Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–3050

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (MacArthur)

priority

[Washington,] November 30, 1950.

Participants:	Mr. Matthews, G
	Mr. C. E. Steel, Minister, British Embassy
	Mr. MacArthur, RA

Mr. Steel called at his request to bring to the Department’s attention the views of the British Government on the creation of an integrated force for the defense of Europe and the naming of a Supreme Commander. Mr. Steel said that the British had only with the greatest reluctance agreed to the compromise proposal put forth by Mr. Spofford since they consider that the French desire to create a strictly “European Army” is not desirable. The British feel that this will complicate the problem of obtaining German adherence and further-more might result in the creation of some kind of a weak European Third Force which would be subject to pressures from the “neutralists”. Such a development, where a European Army would be responsible to a weak European political structure, could prove very dangerous in terms of NAT military strength.

Mr. Steel said that while the British had agreed to go along with the Spofford proposal, they felt very strongly that it would be impossible to make any progress in creating the necessary defensive strength in Europe if a Supreme Commander were not named immediately. The British therefore trusted that if agreement were reached by the Military Committee and Deputies and ratified by the Defense Committee, we would at once announce the creation of the integrated force and the Supreme Commander thereof. Mr. Steel said that the British believe that this would be helpful throughout Europe but would in particular be of great help with Germany. He believed that a Supreme Commander of outstanding stature and leadership could, given the nature of the German character, go far to obtain German participation.

Mr. Steel requested that the British Government’s very strong views in this respect be brought to the attention of the Secretary. He concluded by stating that the British Government believes that our whole effort in the NAT defense field would bog down unless we took the above steps.

Mr. Matthews said that we were giving this question our most serious attention and that while he could not give an answer on what our position would be, we would keep very much in mind the considerations mentioned by Mr. Steel.

There are attached copies of two telegrams that Mr. Steel left with Mr. Matthews on this problem. One is from the Foreign Office in London and the other from the British High Commissioner, Mr. Kirkpatrick.¹

1. Neither printed.