Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–2250: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, November 22, 1950—1 p. m.

Depto 211. From Spofford. Depto 202 paragraph 15. Following is text paper we have circulated this morning:

1. Urgency of organizing and developing collective defense of Europe is increasing rather than diminishing. While it has been agreed that western Europe must be defended as far to east as possible and that Germany must participate in that defense, defining method of German participation has retarded development of our collective effort.

2. Situation is further affected by reaction in Germany. As time passes without definite terms for German participation being put forward, political climate in Germany becomes more unstable and makes problem more difficult of solution.

3. Proposals far-reaching in both their military and political implications have been advanced by French Government as one means of dealing with German problem. Implications of these proposals are such that they deserve and require mature consideration. All problems involved clearly cannot be solved in any short time. Consideration of them on their merits and free from pressure of military urgency appears necessary if fully adequate solutions are to be reached. Furthermore, it could not realistically be expected that these institutions, even if agreement upon them were quickly reached, could attain adequate development in time to serve as basis for immediate and effective military effort.

4. While work proceeds toward solution of political problem, certain measures, upon which there already exists large measure of agreement, can and should be undertaken immediately. Logic of situation therefore appears to compel separation of two aspects of problem and use of transitional period. Purpose of such transitional period would be:

(1) To permit essentials of military organization to proceed immediately;

(2) To proceed with recruitment of German manpower and production of matériel under strong provisional controls pending development of more permanent system; and

(3) To enable broader political problems to be dealt with concurrently but freed from pressure of military urgency.

5. These provisional arrangements would be progressively superseded as and to extent that permanent mechanisms, either military or political were developed which would be effective to discharge various responsibilities.

6. These provisional arrangements might include following:

a. Registration, recruitment, and training functions with respect to German manpower (such as are not performed by Supreme Commander) would be provisionally performed by German federal agencies controlled by High Commissioners and as appropriate by Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany. Control of production and supply of important matériel would be exercised by Allied High Commissioners and Military Security Board, working in conjunction with appropriate NATO agencies.

b. Arrangements with respect to German contribution to integrated force, particularly to minimum effective size of unite to be contributed, are matters for determination by military commanders. US view would be that nothing less than units of minimum full effective size, as determined by military commanders would be acceptable for integration into NATO defense forces.

7. Concurrently European powers (including German representatives) would be convened to formulate proposals for institutions adequate to meet objectives of French proposals. To extent such institutions were agreed upon by European powers and were developed to point where they could create and support effectively military forces of Europe rather than national character, suitable for integration into NATO, arrangements for creation of such forces would be implemented. Integration of any such forces into NATO integrated force would necessarily be contingent on European contribution being militarily effective.

8. Definitive solutions of various segments of problem posed by German participation should be facilitated by actual experience in working under provisional agreements for period after Supreme Commander has been appointed and in dealing with practical problems involved in developing integrated force for defense of Europe, including German contingents.¹

Sent Depto 211, repeated information Paris 972, Frankfort 429.

[Spofford]

1. The United States paper was circulated as D–D/190, “Provisional Arrangements for German Participation in Defense of Western Europe,” dated November 22.