850.33/8–350: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
secret
Washington, August
3, 1950—7 p. m.
681. For Bruce.
- (1)
- Re Schuman plan, Dept and ECA have given considerable thought to Auth’s role in defense matters (tel 92 July 18 from The [Page 745] Hague and cirtel July 25 3 a. m.). Our prelim view is that it is probably necessary that broad decisions re defense measures affecting coal and steel industries must rest with member states rather than Auth. We foresee risk that if specific provisions adequately safeguarded are not provided for in treaty, member states may either seek inclusion of general escape clause which wld seriously impair Auth’s powers or alternatively may later argue that necessary individual natl defense measures are implicitly exempted. Any broad and general exception, either explicit or implicit, cld be easily abused by natl govts to defeat purposes of Auth.
- (2)
- Accordingly, Dept and ECA have
attempted formulation of detailed provisions on defense matters
based on fol principles:
- (a)
- Member govts wld be empowered through proposed Consultative Comite to give directions to the Auth in the circumstances described below, provided such directions were genuinely for purpose of furthering the common defense of pool members and provided further that they were subscribed to by some stated majority of members.
- (b)
- Auth wld be the administrative agency for the achievement of common defense objectives in reference to coal and steel wherever such objectives cld be achieved by exercise of Auth’s existing power or wherever such objectives otherwise wld require action by member states inconsistent with treaty.
- (c)
- Auth wld be provided with some safeguard against possibility its funds wld be entirely diverted to projects designated by member states as defense projects at expense other projects which Auth considered necessary.
- (3)
- Formulation cld be incorporated in draft treaty in a separate
art along fol lines:
- (a)
- Each member state shall designate minister to serve as member of Consultative Comite. This Comite will meet with High Auth as frequently as may be necessary for discussion of (i) defense measures contemplated by natl govts which have direct bearing on work of High Auth; or (ii) defense measures which shld in interests of common defense of area be instituted by High Auth.
- (b)
- By two-thirds majority of votes cast, Consultative Comite may direct Auth to develop and execute programs necessary to meet any of fol objectives required for defense: (i) achievement of minimum production capacities and production goals by products for specified locations or for area as whole; (ii) allocation to specified users of products in short supply; (iii) establishment of maximum prices; (iv) establishment of maximum limits on amounts of raw materials, electric power or manpower to be absorbed by coal and steel industries; and (v) limitation on exports for security purposes.
- (c)
- High Auth may require that special expenditures necessary for execution of defense programs initiated under (b) (i) above shall be financed by govts of member states, to the extent that such expenditure wld not otherwise have been made by the Auth in carrying out the objectives with which it is charged.
- (4)
- Background paper describing considerations on which, this proposal based being airmailed as Doc WGS D–2/9 Rev 3, entitled “Modifications in the Auth’s powers required by defense considerations”.
- (5)
- Foresee possibility this approach may be resisted by Ger because two-thirds vote provision cld result in NATO countries voting as bloc to carry out NATO decisions which wld then bind Ger. Furthermore we wonder whether introduction of common defense concept into current negots on Schuman Plan Treaty might lead to situation in which Gers wld insist upon prior settlement their role “common defense” matters and thus prejudice further progress on Treaty until settlement that issue.
- (6)
- Note that participation of govts in Consultative Comite wld provide necessary link on defense matters between Authority and any centralized intergovernmental org which might be set up in Wes Eur to direct entire Wes European defense effort and wld not prejudice form which such centralized org might take.
- (7)
- Request ur comments earliest on proposed approach. Particularly desire McCloy’s comments on problems in para 5. Shld be no discussions foregoing with participating govts pending further instrs.
- (8)
- Dept and ECA/W comments on draft arts Schuman plan attached to memo from Tomlinson to Bruce dated July 152 being sent in separate tel.
Acheson