Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–2850: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

London, November 28, 1950—midnight.

Depto 238. (Section one of two.) 35th meeting deputies November 28.

1. German contribution. Chair requested comments on the several papers recently under discussion.

2. Canadian deputy supported US proposal provisional military arrangements, D–D/190 (Depto 202 November 21)¹ basing support on urgency immediate progress formation NATO integrated force with safeguarded German participation. US proposal offered best chance progress this direction and left latitude for European countries try work out long-range program pursuant French proposal which acceptable course if accomplished within reasonable time after which if no agreement participants should consider alternatives. Believed that in transitional period occupying powers would learn more of German attitudes and become better able judge feasibility of alternative military arrangements. European countries had primary political concern and his government chiefly concerned quick build-up adequate NATO defense. However, emphasized crucial importance in American opinion which in event undue delay defense preparations might begin to question whole possibility building effective west European defense. Though appreciative French reasons for different view and believing interested European countries should have opportunity work out methods attaining French objective, Canada agreed with US that it was imperative to begin now with steps toward German military participation. Hoped views European countries would be sufficiently flexible permit their considering long-range alternatives to French proposals should Paris conference fail practical results. He believed there had been too much talk on two conceptions as conflicting. Which ever conception was adopted, military effectiveness should be guiding criterion. Creation integrated force would advance concept Atlantic union as would Canadian proposal council represent governments as whole.² He envisaged Atlantic community developing into close association on economy and foreign policy.

3. UK deputy also supporting US proposal stated formal UK position which he said would necessarily be revealed generally in foreign policy debate Commons November 29 prior which he requested strictest confidence. UK position like Canada’s dominated by necessity strengthening west European defenses earliest. This possible only with effective German military contribution. Attached prime importance creation integrated force and appointment supreme commander (expressed hope US would now let these steps be taken forthwith and observed that when this done obstacles in Germany and Europe might tend disappear).

UK had been and still would be willing accept first US plan which appeared offer best basis approach German problem as whole. UK frankly not attracted by and disliked French proposal. Had refrained suggesting alternatives to avoid complicating discussions and causing delay in naming supreme command, creating integrated force, and obtaining early effective German military participation. Liked separation provisional military arrangements from long-range French proposals which need more leisurely consideration. UK agreed immediate approach Germans along lines SG recommended. Accepted brigade group concept for political rather than military reasons. UK was not prepared take part in any European force which might be created. UK accepted and believed in its NATO obligations but Cabinet had decided UK would not go beyond them. UK would not obstruct progress of French and others toward French objectives provided: (1) resulting force was part of and would strengthen NATO and (2) no delay resulted in steps bringing about effective German military participation. Would be agreeable to link European force to NATO if militarily effective and developed soon but effect on NATO military set up imperative soonest.

4. Netherlands deputy summarized Netherlands position as expressed in New York, Washington and here. German military (Section two of two.) participation indispensable for effective NATO defense and it must be carried out under agreed principles and safeguards irrespective of outcome of Paris conference. Netherlands would prefer German military development wholly within NATO and all NATO powers equally and equally directly concerned. Netherlands would have considered participating in European army with UK but not otherwise and would not oppose formation army out other European countries if within NATO framework.

5. Norwegian Deputy, supporting US proposal stressed urgency immediate creation NATO integrated force. With word of grace for French efforts at cooperation, he recalled Alphand’s remarking on French concessions and said this natural as French had furthest to go from extreme and isolated position to reach compromise. Norway favored German entrance directly into NATO integrated force rather than through European army. Agreed Netherlands’ view that European army would be too small combination to contain Germans and with minority of European NATO parties participating risks would be enhanced. Acknowledged French objectives appealing as long-term goal, provided there was no delay in establishing effective NATO force.

6. Portuguese Deputy agreed with US proposals provided Portugal not obliged attend Paris conference. Urged Germans be taken directly into NATO integrated force rather than through European army as problem safeguards of NATO-wide concern. Stressed moral unity NAT countries. Germans should be progessively assimilated in NAT. Atlantic Germany would be less dangerous than European Germany. Accepted concept NATO HICOM or utilization occupation powers HICOMS.

7. Danish Deputy said European army would compromise speedy German contribution and delay creation adequate defense at East boundaries West Germany. Germans should be taken directly into NATO force with NATO supervision and safeguards. Unable say whether Denmark would attend Paris conference; would certainly hesitate if advance acceptance in principle of French proposals necessary. Execution of provisional military arrangements should be independent of progress Paris negotiations.

8. Belgian Deputy uninstructed but thought opposing concepts approaching compromise. Luxembourg conscious of urgency and agreed US proposal. Italy agreed with Canada and supported US proposal for transitional arrangements. Iceland deferred to countries more directly concerned but believed primary criterion was most effective common defense.

9. Chair stressed broad area agreement and said US would shortly submit draft paper reflecting various views on basis discussions military committee. Thought NATO and European groupings not necessarily conflicting and latter might be so devised as to strengthen NATO.

10. Bryn³ referred to fact only those wishing to attend would be at Paris conference and asked whether some NATO body should not be represented there to make sure results did not weaken NATO. Chair observed all participants would be NAT parties and NATO must pass on whether, when and to what extent institutions devised at Paris should be given responsibilities. UK felt this up to French. He accepted their assurance conference designed to strengthen rather than weaken NATO. Alphand reserved French position on NATO representation as such.

11. Discussion will continue Friday, December 1.

Sent niact Department Depto 238, repeated info priority Paris for Embassy and OSR 1030, priority Frankfort 476, Brussels 143, Copenhagen 106, Hague 155, Lisbon 79, Oslo 91, Ottawa 47, Rome 208, Luxembourg 36. Heidelberg for Handy 90, Wiesbaden for Cannon 115.

[Spofford]

1. For the text of D–D/190, transmitted in Depto 202, see p. 475.
2. See D–D/169, November 17, p. 461.
3. Presumably Etienne Burin des Roziers, French Delegate to the Council Deputies, NATO, and Acting French Deputy Representative.