740.5/9–1750: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
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Secto 21. For Bruce. You are aware from cabled summaries of the impasse in the North Atlantic Council on the question of the participation of German units in the European Defense Force. All members of the Council except Schuman are we believe prepared to take an affirmative decision in principle now. Schuman is consequently under heavy pressure from all sides to accede but his instructions from Paris apparently permit him no latitude of any kind. Under the circumstances it has been suggested that Moch (and also Shinwell) come to this country on September 21 and Bevin and Schuman are cabling their governments to this end tonight.
We are Well aware here of the practical political difficulties centering around the Socialist Party to which must be added Moch’s personal and passionate feelings about the Germans, and realize that we were [Page 315] not in a position to give the French Government much advance warning on the indivisibility in our minds between the creation of a European Defense Force with full US participation and the decision that German units shall participate in that force. Nothing could be further from our minds than the creation of a national German Army. We also fully recognize the importance of timing and the psychological importance of exactly what is said both as it affects France and Germany. On the other hand, the American people simply will not accept the commitments implied in our full participation in the EDF unless they are convinced that the resources and manpower of the countries, including Germany, which lie within the line to be defended by that force will be adequately utilized.
We feel that non-Communist French public opinion is, as a whole, prepared to accept now the principle of eventual participation of German units and that the difficulties are largely of a technical interparty nature. While this does not decrease them, it does show where further work has to be done, and we warmly welcome the opportunity which will be created by Moch’s visit to impress on him personally the validity of our convictions of these various points.
Since it is vital that French acquiescence be obtained as soon as possible, and in any case to prepare Moch in advance with our point of view, we think it advisable that you seek an early interview with both him and Pleven and impress on them both the extreme gravity with which continued French unwillingness to concur in decision of the other 11 NATO governments will be viewed in official, Congressional and public opinion here.
As an aid to you we are cabling you2 appropriate extracts from the Secretary’s statement of September 15 to the Council as summarized in Secto 18 which explains quite well our position.
There are, of course, many details to be decided which are important in successfully carrying out the program—(a) from the European point of view, (b) from the German point of view, and (c) to avoid the hazards of German militarism. We have thought about these enough to be sure they can be worked out successfully.
We cannot well overemphasize the importance of this matter. A successful solution is vital to European morale, US morale, and above all to getting on with establishing effective defense promptly.
We must leave it to you as to how to present the situation most forcefully.
Department pass Paris.