above, that, if Soviet forces should interfere overtly on
a large scale in Korea, this action would raise the immediate
question of general war. The U.S. representative made it clear
that they had no intention of fighting a major war in Korea.
Should war occur, it was their intention to fight in accordance
with our agreed over-all strategy.
9. It was agreed that further study should be given to the
question of whether or not overt intervention of the Chinese
communists in
[Page 1663]
Korea
should also raise the immediate question of general war. The
U.K. representatives were inclined to consider such an
intervention by the Chinese communists unlikely since the
Chinese would not act solely at Soviet direction unless they
gained some material advantage to themselves. The U.S.
representatives, however, believing that Peiping is at the
present time under very strong Kremlin influence and that the
Kremlin might wish to involve the Chinese communists in
hostilities with the West, considered such a possible
involvement less unlikely.
Formosa
10. The British representatives expressed a strong hope that any
hostilities arising from a Chinese communist attack on Formosa
would be localized. The U.S. representatives replied that it is
their desire and intention that any such hostilities be
localized. In view of the character of the President’s statement
of 27 June,8 there was reason to believe that there
would be no invasion of the mainland in connec-nection with a
Communist attack on Formosa. The U.K. representatives stated
they were in full agreement with this intention to localize any
such hostilities.
Hong Kong
11. The British representatives stated that their forces in Hong
Kong are adequate to resist internal disturbances or a
small-scale attack from without, but they are not adequate to
hold off a full-scale attack by the Chinese communists. Should
such an attack occur, it would presumably lead to an appeal to
the UN, but nevertheless the U.K. representatives would hope
that the hostilities might be localized.
Macao
12. It was considered that action could not be taken to assist
the Portuguese in case Macao were attacked. The U.K.
representative stated that they have already intimated to the
Portuguese that the U.K. would not be able to assist in these
circumstances.
Philippines
13. The U.S. representatives pointed out the fact that the U.S.
occupied naval and air bases in the islands. Elsewhere in the
discussions it was brought out that the Philippines constitute
the southern end of the U.S.–Japan–Okinawa–Philippine
stopline.
[Page 1664]
Indochina
14. It was understood that the U.S. and U.K. would assist the
French to the extent of their abilities in case of a Chinese
communist attack, but the probability would be great that
neither could provide forces for this purpose. There was no
further discussion of the Indochina problem in the absence of
the French, though further tripartite discussions were
considered to be necessary.
Burma
15. It was understood that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. could
provide forces to Burma in case of attack and that it is
unlikely, though not impossible, that India or Pakistan would do
so. In regard to action to be taken it was understood that the
U.K. would take the initiative.
Malaya
16. The U.K. representatives said that they did not expect to be
able to reduce their forces in Malaya during the next twelve
months but hoped to do so after that time. It was generally
agreed that an early and favorable resolution of the Korean
situation would have a salutary effect on the Malayan
problem.
Siam
17. It was generally agreed that Siam would bend with the
wind.
Japan
18. Interest was expressed by both parties in proceeding with
joint preliminary political discussions of the Japanese peace
treaty at a relatively early date.
Afghanistan
19. It was agreed that Afghanistan could not be effectively
assisted in case of invasion by the Soviets.
middle east
20. The British representatives pointed out the difficulties,
considering the forces now available, of their assisting, other
than to a certain extent with air forces, in the defense of the
outer ring of the Middle East, that is, primarily Iran and
Turkey. In spite of the fact that the loss to the Soviets of
either of these countries might have a fatal effect on other
countries, such as Iraq, the U.K. would be obliged, in case of
general war, to concentrate on the defense of the inner core
which is centered in and about Egypt. They stated that
satisfactory agreement with Australia, New Zealand, and South
Africa was now in prospect for the use of Commonwealth forces in
the Middle East in case of war, subject of course to final
approval by governments at the time. The United States
Representative recalled the common
[Page 1665]
view expressed in previous U.K.–U.S.
conversations that in this area the U.K. would take the
initiative in regard to any action which would be taken. The
U.K. Representative, while not dissenting from this view,
expressed the hope that the U.S. would give consideration to
what further steps it might be able to take in case of need.
Iran
21. The U.K. representatives emphasized the vital importance of
Iran in the entire Near East strategic picture and stated the
view, both that they consider there is risk of a Soviet attack
on Iran, and that such an attack would infringe a stopline. It
was agreed that an overt Soviet attack on Iran would raise an
immediate question of general war. While the U.S. pointed out
that the defense of Iran must be primarily a British
responsibility, it was agreed that the U.K. and the U.S. should
consult together in regard to a means of meeting this
problem.
22. The U.S. and U.K. should, insofar as possible, assist the
Iranian Government to strengthen its position and should
consider what steps should be taken in the event of an uprising
in Azerbaijan or a coup d’état by the
Tudeh Party. It was agreed that the U.S. and U.K. should study
the question of whether the loss of Azerbaijan alone to the
Soviets would be fatal, and at exactly what point in Iran the
stopline should be laid down.
23. The question of demolition of Iranian oil wells in case of
Soviet attack was discussed and the U.K. representatives stated
that their government is examining ways and means of dealing
with this matter.
Turkey
24. It was agreed that the only serious threat to Turkey is an
overt Soviet attack and that such an attack would raise an
immediate question of general war. The view was expressed that
the Turks could deal with an attack by Bulgaria alone but that
this matter should receive further study. It was pointed out
that, since France as well as the U.K. has a treaty of alliance
with Turkey, these questions should be discussed with the
French.
europe
Greece
25. It was agreed that urgent study should be given to the
question as to what action could and should be taken in case of
a Bulgar attack on Greece. It was understood that, in case of
renewal of the civil war, aid to the Greek Government along the
present lines should be increased. It was further agreed that
the U.S. and U.K. should support maintenance of UNSCOB observation along the
northern Greek frontier at full strength.
[Page 1666]
Yugoslavia
26. It was the view of both U.S. and U.K. representatives that an
attack on Yugoslavia by satellites or even Soviet forces would
not raise the immediate question of a
general war. In case of an attack, military and other equipment
would, insofar as feasible, be supplied to the Yugoslavs but no
forces would be sent there.
Trieste
27. The view was expressed that a successful attack on Yugoslavia
would raise a question as to whether U.S. and U.K. forces should
be withdrawn from Trieste. This question would have to be
examined from both the military and political point of view.
Austria
28. It was understood that an attack on Western forces in Austria
by the Soviets would mean war. The possibility of a blockade of
Vienna was also considered.
Germany
29. The U.K. representatives expressed the view that a threat to
Berlin should be placed at the top of the list of danger points.
It was agreed that urgent study should be given to the
capability of allied forces in Germany to resist an attack,
either on West Germany or on the western sectors of Berlin, by
East German paramilitary forces, as well as to whether such an
attack could be successfully resisted without involving the
Soviets. This danger also emphasized the importance of taking
prompt measures to strengthen West German police forces. It was
pointed out that this problem is being studied by the three High
Commissioners in Germany but that the French have so far been
reluctant to agree to the necessary measures.
30. It was agreed that in case of renewal of the Berlin blockade
there should, for political reasons, be a prompt reaction, in
the form of reestablishment of the air lift, even though on the
reduced basis which present commitments elsewhere would make
necessary. The view was expressed that an attempt to supply
Berlin by surface convoy would not be successful. However in
view of the vital importance of holding Berlin, it was agreed
that the possibility of resorting to convoy should be
reexamined.
Finland
31. It was not anticipated that in case of an attack by the
Soviets action would be taken to assist Finland.
Sweden
32. The view was expressed that an attack on Sweden would be
likely to result in general war, in view of the effect of such
an attack on two NAT states,
Norway and Denmark.
[Page 1667]
general topics
33. The United States representatives noted in regard to the
foregoing detailed analyses of specific cases that basic policy
considerations should not be overlooked in estimating immediate
capabilities. Basic policy requires that aggression anywhere
should be resisted; capabilities at any given moment may
determine the kind of resistance and its staging. They called
attention to the President’s statement to Congress that “new
recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to
the breaking point the fabric of world peace”. The present
aggression in Korea and the implications of Soviet policy
inherent in it, already require not only joint planning
regarding other danger spots but also actual vigorous steps to
increase rapidly the capabilities of both the United States and
the United Kingdom and other free countries to meet possible
further cases of aggression. If any further major aggressive
moves develop anywhere, it will, in the view of the U.S.
representatives, be necessary for all immediately to intensify
further their general preparations since the risk of total war
would be greatly increased.
Soviet Intentions
34. The U.S. representatives stated that they were not in agreement with the view expressed
in a British intelligence estimate that the Soviets would not be
prepared to engage in general war before 1955. On the contrary,
U.S. representatives felt that they might be so prepared by
1952, or even earlier, and that prior to that time they would
probably attempt to cause the maximum difficulties short of
general war. The U.K. representatives explained that they did
not feel that the Soviet Union could not or indeed might not
start a war before 1955 but rather that 1955 onward was the
period when the Soviet Union would be most likely to take
serious risks of provoking a major war. In view of the
divergence on this most important question it was agreed that
the intelligence teams of the U.K. and U.S. should meet
forthwith to discuss this matter and attempt to arrive at an
agreed paper on the subject.
35. The U.K. representatives then drew attention to the
importance of the two countries agreeing on an over-all global
strategy. It was agreed that following the intelligence
conference it would be desirable for the U.K. and U.S. Chiefs of
Staff to meet in order to discuss this over-all problem. The
U.S. representatives pointed out that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
might visit unified commands in Europe later this year and that
an opportunity might then be found to visit London for the
above-mentioned discussions.
Higher Direction in War
36. The U.S. representatives expressed the view that the problem
of higher direction in war should be examined. In the present
circum-stances
[Page 1668]
it
might be thought that the standing group of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization should assume the responsibility in war,
though it was pointed out that in order to do so it should
undergo a definite change in character in order to have the
appropriate representation. The U.K. representative stated that
the thoughts of the British Chiefs of Staff were almost exactly
the same but care should be exercised not to offend the
sensibilities of the Canadians and others.
Deception Planning
37. The U.K. representatives stressed the immense value of
deception planning in the last war. It seemed vitally important
that British and American policy in this field should be
carefully coordinated in order that the one might not cancel out
the other. It was agreed that the Cover and Deception
representatives of the two countries should meet in order to
exchange views.
Propaganda and Psychological Warfare
38. The importance of coordinating U.S. and U.K. policies in
these fields was pointed out. It was noted that Assistant
Secretary Barrett had already discussed these matters with the
appropriate U.K. authorities in London and it was agreed that
close coordination along these lines should be continued.9 It was also noted that the NAT deputies are charged with
concerting policies in these fields insofar as NAT matters are concerned.
