740.5/4–2550: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
1887. For the Secretary from Bruce. In connection with M. Bidault’s suggestion for a high Atlantic Council for Peace, and the various discussions which have taken place in the Department and elsewhere on the subject of strengthening the NAT organization with a view to enlarging the scope of its interest and operations, or of constituting still another international body, I am venturing to make a few personal observations.
Before embarking on any analysis of such matters, I must assume that the US Government is willing to go substantially further than it yet has committed itself in developing in concert with the other members of the North Atlantic Community a comprehensive political and economic as well as a military association. The cardinal decision which will determine the degree to which the Atlantic Community can be united with a view to presenting an effective opposition to aggressive Soviet designs is the extent of the commitment which the US is willing to make in this regard.
It is evident that the situation of the countries of western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviets has considerably improved during the past two years. The influences of Communism in the former area have sensibly diminished as the indices of production have mounted. Yet Communism is capable of speedy resurgence, if material conditions in these countries should markedly deteriorate. The nature of the Soviet Communist system, and the skill with which its leaders exploit non-Communist weaknesses will constitute a grave danger for many years to come. The first flush of enthusiasm over the rehabilitation of the economies of the war-afflicted western nations has faded, and the drab prospect of a future indefinitely menaced by an unscrupulous, powerful and evil enemy has depressed the natural buoyancy of freedom-loving peoples.
Two great problems now confront western statesmen (1) how to tie the interests of Great Britain more closely into those of the other North Atlantic nations and (2) how to fit Germany initially into the European complex, and in as short a time as possible into the Atlantic Area Society of Nations.
As regards the first, I am well aware of the reasons why Great Britain, as our most dependable and powerful ally, might claim special status from us. It has been said in this connection that if such a status is accorded, it must not be overtly acknowledged by us. It is almost impossible however to have an understanding of this nature [Page 64] with the UK without at the same time prejudicing our hopes of coordinating the efforts of the free peoples of the Occident for a common purpose. Such special relationships cannot be kept secret. This is especially true when as is the case with the UK some of its representatives are not on occasion averse to letting their continental colleagues know that they are favored above others by us, and that regardless of the degree of cooperation which they might extend to continental aspirations, in the last resort they can safely rely upon us to save them from any ill consequences which might follow from their policies of comparative self-containment. If, however, everyone is associated in the NAT organization although the special pleadings of the British may be hearkened to with sympathy by the US there would be a greater feeling of community effort.
I think we should face this problem of how to deal with the UK cold-bloodedly and bear in mind certain probabilities which are almost facts; namely, (1) there will be no real European integration without whole-hearted participation by the UK, (2) the UK will not wholeheartedly participate in a purely European integration, (3) ergo, there will be no purely European integration.
Consequently the US must probably cease to press for European integration in the full sense that it has been advocated to date without however abandoning our encouragement of the European nations in their endeavors in this respect. Instead we should advocate a broadening of the conception of an Atlantic Treaty Community that will comprise most of western Europe as well as the US, UK and Canada and eventually western Germany, that will function along political, military and economic lines.
Only however if it proves that nothing of this comprehensive character can be successfully accomplished, then we could examine as a last resort the possible future of a US–UK alliance tacitly or openly expressed. In that case it might not be unfitting to contemplate a progression beyond our previous views on this problem and to speculate whether we should not go the whole hog and form an Anglo-Saxon federation with common citizenship, currency, etc. This latter idea has the virtue of presenting a really exalted goal but our present limited most-favored-nation attitude toward the UK which we do not acknowledge as existing is earning us the ill-will of other nations without gaining us the respect or even the goodwill of the British.
As regards the second problem Germany must as soon as possible be included as a full member of a North Atlantic Community.
In their search for hope and their wish to ward off psychological and material deterioration the nations of western Europe turn almost instinctively to the United States for guidance.
[Page 65]The announcement by the United States of its intention to broaden its participation in North Atlantic Community affairs, would provide a powerful new stimulus in the present situation.
In dealing with the possibility of administering such a new stimulus we must, I think, choose between an approach to the problem (1) through US participation in existing European organizations, or (2) through the creation of a new international organization, or (3) through the expansion of NAT.
I shall not undertake to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches since they have been thoroughly canvassed in the Department.
It would be idle to think however that the mere addition of personalities to an already existing organization or the strengthening of an already existing mechanism or the constitution of a new international body would bring about desirable results in the absence of an agreed and elaborated plan of action.
To arrive at a plan of action we might well consider proposing at the May meetings the formation of a temporary study group which will, operating under terms of reference that are clear and precise, address itself first to a recommendation of the best method of developing the political and economic association of the North Atlantic Community, including as members the US and western Germany. Consideration should also be given to utilizing this group for the broader and more fundamental study of defining the problems critical to the security of the free world and recommending how these problems might be solved within the capabilities of the Atlantic Community of Nations. If the establishment of such a group is to have dramatic value and its recommendations to carry weight it should be composed of individuals of internationally recognized competence.