Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–2150: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, November 21, 1950—1 a. m.

Depto 202. (Section one of two.)

1. Chairman advised Deputies that Military Commission arrival London deferred to December 5 earliest.

2. In resuming discussion German contribution with special reference German organization, Chairman stressed need to confine discussion to general principles. Not desirable or appropriate for Deputies to discuss in detail internal German organization since German authorities not participating discussion and no assurance that any detailed arrangements agreed by Deputies would be acceptable Germany. Present discussions intended rather to define Deputies thinking as to principles and practicality of solutions in advance of detailed discussions with German representatives. Chairman stressed importance minimizing any discrimination or restriction against Germany in order obtain maximum German cooperation. Emphasis should rest on principles applicable to all participants integrated force. Any necessary initial discrimination should be held to minimum unavoidable owing present complete lack German military organization and need reorienting existing national military organizations. In US view, no need to decide as matter of principle question whether recruitment, training, equipment and administration of German units should be dealt with by single Federal German agency or several. Practical solution in light decisions of principle on other points would be preferable. US general view was that recruitment might be handled by the Ministries of Labor or Interior which might handle also majority administrative problems, while Supreme Commander might supervise training either directly or through intermediate command structure, in latter case possibly for initial phase through Allied occupation forces.

3. Canadian Deputy observed US, Canadian and UK practice of largely separating supply from defense agency offered nondiscriminatory basis for same practice Germany.

4. Danish Deputy thought plurality agencies added little security and would impair efficiency.

5. French Deputy agreed Deputies should stick to principles and that specific arrangements should evolve from initial measures to ultimate. First preparations for recruitment should be under supervision occupying powers. German Ministries Labor or Interior should then undertake recruitment under supervision European High Command. Training should at first be supervised by occupation powers. Practical considerations should govern decision as between one or more agencies provided over-all framework French proposal followed.

6. Netherlands Deputy favored single German defense agency in interest both of efficiency and ease of control. Its tasks should be limited, with other burdens entrusted to NATO High Commission. For example, German agency could recruit troops up to annual numbers fixed by High Commission and accordance regulations set by it. German agency could train troops under High Commissioner direction and would itself be responsible for pay, feeding, clothing and housing of troops. Reserved powers could be shifted gradually to German agency as NATO confidence in Germany increased.¹ Alphand observed he had suggested European High Commissioner but this was first mention of NATO High Commissioner² and asked Dr. Starkenborgh to elaborate. Latter explained belief German military effort should be undertaken in NATO framework in which all twelve participants in them rather than Europe alone. As between NATO and occupation authorities, occupation was temporary but military effort was NATO responsibility.

7. Norwegian Deputy agreed question was how much power Germans should have in aggregate rather than how many agencies should have it. Understood French fears. Netherlands suggestion of NATO High Commissioner attractive, but he would need machinery such as that already existing under three occupation powers.

8. UK Deputy thought German agency question essentially military. Deputies could discuss political aspects briefly, then would have to take up with Military Commission [Committee] and ultimately Germans. Negotiators with Germans should not have hands tied by inflexible NATO approved scheme. In any case, except for possible separation of supply functions from defense, both NATO military authorities and Germans would probably reject multiple agency idea. In UK view and with reference medium term, say two years, separation supply represented maximum possible internal dispersion German defense powers. He suggested controls be divided into negative continuing ones such as PLI, anti-Nazi restrictions, etc., and should be left to occupation powers and MSB, and positive one such as required recruitment, training and administration which should be trusted to Supreme Commander or civilian official such as a High Commissioner.

9. In discussion of question what controls should be exercised and by whom, Norwegian and Netherlands Deputies supported UK suggestion NATO exercise positive controls, and three occupation powers maintain negative controls. Netherlands, elaborating NATO High Commission idea, thought division German powers with inter-connected NATO agency would establish cooperation which would make NATO directives and control natural and acceptable.

10. Alphand favored use three occupation power machinery for negative controls. Thought emphasis should be on close cooperation rather than control, in hope Germany would eventually be guided same principles as other Western countries.

(Section two of two.) 11. (Section two of two.) 11. Canadian deputy agreeing on exercise negative controls by occupying powers, stressed need for preventing creation German general staff, and operational staff above authorized levels. NATO HICOM proposed by Netherlands deputy might have similar duties in relation all NATO countries, though direct powers only in case of Germany. NATO HICOM would be under supreme commander. Duties much like those of inspector-general US proposal. Would advance concept Atlantic unity.

12. As to relation of German agency to SHAPE, UK deputy thought question premature until responsibilities of German agencies determined. Deputies who commented thought relation SHAPE to German defense agencies should be same in principle as to other NATO countries, with qualification that relation to German defense administration should be closer for sake security.

13. Chairman asked Belgian deputy with help other delegations to prepare paper reflecting discussion for consideration deputies and to serve as partial basis deputies’ discussions with Military Commission [Committee].

14. Chairman advised deputies that Military Commission paper on German contribution would be received tomorrow. Deputies agreed paper should be discussed at early meeting as provisional working paper to get start on coordination military and political aspects of problem.

15. Chairman then advanced US proposal that in view of urgency of moving from planning to effectuation stage, NATO should adopt concept of transitional stage in which military effort should proceed at once while far reaching questions of political organization should be given more leisurely consideration they require. Military plans were currently in abeyance and public attention was as result focusing on whole NATO organization. Also extended German discussion of participation issue was causing chances of successful arrangement with Germany to deteriorate. In transitional stage provisional arrangements primarily under occupying power control would apply to German recruitment, training et cetera. Concurrently European negotiations on wider political arrangements would be undertaken. Responsibility would be transferred as appropriate to such political institutions as were agreed upon when they were in position to take over on militarily effective basis. Latter criterion essential and military authorities could be expected insist on forces of effective size. During transition period, supreme commander would be appointed, experience would be acquired in dealing with the Germans, first steps would be progressively taken toward bringing Germany into Western community, and progress would be made toward formation integrated force. This would lay basis experience on which basic political agreements might more easily be reached. Deputies asked for time to refer to governments and for outline which chairman agreed to provide.³

16. Meeting adjourned to Thursday November 23.

Sent priority Department Depto 202, priority info Paris 955 for Embassy and OSR, Frankfort 421 pass Heidelberg for Handy as 81 and Wiesbaden for Cannon as 106; repeated info Brussels 134 pass Luxembourg as 30, Copenhagen 98, The Hague 144, Lisbon 72, Oslo 82, Ottawa 40, Home 194.

[Spofford]

1. The Netherlands proposal was subsequently circulated as D–D/191, “Establishment of a NATO High Commissioner for Germany,” dated November 22, not printed (740.5/12–550).
2. Regarding this question, see Todep 89, November 10, p. 440, and footnote 1 thereto.
3. For the full text of the United States proposal, see Depto 211, infra.