611.41/1–2450

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ( Perkins ) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

I understand that you are seeing Sir Oliver Franks this week prior to his return to London and that you intend to discuss with him the present difficulties in Anglo-American relations and the potential sources of difficulties in the immediate future. We have worked up a comprehensive list of such items but it is clear that a great many of the individual cases are either relatively unimportant and are being handled in the normal course of business at the working level, or are not expected to raise acute problems in the near future.

For your use at the present time, I am attaching lists covering two types of problems: Tab A—those which are important and which require urgent solution, and Tab B—those which are important but which do not require urgent action although they may flare up at any time. The problems are stated in very summary fashion but can, of course, be expanded if you wish. Even though it might be desirable to postpone the resolution of difficult issues until after the British elections on February 23, the matters in the first category cannot wait. I recommend, therefore, that you describe these to Sir Oliver and point out the reasons (given in Tab A) why we will have to continue to press on these points. You may wish also to run over the second category problems briefly and to indicate that while we are trying to keep these matters quiescent in the next few weeks, they may flare up and our hand may be forced. On our part, we can try to minimize frictions between us in the immediate future.

There are some difficulties on the British side which they can and should attempt to handle. It is clear that they are obsessed by the feeling that they must cut their overseas and defense expenses, sterling as well as dollar expenses, so as to save every possible penny. This causes them, in our opinion, to put undue weight on the financial aspects of their foreign problems. They should try to accept the assurances which you gave Sir Oliver some weeks ago that we are conscious of their fiscal problem, that we are evidencing our concern through the very large financial assistance which we are giving them and that we will not ask them to extend themselves beyond what seems reasonable.

There have been a number of instances recently in which the British have taken very firm and, to us, unreasonable positions with the statement [Page 1611] that such positions represent Cabinet decisions which cannot be changed. Such an approach toward the mutual working out of problems leads to difficulty. We have been told by the British as well as our own people that there is currently in the United Kingdom a feeling that we are trying to push them around and there is reaction against us for that reason. These waves come periodically and this one will be intensified by the election campaign and the self-hypnosis which election speeches glorifying the Labor Government will cause. It seems to me fair that we should ask that responsible Government officials try to take a longer range view point and to discount as much as possible the election fever.

I should also suggest that you mention to Sir Oliver that it might be desirable, after the election, to have a fairly full review of all outstanding issues, first at the working level and then, to the extent necessary, at higher levels so that the points of friction, actual and potential, may be eliminated as far as possible.

[Tab A]

Important Problems Which Require Urgent Solution

Circumstances require that the following problems be handled as a matter of urgency. In some cases the importance is intrinsic, in other cases the urgency arises out of a Congressional or other dead line which makes prompt action essential.

1.
MDAP Bilateral. While it appears that all major points relating to the text of the bilateral are either resolved or are on the way to solution, except a sticky point on the privileges and immunities of military personnel, the British are making difficulties about making available promptly the local currency needed for administrative expenses. The amounts are not large. In fact the administrative expenses for the MDAP personnel dealing with the British program are the least for any participating country and will not be more than the equivalent of $150,000. The British also balk at contributing a share of the administrative expenses of the regional office and of the aircraft distribution set-up at Burton wood. There will be a very strong reaction here if the MDAP is held up by British refusal to bear their share of the local currency expenses of the program.
2.
Petroleum. This matter has aroused wide comment and the current discussions must be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion or at least progress made to that end before the ECA Congressional hearings which are scheduled to start February 21. A brief statement of the problem is as follows: Oil operations constitute the largest single item [Page 1612] in the sterling area dollar drain (currently about $700,000,000 per annum). The British claim they can make large dollar savings by utilizing to the full the production of British companies and by displacing to that extent American companies from the sterling area. Such action would prejudice United States political and strategic interests in the Middle East if it went far enough. The British are going ahead with this displacement unilaterally although we have informed them of our concern as well as of our belief that they have not made an adequate effort to meet American companies’ suggestion of arrangements by which the dollar drain on oil account could be reduced substantially without displacing American companies. ECA has told the British they may well not only withhold ECA aid for new expansion of petroleum facilities but also reduce ECA aid if the British use free dollars to initiate further expansion of petroleum facilities over ECA disapproval.
3.
Relief in Palestine and the Near East. We are discussing with the British the amount of their share of the relief and works programs of the UN in the Near East proposed by the Clapp Economic Survey Mission and are pressing them to contribute 25% of the total program of $55,000,000 for 18 months. The Foreign Office is trying to get the Treasury to agree to increase the Treasury’s first proposal of a much lower contribution. We are about to go to Congress with a request for our contribution (50%) and must be able to show that the British are making an adequate contribution.
4.
Deconcentration and Decartelization in Germany. There is urgent need to agree on a law to succeed to Military Government Law No. 75 dealing with the deconcentration of the coal, iron and steel industries in Germany. Furthermore, we are apparently at odds with the British on the whole question of decartelization. The British have no apparent desire to move in this field. We are under strong pressure and face a Congressional investigation into this matter.
5.
Broadcasting Frequencies in Germany. The Copenhagen plan, in the drafting of which our observers were not permitted to take part, assigns a wholly inadequate number of frequencies for use in our zone in Germany. We need the frequencies for servicing our troops, the Voice of America and internal re-education. (The British and French can reach their troops with their domestic services.) Furthermore, the Copenhagen plan gives the Iron Curtain countries a disproportionately favorable position. The British and other Europeans are planning to implement this plan on March 15. We must work out an alternative or we may be forced into unauthorized use of frequencies and cause radio chaos in Europe.
6.
European Integration. With the renewal of ERP legislation coming up in February, we must continue to press for action among [Page 1613] the ERP countries for the reduction of trade and financial barriers, et cetera. There is a widespread feeling, shared by a number of Congressmen, that the British are resisting action along this line for purely selfish reasons and without adequate justification. We will have to continue to press on this front.2
7.
Japanese and German Accession to the Wheat Agreement. Settlement of this issue has been postponed until about 20th of February. The United Kingdom position has been that it will not consent to the admission of these countries unless it is assured that they will not have the right to purchase wheat from Australia under the existing quota. We have been unable to work out a satisfactory arrangement with the British to date. We will have to keep at this problem so that it can be satisfactorily settled.
8.
Additional Military Production. The British have not been willing to furnish us with the information which we feel is necessary with regard to their program of additional military production. One important reason is, undoubtedly, that they do not wish us to inject ourselves into their economic planning. Solution of this matter is necessary before we can furnish raw materials or machine tools to the British under MDAP.
9.
Military Facilities. The British have now withdrawn from their position that a firm agreement on the cost to them of military facilities furnished at our request is a condition precedent to signing the MDAP bilateral. On both sides, however, we will want to get the matter of facilities which they are to supply resolved as soon as possible. Some cases have been hanging fire for over a year. An open British unwillingness to furnish facilities could react against them all along the line.
[Tab B]

Important Matters of a Lesser Degree of Urgency Which May Flare Up

The following matters which are important do not seem at the moment to present critical issues which must be resolved. Any one or more of them may, however, become active and critical at any time.

1.
Disposition of ECA Counterpart. The ECA counterpart was used initially to retire short-term British Government debt. This practice has been suspended and the counterpart is piling up and now amounts to some hundred million pounds. ECA is exploring the possibility [Page 1614] of using some of this counterpart in the British investment program. The piling up of this money may become embarrassing and an attempt by ECA to become involved in the British investment program will undoubtedly be strongly opposed by the British who want no United States interference in their economic planning.
2.
Relations in the China Area. Difficult problems may arise in the course of our attempts to have the British protect United States interests in Communist China. Two specific matters which may come up are those of UN membership and the disposition of the CAT aircraft now in Hong Kong.
3.
Dual Pricing. While Mr. Hoffman is proposing a formula under which a part of ECA aid will be distributed in accordance with the performance of participating countries along certain lines, the difficult problem raised by the excess of British export coal prices over internal prices may flare up again.
4.
Sterling Balances. Exploratory discussions are going on with regard to the sterling balance problem. We hope to be able to keep this problem in a non-controversial status. There are a number of people interested in this question in this country and there is a danger that we may find ourselves involved in the whole problem in a controversial way.
5.
Political Leadership for OEEC . If we stick to the position that we are not formally promoting Mr. Spaak to be leader of OEEC, this matter may cause no outward difficulties although it is clear that the British will probably try to kill the idea by one means or another. Enough United States people have become committed to the idea, however, to raise a danger that this may become an openly controversial problem.
6.
Italian Colonies. There are not at the present time issues between ourselves and the British with regard to the Italian Colonies. There are, however, a number of danger spots so far as the British are concerned involving the Italians, Ethiopians and possibly the French. It is by no means impossible that we may find ourselves involved in any difficulties which may arise.
7.
High Frequency Broadcasting. A conference is to be held on April 1 on this subject to assign frequencies. It is expected to raise difficult issues between us and the Europeans, including the British. We can anticipate that we will not get adequate short wave facilities for carrying the VOA.
8.
Japanese Participation in International Relations. The British have opposed the authorizing of Japanese attendance at international conferences and participation in international agreements, claiming that such action should await a peace treaty. We are urging the prompt admission of Japan into such activities and it is possible that this issue may arise openly in the near future.
  1. At the top of the source text was the handwritten notation: “I took up only Tab A as amended by my note thereon. D[ean] A[cheson]” Regarding Secretary Acheson’s conversation with Ambassador Franks, see memorandum of conversation, infra.
  2. Next to this paragraph in the source text was the handwritten notation “I did not mention this. D[ean] A[cheson].”