Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/4–2250: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Paris, April 22, 1950—2 p. m.

1859. Eyes only for Secretary. Bidault sent for me last night. He had returned yesterday from the south of France where he has been since he proposed at Lyon the establishment of a “High Atlantic Council For Peace”. He said that he wanted to explain to me the reasoning which had led to its delivery. He stated:

1. That he used this occasion to launch an idea that might stimulate fruitful discussion of the problems that confront the western world. He has been conscious of deepening sense of apprehension and discouragement amongst the continental peoples at the prospect of the indefinite continuance of the cold war. The unification of Europe within practicable limits of which he is an ardent supporter and which he intends to continue to advocate does not seem feasible within a short period of time and it is therefore necessary, in addition to spurring on the continental nations to greater mutual effort to supplement such endeavors by a more dramatic approach. He feels that the British will not wholeheartedly join in any program in which the US is not a partner. However, France is in the difficult position of not being able to live with England or without her.

2. The British and Continental Foreign Ministers are so distracted and their time so engrossed, in addition to their regular duties, in going from conference to conference of the various bodies such as the OEEC, the Brussels Pact Organization, the Council of Europe, the NAT that they cannot themselves be expected to give the continuity necessary constantly to study, suggest and supervise the implementation of policies designed to take advantage of all the capacities inherent in the western world to win a cold war. This is one of the reasons why he proposed the establishment of a small group of select men who will address themselves uninterruptedly to such questions.

3. He has no plan spelled out in the way of composition or terms of reference and so forth for such a body. He and Schuman, however, are in complete agreement about the desirability of something of this sort being done and a detailed program is being drafted in the Foreign Office which will be presented to Mr. Acheson when he comes to Paris as a suggestion from the French and as a basis of discussion. Bidault does not at present know whether this will suggest setting up a new body or giving greater efficiency to the existing NAT organization.

4. He considers that there are two points of capital importance: (a) That the interests of Great Britain be integrated more closely with those of the other Atlantic Treaty powers, and (b) that Germany be associated as closely as is practicable with the interests of other European nations. Re the second point, he assumes at the present time that it would be neither desirable nor certainly from the French standpoint politically possible to have Germany become a member of the NAT organization, entirely aside from the juridical questions involved as to whether in the absence of a peace treaty Germany would be eligible for such membership. He believes that a rearmament of Germany at present would provoke the Russians to war. If weapons become more plentiful and it seems safe to rearm the Germans, that is a matter which can be considered at a later date. At the present time there are not enough arms to equip the present members of the NAT. He is not one who would say that Germany should never be rearmed. Long ago he learned never to say “never” but that Germany should become a member of the Council of Europe and play her full part therein is one of his strongest desires. Moreover, he would welcome any steps which would bring Germany and France together in closer economic, political and cultural ties. He realizes the difficulties of a full liberalization of trade and of exchange in Europe but thinks and hopes that the Germans and the French may be able to work out something along these lines if they do not meet with too much obstruction from the British. He says that he knows Adenauer¹ well and considers him one of Germany’s most valuable men. But perhaps on account of his age Adenauer is somewhat inclined to try to hurry matters to a conclusion and to crash through his obstacles instead of avoiding them. Further thought must be given as to how Germany can be associated with the North Atlantic effort.

5. In short, his trial balloon was an effort to call the attention of his people to the possibility, provided that it met with the favor of his country’s partners, of giving efficacity to the Atlantic Treaty concept.

6. Since his speech as Lyon, he has had an opportunity to judge what the reaction at home and abroad has been to his proposal. He does not wish it to be in any way embarrassing to the governments of either Great Britain or the US. He was careful to explain several times that he is not committed to any course of action in regard to it. He recognizes its vagueness but hopes it can be made sufficiently concrete and detailed so that it will at least attract the serious consideration of you and Bevin. The French Government will have no pride of authorship in whatever it proposes and will not be prejudiced against any propositions that may be brought forward on this subject by the other two nations.

7. M. Bidault looked very refreshed by his short vacation and although he anticipates numbers of difficulties with the Parliament which reconvenes next week he does not fear an overturn of his government and thinks that France is fundamentally in excellent shape and will be able satisfactorily to solve its immedate economic and social problems. The same is not true of its military commitments the proposed expense of which gravely disturbs him.

Bruce

1. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic.