Subject: Limitations in Military Clauses of Italian
Peace Treaty.
This informal meeting was held pursuant to the meeting held September 11
during which Mr. Burrows and Mr. Boyd left a copy of the informal
working paper setting forth “notes of discussions with US authorities on
the coordination of policy toward the Italian Peace
[Page 1515]
Treaty”. In opening the meeting Mr.
Byington permitted Mr. Burrows and Mr. Boyd to read a copy of a paper
entitled “Limitations in Military Clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty”,
which had been prepared in WE. A copy is
attached to the original of this memorandum. He emphasized that this
paper did not represent the views of the Department and that he,
likewise, was merely expressing the views of EUR and was not speaking for the Department.
Mr. Burrows in reply stated that the views which he expressed had not
been fully considered by the British Government and represented only the
thinking of senior officials in the Foreign Office.
After reading the paper Mr. Burrows expressed his agreement with the
necessity for setting forth in detail the revisions which would be
necessary to permit Italy to carry out the tasks assigned by the NATO. Once this exercise had been
completed, it would be possible to determine the procedure by which the
Treaty could be revised. He felt that it might be possible to follow the
course suggested in the original working paper which he had submitted,
namely, ignore the Treaty in minor respects, which would, for example,
permit the supplying to Italy of a few assault landing craft, or of
planes slightly in excess of the stipulated amount; then when a major
step, clearly violating the Treaty, would be contemplated, action could
be taken to make a public declaration that the Treaty would no longer be
considered as limiting, in certain respects, Italian participation in
NATO.
Mr. Byington in reply stated that it would be essential to have such a
declaration of intention made by the US in order that the US position
would be publicly known and would, therefore, answer any charges of
connivance in violations of the Italian Peace Treaty. Mr. Burrows
pointed out that an analysis of the probable positions which various
signatories might take on the question of a declaration involving
changes in military clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty indicated only
11 of the signatories as probably being favorable with 5 opposed and 4
doubtful. Taking the adherents there would be an additional 3 in favor
and 1 opposed. The probable division on this basis would be as
follows:
It was agreed that Mr. Burrows would endeavor to obtain a definitive
statement of the necessary revisions of the military clauses of the
Italian Peace Treaty required to permit Italy to carry out the tasks
assigned by the NATO in accordance with
the medium-term plan. Mr. Byington indicated that the Department would
also endeavor to secure a similar statement and a subsequent meeting
would be held to consider further action which might be taken.
[Attachment]
Memorandum by Mr. Howard J. Hilton of the Office
of Western European Affairs
secret
[Washington, October 3, 1950.]
Limitations in Military Clauses of the Italian
Peace Treaty
necessity for action
The military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty were drafted on
the assumption that the United Nations, in which Italy would be
accepted as a full member, would assure lasting peace. The Soviet
Union has effectively destroyed the basis for this assumption.
Communist aggression in Korea and increasing world tension resulting
from Soviet policies and initiative have increased the urgency of
prompt and effective action to permit Italy to participate to the
fullest extent of its capabilities in the common defense of Western
Europe. It cannot now do this because of the limitations imposed by
the military clauses of the Peace Treaty.
From a military viewpoint, the restrictions imposed by certain of the
military clauses of the Peace Treaty are inimical to the objectives
of NATO. It is apparent from
studies now in advanced stages of completion within NATO that the successful defense of
Western Europe will require a greater contribution of military
manpower by Italy than is permitted by the terms of the Peace
Treaty. These studies indicate that Italy, with the forces at
present allowed under the Peace Treaty, could not be in a position
to defend her northern frontiers in the event of an attack.
Apart from the question of an increase in the strength of the Italian
armed forces beyond the limits imposed by the Treaty, there is, in
addition, the question of the possible relaxation of certain
specific restrictions included in the Treaty. For example, the
Treaty places
[Page 1517]
strict
limitations upon the type and quantity of weapons and material which
the Italian armed forces may possess.
With regard to the question of Italian arms production, Italy is
bound by Article 53 of the Peace Treaty not to manufacture or
possess more war material than is needed for her own forces under
the Treaty. The Italian representative on the Military Production
and Supply Board has produced a paper giving impressive figures on
Italian surplus productive capacity. In addition, the Italian
representative on the Defense Financial and Economic Committee, some
months ago, raised the matter of fuller employment of Italian
manpower in North Atlantic defense production. A greater
exploitation of Italian productive capacity and of Italian technical
skill than is now possible under the terms of the Peace Treaty would
contribute materially to the defense of Western Europe.
Concerning the foregoing three general criteria of restrictions on
the military activities of Italy the question arises as to the
timing of the lifting of these restrictions. The current over-all
efficiency of the existing Italian armed forces can be improved
considerably. A particular deficiency is the lack of a competent
corps of non-commissioned officers and technicians. Therefore, even
if current NATO planning results in
the establishment of a firm requirement for Italian armed forces in
excess of Treaty limitations it would be militarily unsound to
permit the Italians to expand their armed forces until the existing
forces achieve a higher degree of efficiency. On the other hand, in
the military production field Italy could now exceed the levels
prescribed by the Treaty and thereby contribute more than is now
possible to the accelerated NATO
production program. As regards the limitations on weapons and other
implements of war which the Italian armed forces may possess, the
armed forces as now constituted could profitably employ certain
types of such equipment in quantities in excess of Treaty
limitations.
Using the above considerations as a basis for analyzing the military
articles of the Peace Treaty, it is apparent that the military
interest of NATO would be furthered
by the immediate revision or rescinding of the following articles:
Article 52 (Acquisition of German war
material)—Italy should be in a position to participate in
any program wherein Germany supplies war material to NATO nations.
Article 53 (Manufacture or possession
of war material in excess of own requirements)—Italy’s
surplus military productive capacity should be utilized to
the benefit of NATO
nations.
It would be desirable, but it is not immediately mandatory, that the
following articles of the Treaty be amended in order to increase the
capabilities of the Italian armed forces at their present strength:
Article 54 (Limits tanks to 200)
[Page 1518]
Article 56 (Limits size of Italian
Fleet)
Article 59 (Limits types of vessels
in, and tonnage of, the Italian Navy)
Article 64 (Limits Italian Air Force
to 350 aircraft by type).
At such time as it is determined that the Italian armed forces, at
Peace Treaty strength, have attained an acceptable degree of
efficiency, it is militarily desirable that the following articles
of the Peace Treaty be revised to permit Italian armed forces to
carry out the roles and missions assigned them by NATO:
Article 60 (Limits personnel of
Italian Navy)
Article 61 (Limits personnel of
Italian Army and Carabinieri)
Article 65 (Limits personnel of
Italian Air Force).
possible positions
There are a number of possible positions which might be taken by the
United States and other Governments with respect to the military
clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty:
- 1.
- The word and intention of the Peace Treaty could be
accepted as constituting binding obligations, the
fulfillment of which would be the primary consideration even
in the face of Soviet aggression. This position might well
place the defense of Western Europe in jeopardy. It would be
small consolation if Soviet Forces were to advance across
Europe to know that the Italian Treaty limitations had been
faithfully honored by the Western Powers. This is
particularly true when viewed in the light of the
substantial contribution which Italian production and
manpower could make to the NATO defense.
- 2.
- The possibility of achieving the desired result by a
liberal legal interpretation, while maintaining the
intention of honoring the Treaty, has been explored. Such a
position does not, however, achieve the desired result of
assuring Italian defense nor its participation in the full
defense production effort being developed by NATO.
- 3.
- As a similarly undesirable position, the United States and
other principal signatories of the Peace Treaty might inform
the Italian Government that they would raise no objection to
violations of certain clauses of the Peace Treaty leaving
the matter of violation solely to the Italians. While this
might accomplish the purpose of permitting Italy to
strengthen its defense and to make the maximum contribution
to the Western European defense effort, it would certainly
weaken the US position in support of the principle of rule
of law. It would also encourage the Italians to violate
other provisions of the Peace Treaty, the complete
fulfillment of which is desired by the United States and
other countries.
- 4.
- The position might also be taken that the military clauses
of the Peace Treaty should be revised, but only in
accordance with procedures established in the Treaty, to
permit the Italians to participate to the fullest extent of
its capabilities in the defense of Western Europe. The
Treaty provides that the military provisions may be revised
by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Italy or by agreement between the Security Council and
Italy. As the use of the veto by
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the Soviet Union has prevented Italy
from becoming a member of the United Nations it is not
within the realm of practicality that the Soviet Union as
long as it continues in the Security Council would permit a
revision of the military clauses of the Italian Peace
Treaty. As the time for action is so short, it is likewise
unreasonable to delay action pending another Soviet boycott
of the Security Council, at which time the Western Powers
might act in respect of the Italian Peace Treaty.
- 5.
- The preferable position would appear to be the revision of
the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty in
accordance with international practice justified on the
basis of developments unforeseen during the negotiation of
the Italian Peace Treaty. The Italian Peace Treaty was
negotiated on the assumption that the United Nations in
which Italy would be accepted as a full member would assure
conditions of a lasting peace. To this end it was necessary
that the ex-enemy countries be severely limited in their
capacity for aggressive warfare, and, as peace was to be
assured by the establishment of the United Nations, only a
minimum of defensive capability need be permitted. An
aggressive, totalitarian power with subversion and force as
its instruments now threatens not only certain of the Allied
and Associated Powers, but also some of the ex-enemy
countries which have established democratic governments and
are conducting themselves in accordance with democratic
tradition. The aggression in Korea is the brutal
manifestation of the type of aggression faced by the free
world which must, therefore, undertake to prepare its
defenses.
The Charter of the United Nations in Article 51 specifically
recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations”. Article 4 furthermore provides that “Membership in the
United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept
the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out
these obligations”. The majority of the countries concerned have on
several occasions determined that Italy meets all of the
requirements for membership, and its participation in nearly all
international organizations carrying out the aims of the Charter
gives further justification for its admission, which has been
repeatedly denied by Soviet veto. The very power that has denied
Italy the rights and privileges of a member of the United Nations is
the one that, by its hostile posture and menacing words, has forced
the nations of the Atlantic community including Italy to organize
their collective self-defense under the North Atlantic Treaty.
Because of these developments Italy, as a free, democratic and
peace-loving country, should be given the right as recognized in the
Charter of the United Nations to develop its military strength for
its own defense and for participation in the collective defense of
the Atlantic community.
The limitations contained in the military provisions of the Italian
Peace Treaty are effectively preventing Italy from carrying out a
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program for its
defense and for its full participation in the NATO defense effort. As these are aims
authorized by the United Nations Charter, the signatories of the
Italian Peace Treaty should now agree to the removal of these
limitations. If all signatories were to agree, such action would be
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Even though the
Soviet Union and its satellites were to oppose such action, as might
be expected, the approval of such revision by the majority of the
signatories would be sufficient to permit Italy to take the
necessary action.
procedure
Because of the special position established by the Italian Peace
Treaty for the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet
Union it is desirable that informal discussions be undertaken
between U.S. and British representatives, and then the subject
should be further explored with the French in order that the
principal Western Powers may have a firm agreed position, along the
lines of the fifth possibility suggested above, on the action to be
taken to remove the limitations contained in the military clauses of
the Italian Peace Treaty. This position might then be submitted to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for appropriate documentation
and support of the NATO. The
signatories to the Italian Peace Treaty in that organization could
then by formal communication and with appropriate justification call
upon all other signatories of the Peace Treaty including the Soviet
Union and its satellites to become associated with the proposed
revision of the Italian Peace Treaty. As the intent of the action
would be to give Italy the right of defense recognized in the United
Nations Charter, the anticipated Soviet propaganda could be
countered. Such a declaration of interest, if accepted by most of
the signatories other than the Soviet Union and its satellites,
would serve to permit Italy to develop its military strength in
accordance with the agreed revisions.
