740.5/9–2650
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
Meeting With the President, Monday, September 25, 1950
I informed the President of my conversation with Mr. Acheson on Saturday, the 23rd,1 along the following lines:
The French are not able at this time to accept German participation in a unified command even in principle. Moch appears to have changed from an opponent to an advocate. The French Parliament will meet on October 17 and it may be possible to get a resolution of the French position soon thereafter. General Marshall did a good job of explaining the basic nature of the decision, the main point of which is that if the French either will not face up to the issue or turn the program down Marshall, who will have to carry the burden with Congress both on our augmentation of forces and an augmented MDAP, cannot expect success. He must have some indication of progress on the part of both the British and the French. The Secretary had made clear that our proposals was one big concern and that we could not go forward on a piece-meal basis. However, he was prepared to agree to pass on to the military committees the problem of how Germany can participate and how the command will work. This gives time for further French consideration, but if the French cannot come in, the whole situation will probably disintegrate. Marshall had made the point that it was foolish to have the Defense Ministers [Page 354] meeting on the 16th with the French Parliament convening on the 17th of October; that, therefore, the Defense Ministers should put over their meeting until October 28; that Moch had initiated discussions of the French financial problem and wanted to come over prior to the meeting on the 28th to discuss this. Moch also had pointed out that if we can see our way to help on the financial and production problems, then the German matter will be much easier to handle. France needs about $100,000,000 of raw materials and has to find some way to finance a substantial budget deficit. Moch was told we must thrash out the question with the Treasury, ECA, Budget, and other Departments. Harriman (who also participated in this conversation) felt that these problems should first be analyzed out in Paris. However, Mr. Acheson felt that there were certain high policy problems in connection with this decision which should be looked at here in Washington. He posed the questions in this manner: “Is what the French want to do the right thing for them to do?” “If so, are we prepared to share some proper part of the cost?” Both Marshall and Acheson feel that the financial problem is at the very heart of getting on with the program.
The President said he appreciated very much the way Mr. Acheson and General Marshall had presented the matter and felt that their judgment about exploration here should be followed up. I asked if he would like to make a statement himself to the Cabinet about this problem and he said that he believed that it would be better for Mr. Acheson to make such a statement. He indicated that on Friday there would be a discussion on certain reports on NSC 682 and that he felt that in connection with this discussion Mr. Acheson should be present and report on his conversations in New York so that this could form a starting point for discussions within the Government on how to get at the problems which Acheson and Marshall feel are the heart of getting on with the program.
- Memorandum of conversation not found in Department of State files.↩
- For text of NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (a National Security Council Report to President Truman, April 14, 1950), see vol. i, p. 234.↩