Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

Bonn Embassy Files, McCloy Project: Lot 311: Box 355: D(50)135

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)

[Paris,] 20 January 1950.¹

Participants:	W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative in Europe for the ECA
	David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador in France
	John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner for Germany

Harriman showed McCloy a cable from Kenney² reporting an interview he (Kenney) had had with Cripps.³ The general tone of the Cripps remarks was petulant and arrogant. Cripps resented the interference of the U.S. in what he called a “schoolboy lecture” manner in the settlement of European problems. Particularly his remarks were addressed to the present issues before the OEEC, i.e., liberalization of trade, transferability of currencies, a political figure in OEEC (Spaak issue),⁴ assumption of more cooperative attitude toward Council of Europe and lastly proposed visit of Hoffman⁵ to Paris at time of Consultative Assembly and meeting of Council of OEEC. Cripps felt that the Hoffman visit and attendance of Hoffman and Harriman gave note of U.S. dictation to OEEC deliberations and stressed unfortunate aspect from advantage this accorded Soviet propaganda line. He particularly resented any possible statement of Hoffman detailing in (a), (b), (c), (d) manner what OEEC nations should do. He indicated that no major decisions would be made before 23 February⁶ on basic issues. Particularly he could not see a change in British position on dual pricing which would entail increased domestic prices, in view of British internal political situation. He opposed appointment of Spaak, particularly in view of recent speeches against British attitude.

Harriman was extremely perturbed by the tone and substance of Cripps’ statement. He had prepared (by Katz⁷) a cable to Acheson and Hoffman rebutting Cripps arguments. He showed this to McCloy and Bruce, who commented on the draft, McCloy in the general direction of strengthening the wording. The draft was quite strong, and Harriman decided to sleep on it before taking a final decision.⁸ Harriman, when conversation later reverted to subject of U.K. reviewed U.S. original attitude of non-coercion of European countries in seeking U.S. objectives of integration of Western Europe. (In the meantime Saar question had been discussed.) He had been firm believer in U.S. attitude of persuasion against coercion. He had felt that this was proper atmosphere in which to administer ECA aid to Europe. He had supported this method of procedure, even though greatly provoked by Cripps. He recalled famous June 30, 1948 meeting in which he had come to grips with British on question of Sterling balances and had fought them down in a long session ending at 2:00 a. m. He felt he was being faced with similar situation in current discussions on transferability of currency. Working party report, agreed to by British technical level, had evidently been repudiated by Cripps that afternoon.⁹ Harriman felt that the US should no longer tolerate interference and sabotage of Western European integration by UK and should face Cripps with clear statement of US view that the Marshall Plan is breaking down because of the British opposition. He felt that Cripps could not stand the pressure from the British public opinion, at this crucial time, that such a statement would generate. It was granted that Cripps’ position was probably stronger now that the dollar drain had decreased and the elections would probably return the Labor Government. If the latter came about, Cripps would probably be even more cocky. However, the U.S. would not stand for this much longer. The American people and the Congress would not support an aid program which did not show a coordinated approach to W.E. unity.

[Here follows a discussion of French policy toward the Saar, the drain on Germany’s foreign exchange, personnel changes, the site for the next meeting of United States Ambassadors, and control of East-West trade in Germany. For documentation on the Ambassadors’ meeting, see pages 795 ff.; documentation on East-West trade is scheduled for publication in volume IV.]

1. McCloy was in Paris to discuss French policy toward the Saar.
2. W. John Kenney, Chief of the ECA Mission in the United Kingdom.
3. Sir Stafford Cripps, British Chancellor of the Exchequer; the cable under reference has not been identified further.
4. For documentation on the question of appointing a political figure to head the OEEC, see pp. 611 ff.
5. Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration.
6. The date of the British general election.
7. Milton Katz, ECA Deputy Special Representative in Europe.
8. No copy of the draft has been found in the Department of State files, nor is there any indication whether or not a message was sent.
9. Not found in Department of State files.