740.5/9–3050: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfort
priority
2493. Personal for McCloy. As you know, the recent NATO resolution requested the Defense Ministers to recommend to the Council the [Page 355] manner in which Germany could best contribute to the defense of Europe. The purpose of the reference of this problem to the Defense Ministers was to obtain their opinion as to the best manner in which Germany could contribute, from the military point of view, as well as to postpone decision on the German problem in view of the position of the French government. In any event, the Defense Ministers are committed to make recommendations on German contribution at the time of their meeting on Oct. 28. FYI only there is also a possibility that personal representatives of the Ministers of Defense may meet in Washington about October 20 to prepare for the meeting of the Ministers.
The basic need is of course a clearer line-up of German opinion in favor of the general plan but we also need at the earliest possible moment, in order to prepare for these meetings, a practical plan of procedure for the formation of German units with attendant safeguards. The ideal of course would be a joint HICOM German plan, but we doubt that this would be feasible within the time limit and due to the position of the French. In any event, it seems that the thinking of the Germans in some usable form should be obtained as we should avoid if at all possible the position we were in in the New York meetings, i.e. attempting to reach decision upon the details of German participation in the absence of the views of the Germans themselves.
From this distance it seems that we are faced with a particularly delicate and difficult problem as regards the next moves with the Germans. We have noted in ur tel 25721 that Adenauer prefers initiative to come from the Allies. It was apparent from remarks from many of the Ministers in New York that we must avoid at all costs being placed in the position of asking for German assistance and thus placing them in a position to readily name their price.
We do not know what interpretation Kirkpatrick or Poncet2 may place upon the decision of the Foreign Ministers that the entire defense question could be thoroughly discussed with Adenauer. However, we feel it gives you sufficient freedom to enable you to attempt to obtain German proposals. Our idea is that Adenauer being of course fully aware of the exact nature of our difficulties in New York put forward practical suggestions that would facilitate the problem of obtaining common agreement. If Adenauer could see his way clear to present his comments in a way that they could be used, perhaps after consultation with sufficient number of leaders in his Cabinet and Parliament in much the same way as we here clear our positions prior to [Page 356] making commitments in the foreign field, this might greatly ease our problem in the coming meetings of the Defense Ministers and the Deputies.
The difficult parts of the plan of procedure seem to be those which can best be worked out in Germany. These seem to revolve around what steps would have to be taken in the constitutional field in Germany, the nature of the ministry or ministries that would be necessary to bring into being and support German units, the safeguards that could be developed to make the plan more acceptable not only to the French but to German democratic elements, and a clarification of the aspects of the timing of the various moves as they would appear practical in Germany. While the basic safeguards in the command and supply field are already contained in the U.S. plan there are additional safeguards that could be worked in the plan to make it more acceptable. These might include such items as (a) maximum size of German units and overall strength; (b) Germany’s role in the balanced force concept to be restricted to ground units; (c) restrictions on use of the old officer class and plans for training future German officers; (d) description of the militarization controls that would remain in Germany; and (e) the organization and function of the federal ministry pertaining to defense.
With regard to (e) above, we have been wondering whether it would be feasible for the Fed Rep to establish a German Defense Council which would be broadly representative of democratic elements in Germany. The details of this are not at all clear but it has been suggested that such an agency might do a great deal to preserve the democratic nature of the German units as well as to provide a means of obtaining, through representation on the Council, support of the workers through such elements as the trade unions.
Our thinking on the above is very tentative, nevertheless would greatly appreciate your views on a method of procedure so that work being done in Germany and here with Defense can be pieced together at a later date in preparation for the meetings next month.