740.5/10–2550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador |
| The Secretary | |
| Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary, EUR |
I told Sir Oliver that as yet there was no Government position on the Pleven proposal and therefore what I was about to tell him represented only the preliminary views of the Department.
In general, our attitude was that expressed in the press statement I had made this morning.1 I told him I felt Schuman found himself in the position where he could neither accept the US position nor turn it down. I also thought that if we stated that their proposal constituted acceptance in principle of German participation in the European force, the French would have to deny it. However, we were considering whether or not, without stating it, to proceed on that basis.
There is probably not much we could do in the Defense meeting as the governments certainly would not be in a position to accept the French proposal. We thought that perhaps our paper on German rearmament might be discussed first and after that we might ask Mr. Moch to explain the French position; then we could see if there were any steps that could be taken immediately which would fit into either proposal or some other proposal which might be satisfactory. The [Page 405] French, for instance, would undoubtedly be willing to agree on a Supreme Commander and the creation of an integrated force but it is not clear that we should do this at this time until we are sure where we would come out.
I also told him that we hoped the matter could be discussed in some forum other than that in Paris proposed by the French, particularly as we did not want to be excluded from the conversations. Sir Oliver stated that the UK would not participate in the proposed talks in Paris as he understood their position.
I said I thought it might be useful if the Defense Ministers acted as technicians and tried to determine what technical steps could be taken to advance the situation in a sound manner. Perhaps they could refer the over-all problem to the Deputies. Sir Oliver agreed the political problem was not for consideration by the Defense Ministers. He also pointed out that although the French said they did not intend to create any delay, it was still contingent on the signing of the Shuman Plan and that negotiations to establish the European army and Defense Minister would not start until after this had been done, which made it all most indefinite. He thought that we should start as soon as we could on doing what could now be done. I outlined briefly to Sir Oliver the statement I had made to Ambassador Bonnet about the importance of not letting France’s position become rigid.2
Sir Oliver commented on the French proposal itself and said that there were many things left to be clarified. What did they mean by the smallest possible unit? What number of German troops were they thinking of? If there were no answers on questions such as these, there would be no basis for proceeding. Another question which bothered him was whether the French would take any action until all conditions had been fulfilled. It seemed to him it was a very difficult and long drawn out problem. The European Defense Minister was undoubtedly the key to the French thinking but, if such a concept were to be carried out, it undoubtedly would require much wider political action than the French scheme envisaged. I pointed out that there was a problem which the Europeans, particularly the French, faced at the time when our troops and other non-Continental troops would no longer be necessary in Europe and went home. Would the army for the defense of Europe then be disbanded and, if so, would there then be constituted a National German Army?
Sir Oliver stated that he felt that Messrs. Schuman and Monnet3 were sincere in their belief in the plan but he was not so clear as to [Page 406] the other members of the French Government. I said that I thought what was important was to see what should and could be done in 1951 with regard to the Germans. Could we raise 50,000 troops? Could they be brigaded with other troops now in Europe? Perhaps we could limit the number of troops to regimental combat teams but that in any event we should proceed to work out what we could immediately. Sir Oliver pointed out that from the UK point of view having US and UK forces in Europe with a Supreme Commander was the real crux of the problem and that they would be delighted if any action could bring this about. I pointed out that if such a course were followed, it presented us with grave calculated risks because of the time factor involved in the French proposal. Anyway, it was important to get the reaction of the other countries as to the total situation.