Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

750.00/10–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, October 17, 1950—4 p. m.

2213. Depcirtel 18, October 5. I recognize that complex problem of European integration requires continuous attention and that developments since Korea, particularly in defense field, make advisable review of US position. I hope however, that any reappraisal will start with realities of present European scene and will not be based on presuppositions of doubtful validity which will lead surely to invalid if not hazardous conclusions and lines of action.

Careful reappraisal will, I think, demonstrate once again that foundation of US policy toward European integration must be principle of gradualism and trial and error. Effort by US to blueprint plan for genuine political federation and press it upon Europe is philosophically wrong, would inevitably fail, might even reverse progress already made and certainly would waste time and energies badly needed to attain other objectives which as they are reached seriatim will carry Europe further on its way toward union. This is especially true since US would certainly not be willing to participate fully in such a plan. Impression of bankruptcy of European political and social order and urge for revolutionary changes in political structure which seem to underlie draft paper does not accord with our reading of the patient’s temperature chart. We are on verge of real progress toward creating effective defense within NAT framework. If we are successful in this it will do more to restore faith of Europe “in its own worth and its own future” than any other single development which we can conceive of. I do not mean that we have all the answers or that we can feel self-satisfied about prospects for future. Although it is an essential foundation, adequate defense will not alone restore continental morale. Dynamic social philosophy and program which will recapture for democracy loyalties of working classes and other wavering groups together with leadership to put them into effect are also required. Federation may be an element in or possibly a logical outgrowth of such a program but it is not a substitute for it. And US contribution to supplying leadership and bringing it about can best be made through NATO where we are full and equal members and OEEC where we have some degree of participation rather than by trying to pressure Continent into organization from outside.

Our specific comments follow:

1. Economic forecasting particularly since war has been largely exercise in necromancy and present appears to us especially hazardous time to engage in this favorite indoor sport. Since some estimate of future trends must be provided, however, good case can be made against any serious deterioration in Western Europe’s economic position during next three years. If inflation can be kept under control there may even be some improvement in countries with underutilized resources such as Germany, Belgium¹ and Italy. Overemployed economy such as UK may [find going] tough and inflation difficult to prevent, but they are more likely to hold it under some control at least for the short run. But there is no reason to suppose that federation will either suppress inflation, make its control easier, or necessarily improve the economic prospects for the area presently represented by a number of different nation states with wide variety of views toward function of government. Much depends on whether US undertakes necessary measures and leadership to keep raw material prices from spiralling and thus preventing further deterioration in Western European terms of trade.

2. We do not believe US should base policy on assumption Soviets will continue to provide periodic aggressive moves to put over Western programs. Korea may have frightened Russians into degree of caution. Whether they are aggressive or cautious, we should continue to build upon foundations laid by past US support which has weakened strength of communism throughout Western Europe and in UK has greatly reduced number of those who distrust American motives in aiding them or who still put their faith in Soviets.

3. Other posts are of course in better position to appraise continental attitudes than we. From here, however, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 appear to overstate loss of faith in national order and sentiment for full continental federation. Polls of which we have knowledge have been loosely worded and have asked for attitude toward European “union”, not federation. Furthermore from debates and votes of August session of Council of Europe’s assembly it appears doubtful that any but few extreme federalists are willing to go ahead without UK. German reaction in recent weeks suggests that they are more interested in any association with West which will further their return to control over their own affairs than in continental federation as good in itself. British have not lost faith in themselves as nation and indeed may be too content with present international political structure. In any event they have no intention of submerging themselves in a European federation.

4. Apart from question of continental attitudes, conclusions of draft paper appear to view continental federation as single answer to all of Western Europe’s problems. This it clearly is not. Morale in Western Europe as elsewhere depends primarily upon (a) security from aggression and (b) economic recovery and rising living standards. Active US and UK participation is key to first and important element in second. This was recognized on military side by Atlantic Pact and on economic side by decision to associate US and Canada with OEEC. Improvement in economic conditions in continental European countries depends greatly upon administrative and fiscal reforms which federation might make more rather than less difficult at least in short run.

5. For all these reasons any continental grouping which develops must be closely tied in with [U.S.] and UK in North Atlantic association. We should encourage any initiative by countries to pool their resources and to solve their problems by joint endeavor. Our immediate goal should be to persuade European countries to solve each of their common problems. Federation of continental powers as an ultimate goal, may be thus approached and be finally attained.

We can press for more effective cooperation but surely we must leave to Europeans themselves choice of instruments to accomplish this aim. One of main reasons for seeking closer integration is that it should reduce tension between France and Germany. Real rapprochement between these two powers is essential to solution of common European and even some North Atlantic problems. We must be careful not to force pace thereby running risk of jeopardizing degree of Franco-German rapprochement already achieved. Overt leadership in this field can come only from France and can succeed only if there is a receptive Germany. The Franco-German problem remains the key to the solution as it has been for many years.

6. Whatever position we finally adopt on subject of continental federation we strongly urge that, at appropriate time, we discuss question with British. Even though they will not join a federation and therefore can scarcely assume leadership toward this end, they have great influence on continental countries and their attitude toward continental unity might be vital factor in its success. We do not need to accept their views but we should be sure that they know ours.

Sent Department 2213, Paris 638, Brussels 103, Frankfort 267.

Douglas

1. The London post file copy of the outgoing message does not include Belgium in its listing here of Germany and Italy.