Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

U.S. Mission to NATO Files

Paper Prepared by the North Atlantic Defense Committee¹

top secret   cosmic

[Washington,] October 26, 1950.

D.C. 29

German Contributions to the Defense of Western Europe

1. The Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council requested the Defense Committee, in the light of the information available at the time of its meeting, to make specific recommendations regarding the method by which, from the technical point of view, Germany could make its most useful contribution to the successful implementation of the plan for an integrated force adequate to deter aggression and insure the defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany.

2. Noting the Council’s conclusion that the defense of Europe will require the full utilization of manpower and productive resources available from all sources, and the Council’s approval of the concept of an integrated force adequate to deter aggression and insure the defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany, and recognizing:

a. That the greatest deterrent to aggression is an array of powerful forces united in a common cause against the potential aggressor; and furthermore;

b. That the defense of Europe requires, as a practical measure, a defense as far to the east as possible, which will include Western Germany;

c. That such defense will be most effective only if the West Germans contribute armed units and have a sense of active participation in the common defense of their homeland;

d. That this sense of active participation can be thoroughly inculcated only if the West Germans have furnished men to bear arms in defense of their country;

e. That Germany possesses industrial capabilities which they should contribute for the common cause; and

f. That the conditions of her participation must, however, also be of such a nature and presented in such a manner that they will be acceptable to the German people and that the latter will cooperate willingly in the common defense plans,

the Committee have concluded that Germany can make its most useful contribution in the forms of combat forces and industrial production.

3. In consideration of the total size of the force required for the defense of Europe, it is recommended that the primary military units contributed by Germany be in the form of balanced ground divisions, appropriate combat and service support units, and ground anti-aircraft defense units. The balanced ground divisions, made up of personnel of a single nationality, is considered necessary for efficiency of supply and command and for the full exploitation of the infantry-artillery-tank-ground team, as well as to insure integration of German manpower in such a manner as to facilitate German troop morale and inspire confidence and willing sacrifice on the part of the German people.

4. The German divisions and supporting units should be integrated with non-German units in the Corps and higher units. Thus German divisions would be furnished tactical air support by allied tactical support units allocated for the support of Army groups. The authorization of combat and service units sufficient to support the divisions is considered essential from the standpoint that Germans must be used in non-combat, as well as combat, roles as a means of exercising economy in manpower. The organization of ground anti-aircraft defense units is another step in providing an integrated defense of Western Germany. Further, there is a requirement for German manning and operation of minecraft, patrol craft, and harbor defense craft.

5. It is the opinion of the Committee that German units should be recruited, uniformed, quartered and paid by the German Government. All training should be conducted by Germans under the general direction of the Supreme Commander. When training is completed, units should be incorporated, under appropriate groupings, into the integrated force. The location of recruiting and training centers should be determined by agreement between the German Government and the Occupying Powers. The Occupying Powers should be requested to study the availability of Allied schools for the training of German officers and technicians. It is considered that the over-all efficiency of the integrated force will require such Allied assistance.

6. The Committee considers it essential that German officers be included in the international staff of the Supreme Commander and as appropriate on the staffs of subordinate commands to which German units are assigned, and recommends that the Supreme Commander be authorized to negotiate directly with the German Government concerning the assignment of German officers to duty on these staffs.

7. The Committee realizes that there will be a requirement for a German federal agency effectively to organize, train, equip, and administer the German armed forces, and probably a requirement for a military administrative staff to carry out usual administrative functions. However, in view of the fact that German divisions are to be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander from their inception, there will be no national German General Staff and no German operational staffs above the level of authorized tactical units.

8. Present NATO plans for centralized direction of procurement and supply under a strengthened Military Production and Supply Board should be expanded to include over-all control and efficient coordination of German military production with that of NATO members.

9. The Committee recognizes that in the creation of German units certain safeguards are desirable in addition to the basic safeguards provided by the subordination of German divisions to the Supreme Commander and his international staff and by centralized direction of procurement and supply. The following additional safeguards are therefore recommended:

a. German forces should not be developed at the expense of other Allied forces, nor should they be permitted to develop at a rate or to a degree that would constitute a threat to Allied security. To this end, the number of German divisions at any time should not exceed one-fifth the total number of allied divisions readily available for the defense of Western Europe.

b. The formation of an appropriate Federal Agency to perform necessary administrative, logistic, organization and preliminary training functions should be permitted, but the functions appropriate to the plans and operations section of a staff (above the level of authorized tactical units) should be performed in the international staff of the Supreme Commander, and the Federal Agency should be permitted no strategic or tactical command prerogatives.

c. The head of the Federal Agency must be a civilian who has not been on active duty as a commissioned officer in a regular component of the Armed Services within the past ten years.

d. Consideration should be given to the establishment within the Federal Agency of an Allied training mission headed by an “Inspector General” who would be an officer of appropriate rank and experience from the armed forces of the Occupying Powers. This officer would be under the head of the Federal Agency but should report to the Standing Group on matters within the purview of that Group. The German military officer, within or under the Federal Agency, who has the responsibility of being the administrative head of the German armed units shall be an officer appointed by the German Government, subject to the approval of the three Occupying Powers.

e. The Occupying Powers should retain general supervision of officer recruitment and should rely chiefly upon recruitment and training of new officers rather than upon the use of the old officer class.

f. There should remain prohibited and limited industries in Germany and a Military Security Board to enforce continued demilitarization controls. Necessary revisions of existing agreements in these matters would be subject to action by the three Occupying Powers. Sufficient change in this regard should be made to allow Germany to raise and equip, without heavy equipment, the specified ground units; to produce small arms and light military equipment such as minor defensive naval craft, individual equipment, trucks, and optics for the integrated force and for German units; to furnish raw materials, semi-finished products, and special tools and dies as determined necessary to the common effort by the MPSB. The manufacture of offensive armament in the categories of heavy equipment, aircraft, artillery, and naval vessels other than minor defensive craft, must not be permitted in Germany, and such armament must be provided from external sources. The German Government must bear its share of defense costs.

g. The Standing Group will recommend such additional measures as it may consider necessary to insure that the basic safeguards against the remilitarization of Germany are effectively enforced.

recommendations

10. The Defense Committee recommends that:

a. All members of the Council agree for their nations that German participation in the defense of Western Europe along lines set forth herein is desirable and should be implemented as soon as practicable.

b. The Occupying Powers be requested to take immediate steps to obtain German contribution to the integrated force in the form recommended herein, and that the formation of German units, under the safeguards specified herein, be initiated immediately upon the establishment of the integrated force.

c. The task of developing the details of plans and programs regarding the German contribution and of recommending suitable Allied supervisory organization, as well as of implementing the military measures necessary to accomplish this project be assigned to the Standing Group.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the U.S. representative on the Defense Committee proposed that this paper be considered as an answer to the request by the North Atlantic Council for specific recommendations on a German contribution to Western defense. It subsequently became known as the American proposal.