Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–2850: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

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London, November 28, 1950—midnight.

Depto 239. Eyes only for Perkins from Spofford. This morning Hoyer-Millar, Alphand and I had talk on German problem. Hoyer-Millar gave Alphand for first time British position as made known to us late yesterday.¹ In stating it today he stressed fact that British did not like French proposals but were willing to have French proceed with them. Major consideration was getting on with military planning and appointment of supreme commander. He confirmed that British would not participate in European army. In general strongly supported US position.

Discussion which followed centered on major point of link between German rearmament and progress of French plan. I repeated position taken with Alphand yesterday that no link would be acceptable to US since would inject element political uncertainty into military preparations. Hoyer-Millar supported this view. Alphand stated he had reported our view to Paris and had suggested abandoning link concept but had been turned down. He suggested as alternative agreement that military controls (as proposed in MC–30) should be relaxed only upon creation European army. I stated this unsatisfactory but would consider some such agreement if relaxation controls related to permanent institutions which might or might not be European army. Alphand attaches great importance to this system as offering Pleven basis for saying to assembly that new proposals have same strength as old in which he stated categorically that German rearmament would be linked to creation European army, Defense Minister et cetera. Believe area of possible agreement exists here. Would appreciate your comments and guidance.

Alphand then read us telegram he had sent to his government recommending basis of agreement which except for above question of link is in general within scope of our proposals and military commission working paper. Following is summary his telegram:

(1) Level of German units will be RCTs as proposed in MC–30.

(2) French will call conference in Paris to which European NATO nations invited. No agreement in principle will be requested in advance. Agenda should specifically mention French proposals. Non-European NATO members will be invited as observers. Invitation will be given after Schuman Plan accepted.

(3) Preparatory measures for German rearmament acceptable on interim basis. This includes legislation, registration, recruitment and training, latter in first instance, to be in conjunction with occupation forces.

(4) Pending establishment permanent system, controls (as prescribed in MC–30) to be administered by High Commissioners.

(5) When permanent institutions created interim arrangements to be replaced. European High Commission, if and when appointed, would assume responsibility for recruitment and training and controls would progressively disappear.

As separately reported² today’s meeting brought fuller exchange of views than any session so far. Statement by Hoyer-Millar who up to yesterday’s Cabinet decision has been rather strongly opposed to our scheme in his discussions with other deputies, helped break log jam. Canadian deputies statement also helpful and effective.

I had short talk with Alphand before he left for Paris. He intends to press for his solution notwithstanding his previous turn-down on question of link. He states it is most important that US give such encouragement as it can to Paris conference. Separate comment on this follows.

In my judgment next few days are critical. Believe we have gone as far as we can to meet French and have pulled other European countries along that far only with considerable difficulty. In circumstances believe time has come to exert maximum pressure on French. They will probably neither completely accept or completely reject our proposal (Depto 211)³ but it seems essential that they come very close to accepting it as it stands. Prior to government’s fall⁴ we had contemplated asking that strong representations be made in Paris, perhaps by personal message from Secretary to Schuman. Believe pressure should be brought there in such ways and at such times as Department and Bruce may think best, Following are points which we believe should be emphasized to French:

(1) French were in minority of one at Defense Commission meeting.

(2) We have done everything we conscientiously could to meet French and to bring other NAT partners along but they are still more or less minority of one.

(3) We consider it essential that steps to raise and train German forces be initiated immediately as much time would inevitably be required before even smallest German units were formed. We agree that concurrently French should convene conference of such nations as are prepared to attend to discuss French proposals.

(4) We sincerely endorse general objectives of French proposal i.e., Franco-German rapprochement and closer association of European nations.

(5) We are not prepared to exert pressure on other Europeans (whose lack of enthusiasm for French proposal has been very apparent) to accept in advance any particular institutions designed to obtain French objectives.

(6) We emphatically cannot accept any link in time or substance between steps involved in raising and training German forces and progress toward European army and political institutions.

(7) We are prepared to negotiate on some provision to effect that provisional controls over German participation would not be relaxed until replaced by other more permanent controls or agreement reached that they are unnecessary.

(8) If French would accept compromise proposals which all others have now accepted, supreme commander could be appointed and integrated force established immediately. This should greatly simplify solution of many problems which now appear difficult.

(9) We believe any further delay would have most serious consequences both upon development of adequate defense of North Atlantic area and on same public estimate as to willingness and ability of European Governments to face up to requirements of adequate defense.

Sent Department Depto 239, repeated information Paris 1031, Frankfort 477.

[Spofford]

1. On November 27 Hoyer-Millar had informed Spofford that the British had decided to support the United States proposal. The United Kingdom would not participate in a European army but might send observers to the conference at Paris, provided there was no link between political and military developments. Spofford reported these views in Depto 230 from London, November 27, not printed. (740.5/11–2750)
2. Depto 238, supra.
3. Dated November 22, p. 479.
4. For documentation on the fall of the Bidault Government on June 24, 1950, see pp. 1379 ff.