Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–4650: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London¹

top secret   priority
niact

Washington, November 18, 1950—9 p. m.

Todep 106. For Spofford eyes only. Re Depto 182 Nov 16 following represents agreed State–Defense position on German participation. This will serve as guidance to you in your presentation to Deps Monday.

Para 1 (below) represents a redraft of para 5, Depto 182 Nov 16.

Para 2 (below) represents additional guidance:

1.

a. Seek agreement on the need for a German contribution of the minimum effective size as to be determined by the MC. Make it clear that nothing less than units of the minimum effective size will be acceptable for integration into NATO defense forces. However, during the initial development phase the German contribution could, if necessary, be in terms of smaller units, provided it is clearly understood and accepted that these units must be assembled into divisional units for effective use as soon as SHAPE determines that this is necessary.

b. During the build-up phase recruitment and registration and the training functions not carried out by the Supreme Commander would be performed by German Federal Agency controlled by the HICOMs, and, as appropriate, by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany. Control of production and supply of pertinent military matériel would be vested in the appropriate NATO agencies. Foregoing arrangements would serve until superseded by such arrangements as may be later developed.

c. Agreement would be made concurrently which would provide that the French would convene the European powers (including German representatives) and present more fully worked out proposals for the European political institutions. US would agree that if and to the extent such institutions met with the concurrence of the Europeans and were developed to a point where they could create and support effectively military forces, of a European rather than a national character, suitable for integration into NATO, this would be acceptable. The integration of any such forces into the NATO integrated force would, however, have to be contingent on the European contribution being militarily effective.

d. If the French should not, after negotiations with their European partners, and by the time that SHAPE has determined that decision with respect to the disposition of German units is required, be able to develop these political institutions it will be necessary for military reasons to proceed with the grouping of German units Into German units of minimum effective size. This would, of course, he without prejudice to any future success which the French may have in implementing their proposal. In the meantime the situation undoubtedly will be clarified through the appointment of the Supreme Commander which would be made, (after NATO agreement on the provisional arrangements), the working out of the command structure and staff relationships, actual experience in dealing with the Germans, and possible changes in the French political climate.

2. FYI re para 1a above, we still feel that a balanced unit of divisional strength is smallest national unit which can be handled efficiently with respect to combat effectiveness, procurement, supply and military administration. This however, would not automatically preclude a time phased program under which a German contribution could be limited to RCT’s or brigade groups during initial period after which divisions will be required. The idea being to allow the French the benefit of the time required to build up effective RCT’s for incorporation into divisions, to try and sell their federated structure to Germany and other interested Europeans, it being understood that the end result must be effective divisions created with the minimum of delay. Definition of composition and size of RCT or Brigade group and exact size of German contribution should not be considered in the Council of Deputies, pending receipt of the Military Committee report.

Acheson

1. Repeated to Paris as 2751 for information only and eyes only Bruce, and to Frankfort as 3712 for information only and eyes only McCloy.