750.00/10–1450: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

secret

2002. Depcirtel 18, October 5, 9 p. m. Following are our comments on assumptions and conclusions set forth reftel describing draft paper not prepared in Department and to which high level government consideration being given.

Before entering upon detailed analysis reftel, we wish to state as emphatically as possible that we believe in ultimate objective of strengthening political and economic structure of western Europe through the creation maximum number of effective media for international cooperation, including supranational bodies. We believe American policy has furthered and is furthering achievement these ends which are supported, though not without qualification as to timing and substance by majority influential European public opinion. We do not however believe assumptions and conclusions set forth in reftel bear a sufficiently close relationship to European political realities to render them useful under immediate circumstances with which we believe ourselves to be confronted.

These circumstances may be very briefly summarized as follows:

(a)
Major factor depressing morale of non-Communist Europe is fear of Soviet aggression in view present relative defenselessness of western Europe.
(b)
Our major current effort in both defense and economic fields is being directed at helping to overcome this feeling of defenselessness.
(c)
In absence overt Soviet aggression or imminent threat thereof, national governments western European countries have now, we believe, achieved condition of stability in which internal subversive elements can no longer envisage major successes (in absence of course of major economic depression).
(d)
Five years since termination hostilities have witnessed astonishing progress in comparison any previous period toward unification western Europe. One has only to recall isolated, selfish, even suicidal manner in which major economic military and political problems of common concern were met in 1939 and previously to realize extraordinary advance represented by creation OEEC, NAT, Council of Europe, Schuman Plan negotiations, et cetera. At same time practical difficulties of immediate or even very rapid political and economic unification becoming increasingly apparent as new ground being broken in fields hitherto untouched by international action. Among practical problems of course is UK attitude, with the general lines of which we assume drafters of paper summarized in reftel to be familiar.
(e)
Any generalized approach to conditions in western European countries immediately runs into fact of great diversity of conditions in these countries. Practical question which must be asked is this: to what extent will prompt political union make to an immediate contribution [Page 677] to solution of specific political, defense and economic problems facing western Europe.

We turn now to comment on numbered paragraphs reftel:

[Here follow comment on assumption 1 and the first paragraph of comment on assumption 2.]

[2.] It is most important that we realize that thanks in large part to renewed national self-confidence in framework of US aid and intra-European cooperation, Soviets and their local allies have suffered series major defeats on political and labor fronts in west Europe. Even in countries where numerical strength of Communist parties apparently remains fairly constant, action possibilities of Communist leadership greatly limited by their knowledge rank and file unwilling and unable to follow directives aimed at producing economic and political chaos for Soviet benefit. We believe however that fear of Soviet aggression will continue during next three years to be major political fact in Europe with twin effect on the one hand of depressing morale until rearmament much further advanced than at present, and, conversely, on the other hand of continuing to make major contribution to growth intra-European solidarity. Failure on our part and on part our European allies to pursue present policies would indeed encourage Soviet aggressiveness.

3. While it is obvious major continental countries, especially France and Italy, are passing through severe crisis of public confidence, fact is national political structure has shown great sturdiness in face knocks of two wars and major depression. Attempts to overthrow democratic governments in France and other western European countries have failed and present line-up against such attempts stronger than ever. Growing strength of national structures is not inconsistent with growing realization that individual national governments are unable alone to guarantee to the individual real security, freedom and progress. In fact, to extent national governments give practical effect to this realization by engaging in various forms of international cooperative action they strengthen public confidence in them.

[Here follows the first paragraph of comment on assumption 4.]

[4.] We repeat that in many European countries, including France, the national political structure, including the machinery of democracy, is passing through a crisis of public confidence. In view of the disasters of our generation and the unsolved major social and economic problems it would be strange if this were not so. Yet since 1947 there has been, thanks in large part of [to] US assistance and example, a great improvement in national morale in western Europe. It is upon this foundation rather than upon a turning away from and a rejection of national political orders that we must build. We disagree fundamentally with assumption that a strong European union can be created on basis loss of faith in national political orders. We view restoration of national self-confidence and stability in western Europe as major asset of free world. Communist propaganda and tactics amply demonstrate that Communist leadership agrees with this statement.

[Here follows comment on assumption 5.]

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6. US leadership and example has achieved great things in post-war Europe. The opportunities for future achievement are great and fate of free world probably depends on their being taken the fullest advantage of. But official US leadership can be exercised only through and in contact with the national leadership which the western European peoples have given themselves through exercise of their own democratic privileges and responsibilities. We energetically reject possibility that, if there is a lack of “effective continuous leadership” in France this lack can be replaced by action of US Government to “give this essential leadership”. In fact it is vital that US leadership be so exercised as to strengthen not weaken prestige and influence national leaders of European countries. Accusations that latter are lackeys and slaves of Washington is favorite theme of Communist propaganda—a propaganda often astute at national level.

In conclusion, we must build world of future with materials we have at hand. In Europe, those materials include a large number of rugged national communities. We must maximize advantages and minimize drawbacks of our material—but we cannot build without accepting it for what it is rather than for what some of us would like it to be.

While we would agree that opportunities for US leadership in many directions must be continuously explored and developed, we believe that our leadership in direction of European unification may have been exercised even beyond effective limit, especially in absence of any willingness on our part to subordinate our own sovereignty beyond existing arrangements. We understand and sympathize with US impatience at alleged slow European progress toward unification, but realities of European situation must be faced and it would appear major responsibility of Department and related agencies to help inform US public opinion adequately of those difficulties instead of permitting impression to arise that failure to progress more rapidly due primarily to lack of vision and of effective leadership.

Bohlen