740.5/9–1750: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
niact
Secto 22. Re Secto 21. Following are extracts from Secretary’s September 15 remarks. After introductory remarks and referring to locale of defense he said:
The defense must be as far to the east as possible. That means defense in Germany. If that is true, it seems to me to follow inevitably that the morale and the will to resist of the German people has become a major element in the whole defensive system of the west.
Surely, no one would be mad enough to advise that forces of our countries should undertake to fight in Germany in the midst of a population whose morale had been allowed to go to pieces, where defeatism and collaboration with the enemy were rampant. That would be surely an invitation to disaster. So the morale of the German people is a matter with which we are concerned, as we are concerned with the morale of the whole area which we have undertaken to defend. Really, it must appear to the Germans and to all of our people that the consequences of giving up Germany, either through lack of military effort to hold it, or lack of preparation which even allows us to begin to hold it, are far too serious to admit of any doubt. If we move out of Germany or are thrown out of Germany by an enemy, what happens is, first of all, that the consequences, to the North Atlantic countries are disastrous.
He continued: At our last meeting in London Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman and other Ministers made statements which were moving because they were simple and very true. They bore on this question of the will to resist and morale. They pointed out that a successful defense of Europe could not be organized unless it were clearly understood at the beginning that what we were forging was defense and not liberation. Those statements and the profound truth which lies behind them has made a very deep impression on our government. The Government of the United States has searched its intentions deeply in the months which have intervened and has come to decisions which I think can only be described as a complete revolution in American foreign policy and in the attitude of the American people. These conclusions I wish to lay before you—not as actions to be taken by us in isolation but as conclusions which are intended to fit into a comprehensive effort by all of us and as conclusions which hang together as part of a unified program. No one of these conclusions is practicable if put forward by itself. Taken together we believe they will lead to a program—if sufficient effort is put into it—which would deter aggression against any of us and repel it if it should occur.
[Page 317]The first of these proposals is one which the President has referred to publicly. That is that the US Government will, at the very earliest possible moment, place in Europe in addition to the forces which it has there now, very substantial bodies of troops. Those troops will go there, as I said, at the earliest practical moment.
In addition to that, it is ready to raise, identify and commit as reinforcements to those troops, to go whenever the need calls for them, additional bodies of troops.
This, of course, means that if there were troubles in Europe, the US would be involved in it from the very first moment and would be as deeply committed to the repulse of any attack as any member of the North Atlantic community.
That, I say, is a far-reaching conclusion for our government to make. In making it, of course, we must look to the next step and that is in connection with what other decisions about a force for the defense of Europe are made. The mere presence of a body of American troops in Europe is not going to solve the problem.
He then analyzed the need for a completely integrated force composed of identifiable national units provided with a central staff organization commanded by a single man.
He went on: Now, such a force will require a great deal of equipment in the shortest possible time—modern, efficient, effective equipment. We have already taken steps in the US to expand our own production of that sort of equipment to the utmost limits. We are willing to go further than that and participate with you, if you wish, in a complete reorganization of the Military Production and Supply Board so that instead of having merely a planning organization for production, we can get an action body which will be of the greatest assistance and help to the various governments represented here in utilizing every possible element of European production to produce to the full everything that it can produce and see that raw materials are available and that the production goes immediately to a useful destination.
Re financing he said: We have already taken steps to make funds available for this whole production effort at the outset, and we agree pretty strongly with the deputies that this high priority production program should be put into effect immediately, and we would be willing to work out the financial problems of that within the next few days.
Thereafter there will be larger financial problems. Those will require additional effort and additional organization, but we should like to see organization reduced to the minimum on this so that we can take practical steps and immediate steps to get wheels turning, to get production going forward, to have programs put into effect, so that [Page 318] the goods may be turned out at the earliest moment. We are willing to consider with you any method that seems simple for doing that. Our basic thought in approaching it would be that if any of our partners in this effort find and convince us that, having made all the effort and all the sacrifices that a people might reasonably be expected to make toward defending their own existence and freedom, and their continuance as a nation, they find that they cannot do things which they otherwise could do if financing were forthcoming. We will cooperate in solving those problems.
Returning to the question of Germany: Everyone seems to be agreed that the defense must be to the east, in Germany, and everyone seems to agree that the loss of Germany would create problems of the greatest difficulty for all of us. In that situation and in view of the fact that the Chancellor of the Western German Republic has offered to participate in this effort, both in the field of production and in the field of manpower, we are faced with the decision as to what we do about that. Do we repulse this offer? Do we encourage it? What is our basic decision?
We must go through or we must turn aside. We cannot stand shivering on the doorstep, unable to make up our minds what we are going to do. After we make up our minds, it may take us some time to do it. It will take adroitness to do it. A great many items will enter into our conduct, both things that have to do with time, things that have to do with method, many things which have to do with the form of announcement, and all of that; but the basic point is, what is our will? Do we believe that this program contemplates, indeed almost necessitates the participation of Germany, or do we think that we should repulse Germany and insist that all of us go to even greater sacrifices to defend German territory and the German people without requiring them to make some of the sacrifices which we are going to make—particularly when they have offered to do it.
He excluded from the present problem the German police force which cannot: Oppose or help us oppose the Bereitschaften from Eastern Germany, nor can it oppose any Soviet invasion if that occurred. The whole police matter is an internal security question. He continued: Referring to the time factor he pointed out that there was as yet no German Defense Minister and that constitutional changes must precede the establishment of a German force, he said: I do not mean a German National Army. I do not mean an army which is commanded by Germans, supplied by Germany, directed by a German General Staff, and which might be in a position to join with the Eastern German Army to take action against us. I agree with everything which [Page 319] has been said about the evils of German militarism and the importance of not allowing it to be recreated.
I mean that [at] a proper time—German units, beginning with a few and then perhaps getting more German units, would be raised by the German Government, paid by the German Government and uniformed by the German Government. Those units would be incorporated in and would be under the command of the force for the defense of Europe. I should hope that the unit of the German force might be kept quite low, so that units would be brought in with other units, American or Canadian or British or French or Dutch or whatever they might be, into larger units, but they would be incorporated into European force, would be commanded by that European command structure. Also, the ordnance for this force should be produced outside of Germany, so that it would not have the capacity for independent action. Furthermore, its equipment should be of such a nature that it would be of little use unless it remained as part of this force for the defense of Europe.
Re possible interference with equipping of NATO countries he referred to experience of last war when only after 18 months did equipment really flow in quantity from pipeline and said: After you get a group of young men and want to train them, experience has shown that it takes pretty nearly two years to get a man from civilian life until he is ready for combat. It might be shortened. But it takes about two years. So you see that you already have a considerable period stretching ahead, and therefore, if anyone wishes to act in this matter so as to be effective at an important time in the development of Western European strength, one must begin to act pretty soon.
In conclusion he said: In my judgment not even the opportunity would exist to divert equipment from the arming of member nations of this council to that of the proposed German units, even if one were foolish enough to do that, and of course that idea would not occur to anybody who has been thinking about this proposal. The flow of equipment would be entirely in the control of powers other than Germany. That can be of course handled and will be handled to the complete assurance of everybody involved in this great North Atlantic effort.
However this is done it should not be done in such a manner as to give the Germans the idea that they can bargain about it. They have made an offer. In discussing it with them it should be discussed on that basis, not as asking anything from them but as considering how and in what manner they can do what they have asked to be allowed to do.
[Page 320]I similarly agree that the presentation of this, both to the Germans and to the public, is of the greatest importance, and I am not prejudicing that in any way, I hope, by what I have said.
There is one other matter that I would like to touch on. It has been suggested that doing something along this line might provoke the Russians to military action which they might not otherwise take. It does not seem to me that that fear stands up very well under analysis. I do not believe that the mere fact that one is talking of raising some German units would bring about a provocation, would provoke an attack. If there should be an attack, I presume it would come from Russian fear that we were gaining strength. I don’t suppose they care whether we are gaining our own strength or how we are gaining it. That would be the thing which they might take as the occasion for action. Certainly that is not going to deter us. We are not going to stay weak because if we get strong enough to resist attack we may bring it on.
That is a chance we have to run. We have to run it with our eyes open, and that is one reason why I think speed is so important. Here it seems to me that every element of strength added at the outset reduces our chances of our being attacked before we get enough power to really deter or resist attack.
It seems to me that we are really at the crossroads with Germany at this present time, and Germany seems to me to be in a state where it will either come along and be a good member of the western community and be allowed to come into it and take a full part and help, or it will begin to hedge and begin to have defeatism, and other forms of internal dry-rot in morale will take place. There isn’t much time to hesitate about it, and with that thought I am through.
Department pass Paris.