Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/12–1950

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council With the Defense Ministers¹

top secret

Brussels, [December 19, 1950].

USDel Min–2

Mr. Acheson read to the Council a letter which he had addressed to the Chairman transmitting the reply of President Truman to the request of the Council of the previous day.² The President’s reply stated that in response to the Council’s request that the United States Government designate a US officer to occupy the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Council’s recommendation that General Eisenhower be so appointed, he had designated General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. Van Zeeland, on behalf of the Council, expressed thanks to Mr. Acheson for accomplishing speedily the mission which had been given him on the previous day. He also expressed the thanks and appreciation of the Council to the President of the United States for his action. He then proposed a resolution which formally expressed the will and decision of the Council regarding the designation of the Supreme Commander and read a letter received from the French Defense Minister expressing the confirmation of the French Government to the designation of General Eisenhower.

Mr. Moch congratulated the Council on arriving at a decision which was so essential to the future success of the defense effort. He expressed thanks to Secretary Acheson for the fast work in communicating to the President the wishes of the Council and in obtaining the speedy reply. He thought that the act of designating the Supreme Commander should be solemnized in two steps:

• (1) The Council should give its unanimous agreement to the resolution which had been proposed by the Chairman and the resolution should be signed by the 24 ministers present.

• (2) An individual communication similar to the one which he had addressed to the Chairman should be sent by each government confirming the designation of General Eisenhower.

On the proposal of the Chairman the Council unanimously accepted his resolution.

With regard to the individual letters to be sent to the Chairman, this was agreed in principle.

Count Sforza stated his ability to agree in principle to Mr. Moch’s proposal but said that the constitutional rules within his government would not allow him to address such a communication to the Chairman immediately.

Mr. Lange observed that each minister would need to conform to the constitutional procedures within his own government. In addressing a communication to the Chairman each would say the same thing in substance, but perhaps in different form.

It was agreed that each minister would sign the resolution and that the letters from the individual governments could follow as the various constitutional processes permitted.

Mr. Acheson stated that the Council in taking the step just completed and in taking subsequent legal steps regarding the Supreme Commander had made progress forward with regard to the defense of Western Europe. He stressed that the mere act of appointing a Supreme Commander would not, however, raise the necessary forces or provide the supplies behind them. He therefore urged all governments to move forward as quickly as possible to accept the act just completed as a challenge, and to bolster it by building the forces and providing the necessary supplies behind them. He thought that the following steps were necessary:

• (1) Each government immediately should place under the Supreme Commander forces now in being. In this connection the President of the United States had authorized him to inform the Council that he was placing under the command of the Supreme Commander on the present day the United States forces in Europe. It was the hope of the United States that this act would be matched by similar action by other nations.
• (2) It was clearly obvious that the forces which could be placed under the Supreme Commander were inadequate. Therefore, all nations concerned must take steps to increase their forces and those to be placed under the Supreme Commander as quickly as possible. The United States already had started this action. Again, the President had authorized him to say that the United States would increase its forces under the command of the Supreme Commander.
• (3) It was also obvious that forces without arms and supplies would be unable to carry out their mission of defending Western Europe. Therefore it was of primary importance that all nations take steps to increase the production of equipment and supplies for those forces to be placed under the Supreme Commander. No one nation had yet done enough on this score. The United States was taking steps to increase production of war materials.³ The President had just asked, the Congress for an increase of approximately $40 billion for United States forces and for the forces of other free nations. In connection with this the President had directed a cut-back in civilian production and the immediate placing of military orders for equipment. This was all being done on an urgent basis in the US, and it was imperative that there should be great activity in all countries concerned in the planning and organization of production and industry in order to equip and supply the forces being raised. The United States would be glad to assist in this.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that, in order to bring coordination and direction to bear on industry and production in the United States, the President had appointed Mr. Charles E. Wilson to exercise the necessary functions.⁴ He urged that similar steps be taken in Europe. He referred to the discussion in the Defense Committee of the Defense Production Board and commented that the solution arrived at there was entirely inadequate. A board with a staff director was not good enough to perform the necessary tasks. There should be a person who should be charged with the responsibility of seeing that the productive efforts of Europe were put behind the creation of forces. Obviously many national problems were involved. It was not suggested that an executive authority should be put over each nation but some one man should be designated and given responsibility for production and should work along with General Eisenhower in the building and equipping of the Integrated Force.

Mr. Acheson urged that each government review its own actions and its own concepts in this matter and do whatever is necessary to get the production effort under way as quickly as possible. There should be less talk, fewer resolutions and schemes of organization and more action. This must come about quickly because there was not much time allowed for its completion.

Mr. Moch agreed that the time for speeches was past and said that the letter which he had addressed to the Chairman would be forwarded to the French Commander in Germany. As a result of this the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division comprising French troops in Germany would be placed under the Supreme Commander. These divisions were equipped with United States arms and matériel and were almost completely battle-ready. There were other French forces which were being held for other purposes, and in this connection he made specific reference to the French effort in Indo-China. In addition other forces were being raised forthwith. Two divisions, one infantry and one armored, would be placed under the Supreme Commander in the new year. Also five divisions were being trained on a mobilization basis within France. These divisions would be capable of mobilization within a few days when needed since most of the men comprising them were located closely together in the villages and cities of France. Mr. Moch drew attention to the fact that this action was in accordance with the French position as stated in his communication of August 5th.⁵ With regard to production the French effort was being increased commensurate with the credit available. He could go into further detail on this but perhaps it would be better to do so at another time. In summation he said that France was fully supporting the Supreme Commander in his work towards building the defenses of Western Europe.

Count Sforza said that Mr. Acheson’s statement had really been an appeal. He was pleased to hear Mr. Moch, but thought that his statement was more in the nature of a military solution. The present effort would be successful only if a gigantic economic effort were made parallel with the military effort. This was why Mr. Acheson had called attention to the appointment of Mr. Wilson. He drew attention to the fact that whatever the merits of Mr. Wilson—and Mr. Wilson had been appointed because of his outstanding ability—he would be correspondent only to a European business man if his efforts in the United States were restricted to one or two states. Mr. Wilson’s importance derived from the fact that he was continental in scope. Count Sforza thought that there was no Wilson in Europe. Europe faced not only the Russian danger but also a German danger in that there was the great chance of domination by that nation in any coordinated effort with which it was connected. Europe could not be sure against Russia without German support. German support could not be safely had unless something were done about the basic character of the German nation. Germany must be faced with an organized Europe so that its tremendous productive capacity and powers of initiative could be utilized safely. Count Sforza thought that this vision of an organized Europe might be realized sooner than expected. He thought until this Utopian idea could be considered and something done about it the whole scheme could not succeed. Only with its arrival would many of the dangers from all quarters be alleviated.

Mr. Bevin thought it appropriate that this vital matter of national effort should have been raised by the United States after the Supreme Commander had been designated. The Council must seriously consider the development of a defense organization, the constitution of forces and the rapid development of a defense production. The UK had previously announced the contribution which it could make to the effort. He thought that following the present meeting the UK Government would make a further supreme effort with regard to defense production for equipment of forces under the Supreme Commander. He emphasized the field of production and drew attention to a slogan of the last war that metal was cheaper than men; good and sufficient equipment would provide the men with mastery of whatever situation they had to face. He was sure that the UK would do everything possible commensurate with maintaining a reasonable economy. He recognized, however, that there must be adjustments in the economy and that similar adjustments would be necessary in the economies of other nations. With regard to defense production two factors were dominant—quantity and speed. Speed must be on the side of the NATO nations. Production must be put in hand and multiplied without waiting to work out theoretical approaches or organizations.

He noted that the UK had been engaged since the war in the struggle in many parts of the world against Communist encroachment. Other nations were also involved. However, in view of the present disturbing and dangerous situation, the UK had decided to increase its accelerated defense effort still further primarily to help the NAT nations and other friendly nations. He could not commit his government to a specific sum of money for this effort but assured the Council that the UK would do what needed to be done. All nations must, with the greatest vigor and resolution, get on with building up the Integrated Force rapidly. He said that in the building of the defense force Great Britain would give of her best.

Mr. Kraft thought that the present action demonstrated that the fate of Europe and America was inextricably tied together. The designation of the Supreme Commander had confirmed this. Although much had been done, there were still great decisions to be taken. He mentioned the question of Germany’s participation in this regard. He felt it necessary that the Germans must be convinced that the beliefs and concept and line of action of the NATO nations was the only way in which the security of German soil might be insured. He thought that the assignment of forces by the United States to the Supreme Commander and the intention to increase these forces would greatly strengthen the confidence of the peoples of Europe. He pleaded for a greater pooling of effort by the NAT nations and thought that the results of such would greatly enhance success.

Mr. Cunha agreed that efforts to date had not been enough and that they must be developed and increased. He said that Portugal would make new efforts. He called attention to the special situation in Portugal, in particular her overseas territories and her geographical position on the Iberian Peninsula. He had hoped to see the development of more cooperation with respect to the latter, and perhaps there could be a solution soon along the lines envisioned by the Portugal Government. As to defense production this would require further study. He did not know how Portugal would be affected but he was sure that Europe must do more. However, he cautioned that civilian production should not be weakened since this was the basis of the internal strength of the nations. In summation he said that Portugal would study all efforts to strengthen the common defenses.

Mr. Claxton said that Mr. Acheson had put in sober and serious terms his estimate of the international situation. He had indicated what the United States would do to deal with the situation. The increase in Communist aggression had been a source of great concern to Canada. Canada had taken steps to increase her defense effort just after the Korean hostilities and would continue to press on with them. An important aspect of the Korean situation was that it showed the strategy of the USSR to be that of involving the western nations heavily in Asia. Canada was convinced that the defenses of Europe must be strengthened and that Europe was in essence the heart of the strength of the West. Europe must take first place in our global strategy, and the NATO area is the key to defense against the USSR. He spoke of the need to press on with building military strength and said that political and other progress must be carried along with the military plan. Canada was ready to carry its part in the effort. The acceleration of production was an essential part of the defense build-up and this involved many activities such as standardization and coordination in placing of defense orders. All of these things must be worked out with the greatest possible speed.

Mr. Van Zeeland said that Belgium Was convinced that following the events which had taken place, peace could be saved only by strength. This meant increased combined efforts in the NATO. Belgium was ready to do its share. The designation of the Supreme Commander was a great step forward and in addition some countries had already assigned troops to his command. In this connection Belgium would take immediate similar steps. With regard to production the Belgium Defense Minister had made certain proposals in the NATO and he hoped they could be taken into account in planning the increased effort. With regard to production, orders must be placed with manufacturing firms and all efforts made towards speeding up the work of the people in the industries. He would have further ideas on this which could be discussed later.

The Council recessed from 12:20 to 1:40, at which time the Chairman, in the absence of further discussion on Item III of the agenda, asked Mr. Spofford to present Item IV—the Report of the Deputies.⁶

Mr. Spofford thought that the report spoke for itself and suggested that it be read not in the light of what has been done but what needs to be done. It was clear that the efforts made to date were totally inadequate and that a greater production effort such as proposed by the Council was needed to supply and equip the Integrated Force.

The Council took note of the Deputies Report.

Mr. Stikker then raised, under Item V—other business, the question of raw materials and the Council resolution in New York which asked the Deputies to work on the supply aspect of raw materials and the control of prices. This was of recognized importance since in building up production the NAT nations must begin with raw materials. He outlined the action which had been taken since within the NATO and within the OEEC concerning raw materials. In this connection representatives of the OEEC had been asked to go to Washington to discuss certain commodity problems. These representatives had been informed that a raw materials planning board had been set up as a result of the talks between the President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.⁷ He understood that France later had been asked to join this board. He pointed out that the question of raw materials concerned many other nations and other organizations, i. e., NATO and OEEC. He thought it most important that decisions on this matter should not be made in a tripartite body but on a broader basis. He thought there should not be a tripartite allocating board even if the OEEC were asked to send an observer to such a board. He hoped that the tripartite powers would reconsider their decision in the light of the work in this field by the OEEC and the NATO. (See Annex A)⁸

Mr. Lange supported the position taken by Mr. Stikker. He said that if the information reported by Mr. Stikker was true, the problem could not be worked out on the basis as it was represented before the Council in the Deputies’ report. Work on the raw materials question should be done so far as possible in bodies where all nations present were represented. He recognized that some nations outside both NATO and OEEC were concerned but he felt that the primary effort in this field should be through the OEEC with the NATO assisting where appropriate.

Colonel DeGreef supported the position taken by the Netherlands and Norwegian delegates.

Count Sforza associated himself with the preceding remarks and said that these statements were made not with an intention of manifesting prestige but in the interest of the common effort of all nations involved.

Mr. Cunha associated himself with the Norwegian position.

Mr. Acheson said he understood the concern expressed grew out of the recent Truman–Attlee discussions which set up a US–UK–French Working group and a fear that: (1) action would not be taken in accordance with agreements in the NATO; (2) an allocation function might be performed by the tripartite nations; and (3) action might be taken without consulting all nations present. He thought that these fears should be put away. The three powers were trying to work out some means of handling the question in the interest of making rapid progress. There were two aspects to the raw material problem—production and allocation. It was a question of trying to get the producing countries, which in many cases were not represented on any of the bodies, to move toward cooperation in the supply of raw materials. There Was the question of the consumer countries who also in many cases were not represented on the bodies concerned. The problem could be worked out only if all countries concerned endeavored to reach a solution. It would have to be on a commodity by commodity basis regardless of the interest of OEEC or NATO; groups of countries concerned with particular commodities must get together and address themselves to the problem. These groups could, of course, have no powers other than those of persuasion.

Mr. Bevin said that the whole idea was to get the materials and to get them quickly. He thought it might be better to have the three powers get the materials and then arrange for distribution of them by consultation with other countries or agencies concerned. He felt that the creation of a large new agency or organization to deal with this problem would be a cumbersome and unworkable solution. Everything that was done would be checked with the OEEC and the NATO.

Mr. Stikker said that it had never been in his mind or in the minds of other OEEC countries that there should be one body to discuss this question; there was agreement that it must be an attack on a commodity basis. However, Mr. Bevin indicated that a new three-power organization should take things in hand to procure materials. He took exception to the idea of a new organization, which meant that decisions would be made outside the OEEC and the NATO. Consequently he felt there would be great harm done to cooperation in Europe.

Mr. Bevin pleaded for agreement by all concerned that the job must be done quickly and without any delay. He felt that the ideas he had expressed were for the good of all concerned. The three-power body would be able to move quickly and effectively in obtaining the materials and then after consultation could arrange for their distribution.

Mr. Lange realized the essence of speed but he was not put at ease with the answers which had been given on the matter at hand. He did not feel that speed would be sacrificed by the use of the OEEC in which all the three-powers were represented. He pleaded for the use of the OEEC and NATO on this problem and felt that if they were not used confidence in them would be undermined. He suggested that the Deputies might be asked to look into the matter and endeavor to work out a solution in the light of the remarks made in the present meeting.

Mr. Bevin thought that if the matter were referred to the Deputies another difficulty would arise—the position of the producing countries which are not in the NATO. He urged that a solution be found which would not cause delay in the essential work. He suggested that the Council might call the attention of the tripartite body to the anxiety expressed regarding liaison and consultation with other nations. The importance of consulting the OEEC, the NATO and producing countries could be emphasized. Mr. Bevin felt that the tripartite body would certainly not be an unreasonable arrangement and he envisioned that the Deputies might be the NATO body which would be consulted by the tripartite body. He recorded his government’s position that the basis of the organization should be the tripartite arrangement.

Count Sforza said he supported the remarks made by the Dutch and Norwegian Foreign Ministers, but he felt that the whole matter should be ref erred to the Deputies.

Mr. Stikker called attention to the decision recently made by the OEEC to arrange conferences on raw materials. If it were now agreed that decisions on raw materials were to be made by a tripartite body, difficulty would be encountered in the OEEC. He, therefore, could not give his approval to Mr. Bevin’s suggestion.

Mr. Claxton said that he would be satisfied with Mr. Acheson’s explanation. However, Mr. Bevin had indicated that a body had been set up in Washington to deal with the matter. Mr. Claxton suggested that the question be referred to the Deputies who should be asked to look into the question from the point of view of the countries concerned.

Mr. Acheson associated himself with the remarks of Mr. Claxton. He felt that the situation had become quite confused. So far as he knew there was no tripartite organization in existence with regard to the raw materials problem. The three powers were merely trying to decide where to go and how to get there. Not only the OEEC and NATO were involved but other countries all over the world had vital interests in this question. The efforts of the tripartite powers had been designed to see how a beginning could be made to solve this very complicated problem. They were aware of the interests of OEEC and of NATO and of other countries of the world. They were merely trying to suggest a means of attacking the problem. It was not even agreed that more powers might not be associated with the three in this preliminary phase.

Mr. Stikker supported the views of Mr. Acheson.

Mr. Bevin said that he was even further confused by this. He agreed that the matter could be referred to the Deputies but said that he could not regard himself as being committed to any solution as a result of this reference.

In absence of any further objections, Mr. Van Zeeland said that the matter would be forwarded to the Deputies for study and that no definite instructions would be issued to the Deputies. They must work out the problem themselves on the basis of instructions of the governments.

This was agreed by the Council.

Mr. Claxton introduced the Canadian resolution pertaining to reorganization of the NATO structure;⁹ the sense of which was that the Deputies would give the matter further study. The resolution was adopted by the Council.

The Council approved a communiqué and directed that it be issued to the press. (Annex B)¹⁰

The meeting adjourned at 3:20 p.m.

1. Held at 10 a. m. December 19 in the Palais Provincial.
2. For the texts of the two communications under reference here, see Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1951, p. 6.
3. See the address by President Truman on the National Emergency, broadcast to the nation on December 15, and the presidential proclamation on the existence of a national emergency, dated December 16, Department of State Bulletin, December 25, 1950, pp. 999–1003.
4. Charles Edward Wilson, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
5. See telegram 852, August 17, p. 220.
6. A copy of the report of the deputies, D–D/210, “Second Report by the North Atlantic Council Deputies,” dated December 13, not printed, is in the Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95, CF 44. Lot 59 D 95 is a collection of documentation on official visits of foreign dignitaries to the United States and on major international conferences for the years 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
7. For documentation on the Truman–Attlee talks, December 4–8, see pp. 1698 ff.
8. “Statement on the Subject of Raw Materials, Made by Mr. Stikker,” not printed. The statement, which records in detail Stikker’s views, was circulated before the second meeting.
9. D–D/169, p. 461.
10. Not printed. For the text of the communiqué, issued on December 19 at the close of the sixth session, see Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1950, p. 7.