Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/12–1850

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council With the Defense Ministers¹

top secret

Brussels, [December 18, 1950.]

USDel Min–1

Mr. Van Zeeland, as Chairman, opened the meeting by welcoming the Council to Brussels. He then raised the question of the agenda, which was adopted without change.

Mr. Van Zeeland then proposed consideration of Item I on the agenda—German Participation in the Defense of Western Europe. The Council had before it a letter from the Chairman of the Defense Committee (Mr. Pace) approving and transmitting to the Council the joint report of the North Atlantic Council Deputies and the Military Committee on this item (Doc C6–D/1²).

Colonel E. V. G. A. DeGreef (Belgian Defense Minister) raised a question with regard to that portion of the Deputies report (paragraph 15, sub 1 and 2) wherein it is recommended that the Occupying Powers be invited to keep the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty informed as fully as possible of the course of the discussions with the German authorities and the steps taken to initiate German participation. He observed that since the German position on the question was not known, the Occupying Powers in the course of their discussions with the German authorities might be obliged to seek agreement on a framework outside that already agreed by the NATO. He submitted that in such an eventuality, the Occupying Powers should not only inform the other NAT countries of the course of discussions, but should refer any different decision to the Council for approval before proceeding in discussions with the German authorities. He did not propose that the wording of the report be changed, but that an interpretative note in the above sense be included in the record of the meeting.

Mr. Bevin (UK Foreign Minister), without commenting specifically on the proposal made, suggested that if the other NAT nations had views to express with regard to the approach to be made by the Occupying Powers to the German Federal Republic, such views should be expressed now.

Mr. Schuman (French Foreign Minister) agreed with the proposal made by the Belgian delegate, expressing his support not only as a member of NATO but as one of the Occupying Powers.

Mr. Acheson said that if it were proposed that the Occupying Powers in their discussion with the Germans should not depart from the agreement reached by the NAT nations, insofar as NATO jurisdiction were considered, this was only right and proper. On the other hand, if this were intended to extend the powers of the NATO and in effect place some additional or new restriction on the Occupying Powers, he could not agree.

Colonel DeGreef explained that his proposal was designed to provide an interpretative note of the relevant portion of the documents agreed by the Deputies and the Military Committee. However, in view of Mr. Acheson’s statement, he was satisfied and could agree to the recommendations as made by the Defense Committee.

The Council then approved the recommendation of the Defense Committee as contained in the letter from the Chairman of that body, which transmitted the report of the Deputies and the Military Committee.

Mr. Van Zeeland then invited discussion on Item II of the agenda—the Creation of an Integrated Force for the Defense of Western Europe. The Council had before it a letter from the Chairman of the Defense Committee (Mr. Pace) transmitting the Military Committee report on the subject item and recommending approval by the Council of that report (DC 24/3; C6–D/2³).

Mr. Schuman observed that in the report of the Military Committee it was envisioned that senior officers would be designated as commanders of various operational commands in the integrated force. He wondered who would make such designations and when it would be done. This was not made clear by the report.

Mr. Pace (U.S. Secretary of Army representing the Secretary of Defense) explained that it had been envisioned that such designations would be determined in the first instance by the Supreme Commander, assuming his appointment, but that the final designations would presumably be made after the Supreme Commander had consulted on this point with the nations concerned.

Mr. Bevin envisioned the appointment of the Supreme Commander in the first instance and following this the appointment of other senior commanders. With regard to the Supreme Commander, he wondered by whom he would be appointed, when he would be appointed and how such appointment would be made.

Mr. Acheson quoted the pertinent provisions of the Military Committee paper on the appointment of the Supreme Commander, which stipulated that he should be appointed “forthwith”, and suggested that the Council should first consider and adopt the basic paper which was in front of it. If after adopting this paper the Council addressed a request to the President of the United States to designate a United States officer as Supreme Commander, then the President would designate such an officer.

Mr. Bevin said he was satisfied with this but that he would later have a proposal to make on this question.

Mr. Van Zeeland asked for further general comment and in the absence of any recognized the Portuguese Foreign Minister on the point of detail.

Mr. Cunha (Portuguese Foreign Minister) drew attention to that portion of the paper before the Council concerning the relationship between the Standing Group and the Deputies. The Defense Committee had approved the document on the understanding that proposals made by the Portuguese and Danish governments with regard to the specific point mentioned would be studied further by the Military Committee. In the present paper it was proposed that the Deputies, as a continuing political body, should furnish guidance to the Standing Group when the other political bodies were not in session. There was a question as to what authority would be given the Deputies if they were to perform this function. If they were to work on the basis of directives of the Council, that was one thing, but if the Deputies were to promulgate new decisions and directives that was another.

Mr. Lange (Norwegian Foreign Minister) called attention to the fact that the Council had agreed at New York on the principle of giving continuous political guidance to the Standing Group. The Deputies, the continuing political body, was the natural agency to perform this function. In performing this function, however, the Deputies would be expressing the views of their governments, and their authority and decisions would be made accordingly. This particular aspect of the question related to the proposal made by the Canadian Government for the reorganization of the NATO structure, which proposal would be considered later by the Council. He emphasized that the Deputies must come more and more to be the channel through which governments exercised direction in the NATO.

Mr. Stikker (Netherlands Foreign Minister) supported the position taken by the Norwegian Foreign Minister. He also pointed out that in the resolution adopted by the Council in New York the function in question was contemplated as exercising higher direction, whereas the present document spoke in terms of guidance. He raised the question as to any possible difference.

Mr. Kraft (Danish Foreign Minister) agreed with the Norwegian position. He thought that the Deputies should be the continuing body concerned with action at the governmental level. He proposed that Part I of the present document be studied by the Deputies and the appropriate military body so that both political and military aspects of the question were given due weight.

Mr. Stikker, addressing himself to the point he had raised earlier, said that he understood there was a considerable difference in meaning between guidance, as used in the present pamper, and direction, as used in the original Council resolution. He also noted that in the present document it was provided that in the event the political guidance appeared militarily unacceptable or in conflict with the strategic concept previously approved by higher NATO agencies, the Standing Group in consultation with the Military Representatives Committee, or the military representatives of the individual nations as appropriate, should inform the Council Deputies and if agreement is not reached immediately report to the Military and/or Defense Committees. He realized that it would be difficult to amend the present document, but he proposed that in future discussion of this question it should be made clear that the wording of the present document did not in any way change the decision of the Council in New York.

Colonel DeGreef observed that the relationship of the Standing Group to representatives of other NAT nations was a question subject to many objections by the smaller governments. He realized that the Standing Group should be able to act definitively and with rapidity of decision and therefore that it must not be a heavy or cumbersome body. However, he thought that the provisional arrangement contemplated in the present paper, i. e., the Chairman of the Standing Group should be the Chairman of the newly constituted Military Representatives Committee, was not a satisfactory solution. He made the alternative proposal that the Chairman of the Military Representatives Committee should be elected by the non-Standing Group nations and that this Chairman should sit as an observer on the Standing Group.

Mr. Bevin thought this whole question should be studied by the Deputies.

Mr. Van Zeeland suggested that Mr. Bevin’s proposal would seem to be acceptable to most of the governments and in addition bore relationship to the Canadian reorganization proposal which had already been preliminarily discussed by the Deputies. He wondered therefore if it could be adopted by the Council.

Mr. Moch agreed that Mr. Bevin’s suggestion of referring the matter to the Deputies would be acceptable, but stressed that the Standing Group had a heavy load of vital and important work before it and that this work must suffer no delay, in particular that part of the activities of the Standing Group relating to SHAPE must proceed without delay. Hence, paragraph 11, relating to the establishment of the Military Representatives Committee, must be implemented immediately even though the question were referred to the Deputies for further study.

Colonel DeGreef noted that paragraph 11 was precisely what he proposed should be amended. His proposal was that the Chairman of the Military Representatives Committee should be elected by non-Standing Group nations and that this Chairman should sit as an observer on the Standing Group.

Mr. Pace observed that paragraph 11 was primarily a military problem. It had been considered by the Military Committee and had been agreed in the present form as the most acceptable solution for the present. The Defense Committee had also approved this proposal. He thought that the proposal should be implemented and that opportunity must be given to determine its workability before any attempts were made to amend it. He therefore strongly supported the position that it should be put into effect without delay.

Colonel DeGreef thought that the Defense Committee had not really had occasion to discuss fully the point in question. The bulk of the discussion had been concerned with the Supreme Commander, and he had not suggested his amendment formally in the Defense Committee but had submitted it to the Secretariat. He was, however, prepared to accept the proposal that as a provisional measure the Chairman of the Standing Group should be the Chairman of the Military Representatives Committee, reserving his position, however, on future action on this question.

Count Sforza (Italian Foreign Minister) supported the Belgian proposal and thought it was a just and appropriate arrangement when considered with respect to NAT countries.

Mr. Van Zeeland then suggested, and the Council approved, the proposal as follows:

1. That the question of the relationship between the Standing Group and other bodies in the NATO be referred to the Deputies for consideration, and

2. That paragraph 11 of the present document be put into effect provisionally with the Chairman of the Standing Group acting provisionally as the Chairman of the Military Representatives Committee.

The Council then addressed itself to the consideration of a resolution put forward by the Chairman concerning the creation of the Integrated Force.

Mr. Schuman referred to that portion of the document concerning the appointment of a Supreme Commander and the recommendation that he should be a U.S. officer. He agreed that the Government of the United States should be requested to designate an officer as the Supreme Commander; however, there was a juridical aspect of such an action which was most important. The designation of such a Supreme Commander should be made by all the governments concerned. This was necessary if the Supreme Commander was to command forces of all the nations involved.

Mr. Bevin said that he had in mind the same point and proposed that there should be added to the appropriate sentence in the resolution before the Council the following: “On appointment the Supreme Commander would receive a letter of confirmation of his appointment signed by the members of the Defense Committee.” Mr. Bevin submitted that this would make sure that the Supreme Commander had the necessary authority over the forces of all the nations concerned.

Mr. Acheson observed that the resolution as presented requested the United States Government to designate an officer to occupy the position of Supreme Commander. If the Council approved this resolution, he hoped that the Supreme Commander could be designated as quickly as possible, perhaps by the next day’s meeting. The Council could then concern itself with what further legal steps needed to be taken. He thought that in addition the Council might wish to suggest by name an officer who might be designated by the United States Government.

Mr. Moch stated that if he had correctly understood Mr. Acheson’s statement, he thought the NAT nations were on the verge of taking an important step and making real progress. He had understood Mr. Acheson to say that the United States was ready to designate an officer and to suggest that further aspects in connection with this appointment could be worked out later. He thought that this was a point for action and said that as to the officer concerned, the French Government had in mind many U.S. officers who might be designated but that one officer in particular, because of his great service in liberating Europe, stood out above all others. He suggested the name he thought was in the minds of everybody—General Eisenhower.

Mr. Claxton (Canadian Defense Minister) said that he had intended to submit a resolution on this particular point if the present resolution before the Council received approval. He contemplated action by the Council specifically as Mr. Moch had suggested.

Mr. Bevin said that in view of the statements just made, he would withdraw his suggested amendment to the resolution before the Council.

Count Sforza said that he knew that the thoughts as to the individual who should be Supreme Commander were in the minds of everyone, and he said that the choice of General Eisenhower would make a great impression on the Italian people.

Mr. Lange said that the appointment of General Eisenhower would be received with great joy by the Norwegian people.

Mr. Stikker said that the appointment of General Eisenhower would be a most important step and would go far to restoring the confidence needed so much in the nations of Western Europe.

Mr. Cunha said that the appointment of General Eisenhower would meet with the wholehearted approval of the Portuguese people and would give to Europe a great confidence in the defense effort.

Mr. Bevin said that the UK would of course agree to designation of General Eisenhower.

Mr. Kraft associated himself with the suggestion of Mr. Moch that General Eisenhower be appointed.

Colonel DeGreef said that in his country which had been liberated by General Eisenhower, his appointment would be received with great enthusiasm. The Chairman regretted that because of his holding the chairmanship, Belgium had to wait until last to give its approval to the appointment of General Eisenhower.

Mr. Lange, continuing the discussion on the resolution, suggested the addition, after the words “The Medium Term Defense Plan,” of the following, “and in Part IV of the report of the Defense Committee.”

Mr. Pace said that he understood the intent of the Norwegian proposal to be that the NATO should move ahead more rapidly in the defense effort and he therefore supported the proposal.

The amendment suggested by Mr. Lange was accepted.

Mr. Schuman referred to the question of how the other NAT governments would be associated with the designation of a U.S. officer as Supreme Commander. He stressed again the necessity of this in order that the Supreme Commander would have the proper authority over national contingents.

Count Sforza wondered if this question had not been answered already. The Council had expressed itself in the sense that not just a General Officer should be designated but that General Eisenhower should be designated. He thought that this would meet the situation if it were reflected by a slight change in the wording of the resolution.

Mr. Claxton said that there were two aspects to the designation of the Supreme Commander—the first of these concerned making the news known to the public, and the second concerned the legal position of the Supreme Commander. The first required immediate action by the Council. However, the second aspect must be dealt with in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each nation. He felt this could be done very quickly.

Mr. Bevin suggested that if the Supreme Commander were designated by the next day the Council could pass a resolution which would put the matter in order with the Parliaments and governments concerned.

Mr. Lange thought that the Council could do what Mr. Bevin suggested but he felt that each Defense Minister should write a letter on the following day, after the designation was made, confirming that designation. This would meet the constitutional point involved.

Mr. Moch injected that the letters should be addressed to the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council.

On the basis of this discussion the resolution before the Council was approved. (Annex A)

Mr. Claxton then proposed a resolution, the effect of which was a request to the President of the United States that he designate General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. In connection with proposing his resolution, Mr. Claxton stressed the fact that naming a Supreme Commander would not of itself raise the forces which were required for the defense of Western Europe and that this mission must be accomplished by the nations themselves.

The resolution proposed by Mr. Claxton was approved. (Annex B)

At the request of the Chairman, Mr. Acheson agreed to communicate to the President of the United States the action of the Council and the request made with the hope that a reply could be received by the next day.⁴

Mr. Van Zeeland then raised the question of a communiqué. He said this always created great difficulties, and he would therefore like to suggest that the Deputies meet as a drafting committee that evening.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether the Chairman had in mind one communiqué that evening and another the following day. Mr. Van Zeeland said he contemplated only one communiqué at the end of the session, which led Mr. Bevin to comment that he was an optimist about press relations.

Mr. Acheson suggested that there should be an interim communiqué, largely colorless, issued that night. He said he wished to urge the Council with the greatest possible fervor that there be no substantive report to the press that night on the decisions taken during the meeting.

Mr. Van Zeeland said they all agreed and were under a moral obligation to exercise restraint. He proposed that the Deputies meet immediately to draft an interim communiqué and to begin work on a final communiqué. This was agreed by the Council.

The meeting was adjourned at 7:15 p. m.

Annex A

The Council, convinced that recent developments in the international situation have increased the urgency of establishing the integrated force for the defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany, envisaged by the Council in its resolution of 26 September 1950 (C5–D/11 final);⁵

Having considered the report of the Defense Committee on this matter;

Approves:

The Defense Committee’s report, including the measures proposed therein to establish the integrated force and the terms of reference for the supreme commander attached thereto. In this connection the members of the North Atlantic Council, speaking on behalf of their governments, indicate that it is the intention of their governments to proceed along the lines outlined in this paper in order to achieve its purposes;

Authorizes:

The implementation of the recommendations therein for the necessary reorganization of the NATO military structure to provide for the integrated force and its supreme commander;

Agrees:

That the integrated force is to be constituted, and the supreme commander appointed, at the earliest possible date;

Requests:

• (a) The Government of the United States to designate an officer of its armed forces to fill the position of supreme commander of the integrated force.
• (b) The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to take immediately all practicable steps to have ready, as set forth in the medium term defense plan, and in part 4 of the report of the Defense Committee, their initial contribution to the force on the request of the supreme commander and concurrently consider ways and means of rapidly effecting completion of the requisite additional national contributions to the strength of the force.⁶

Annex B

The Council, having agreed with the recommendation of the Defense Committee that a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, should be appointed as soon as possible as an essential action in proceeding with the prompt establishment of an effective NATO defense force in Europe;

Recognizing that the ultimate success of such a force lies in its sound initiation and that, for this reason, the selection of the first supreme commander is a question of the utmost importance;

Reposing the greatest faith in General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as a commander of incomparable prestige, proven ability, and the highest order of leadership;

Unanimously recommends to the President of the United States that he designate General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.⁷

1. Held at 4 p. m. December 18 at the Palais Provincial.
2. Not found in Department of State files. The joint report, C6–D/1, entitled “German Contribution to the Defense of Western Europe,” dated December 13, is a composite document consisting of D–D/196 (see D–D/196 (Final), p. 531), and D/MC–D/2, p. 538, which is usually referred to as the “Brussels Decision,” “Brussels Formula,” or “Brussels Agreement.”
3. DC 24/3, p. 548; C6–D/2 is the Council designation for DC 24/3.
4. For the texts of Secretary Acheson’s telegram to President Truman on December 18 and the President’s reply of the same day designating General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, see Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1951, p. 6.
5. Transmitted in Secto 55, September 26, p. 350.
6. A copy of this resolution was transmitted to President Truman at 10 p. m. on December 18.
7. A copy of this resolution was also transmitted to President Truman at 10 p. m. on December 18.