Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 252: Bradley–Tedder

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret

[Washington,] July 12, 1950.

Participants:	General Omar Bradley, U.S. Army Chief of Staff1
	Ambassador Philip C. Jessup

I called on General Bradley at the Pentagon this afternoon. I told him of the telegram from Ambassador Douglas in which the U.K. inquired when we would be prepared to begin.² He said that Lord Tedder³ had stopped in to see him and had made a similar inquiry. General Bradley is prepared to begin the first of next week, and after a little discussion I agreed that we would send out a telegram to London today indicating we were ready to begin on Tuesday or Wednesday of next week whichever they prefer.⁴ General Bradley thought that two or three days would be sufficient for the talks.

I asked him whether he wished to designate someone to go over the points with me in advance of the talks, and he said he preferred to discuss them himself with me and not to appoint any intermediaries. He said that he expected to have two JCS papers by Friday which would cover their estimate of the danger spots and the question of capabilities. He would like to study these over the weekend, and we agreed to meet again in his office on Monday at 2:00 p. m.⁵

I mentioned that part of the President’s reply to Attlee which referred to informing other governments. General Bradley suggested that we be very firm in telling the British that we would not discuss NATO plans in bilateral conversations. He said they had pressed for some time for a continuation of a combined staff relationship and had only been convinced that we were serious in rejecting this when we moved their combined staff people out of the Pentagon and moved the standing group in. On Indochina, I said that we would not consider it helpful to have Ambassador Bonnet⁶ brought in on such conversations. He suggested that we tell the British that we would not discuss Indochina in the absence of the French, that we proposed to go ahead with our bilateral talks and then to consider whether we should set up trilateral talks on Indochina.

I said that I thought it most likely that the British would raise the three points which they had mentioned to us in the London talks.⁷ General Bradley had not thought they would go beyond the kind of estimate of the situation which we were making in NSC 73⁸ but agreed that they would probably want to press on from that point to consider what action we would take in each one of the areas if trouble developed. He had not considered the question of the suggested guarantee to Australia and New Zealand. He was inclined to doubt whether we were in a position to give such a guarantee but thought we could give “assurances” that we intended to hold the line Japan–Okinawa–Philippines, come hell or high water. He did not know what guarantee we could give in case the Chinese Communists got down through Malaya and Indonesia. We talked about particular places. We agreed that the existing policy in regard to Yugoslavia would probably stand, that is that we would furnish supplies but not forces. On Greece, he thought we would be able only to renew the kind of assistance we gave before. He mentioned specifically that we might have to send back “a Van Fleet.” In regard to Turkey, he was not clear about the action we might take but in this connection said it was worth considering whether the Mediterranean fleet should show itself in that area. He thought this should be weighed against the possible Soviet reaction, particularly in view of the Black Sea maneuvers which are scheduled for August. He said the Russians were always very sensitive to the appearance of our fleet in that region. On Iran, he said that they always considered this primarily a job for the British. He agreed we might consider whether there was anything we could do to help if a Korean-type operation developed there. On Indochina, he doubted whether there was much we could do but said it was possible we could give some air support from a carrier although he doubted whether this could be very effective. I asked whether he thought we, the British and the French were pooling our best skills in jungle fighting. He thought this was a good point and said that he would see that our military mission to Indochina included one of our best jungle fighters.

In connection with the discussion of a Pacific Pact, General Bradley touched on the question of a Japanese Peace Treaty. He said that General MacArthur’s written memorandum⁹ cleared up a misunderstanding about his views and showed that there was no real difference of opinion on what was meant by the maintenance of “bases.” He thought the views of State and Defense were not now very far apart. He noted that the maintenance of American forces in Japan by agreement with the Japanese would be very different from a continuation of the occupation on the present basis. He doubted whether we could indefinitely refuse to permit the Japanese to get in a position to defend themselves, but this problem could not be settled for some time because of the strength of the feeling of Australians and others about Japanese rearmament.

He mentioned the German situation as another one which must be considered.

I suggested that a useful plan of procedure would be for State to indicate the political considerations which would dictate our making an effort to resist another Korean-type action in any other quarter. The situations could be arranged with an indication of priorities. We could then compare these results with their estimate of capabilities and thus come up with a view as to what could and should be done where.

Philip C. Jessup

1. General Bradley had relinquished this post to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 16, 1949.
2. Telegram 176 from London, July 10, vol. vii, p. 343.
3. Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission.
4. Telegram 185 to London, July 12, not printed (795.00/7–1050).
5. On July 17 Bradley and Jessup reviewed the administrative details of the talks and went over the current situation regarding a general war, the Kuril Islands, Hong Kong, Indochina, Australia and New Zealand, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Notes on a talk with General Bradley, July 17, not printed (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 252: Bradley–Tedder).
6. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the United States.

7. The three points were:

   “(1) The necessity of knowing something more specific regarding our strategic thinking in the Far East as a prior step to eliciting Dominion—particularly New Zealand and Australian—assurances of participation in defense of the Near East; (2) The desire of the British to know the extent to which we will furnish air support for Turkey; (3) The question of United States economic assistance in Libya in order to assure the maintenance of our strategic facilities there.” Letter from Jessup to Bradley, dated July 13, not printed. (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 252: Bradley–Tedder)

8. Of July 1, vol. i, p. 331.
9. It is unclear whether this reference was to General MacArthur’s memorandum of June 14 or June 23 concerning the place of Japan in the security of the Pacific Ocean; for texts, see vol. vi, pp. 1213 and 1227, respectively.