Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/9–1650: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
priority

New York, September 16, 1950—2:19 a.m.

Secto 18. Summary, second meeting, fifth session, North Atlantic Council, 3 p.m., September 15.

1. Continued discussion agenda item 4 re defense WE.

2. Portugal stated that both increased troops in Europe and German participation in European defense desirable and stated that defense lines should be as far to east in Germany as possible but that realism dictated preparation of secondary lines of defense should initial battle go badly (no specific mention of Spain).

3. Norway stressed psychological and political problems involved in use of German manpower. Recognized possibility of utilizing German manpower but noted German reluctance to take part in defense of west, possible Soviet reaction to German participation, and adverse propaganda if Germans hastily taken into defense forces of west. Proposed NATO begin studying technical aspects of problem of utilizing German resources and manpower but would need to consult Norwegian Government before approving German participation and believed we should move cautiously.

4. Belgium urged defense line as far east in Germany as possible and German participation in own defense. In view possible adverse public reaction and danger rebirth German militarism, Germany should not be armed ahead of other pact countries. Favored increasing German police force, associating Germany with economic effort for defense and, provided margin of strength maintained in favor of NAT countries, participating in joint armed effort. Suggested planning take place on problem but stressed need for proceeding with caution.

5. Luxembourg also stressed psychological obstacles to hasty action re Germany and in general took same position as Belgium.

6. Denmark agreed with Norway and Belgium.

7. Italy stressed psychological advantage in pushing defense line east, and urged full cooperation in favor of German participation in common defense.

8. Canada favored principle of using Germany in European defense. Canada accepted principle of German manpower being appropriately used in defense of west.

9. UK emphasized need for public and parliamentary support before Germany could participate in European defense. Noted steps recently taken re term of conscription and urged early creation of central command for recruitment and training European forces. When this accomplished, German participation possible without adverse public reaction. Did not oppose participation in principle and would stand publicly by opinions when proper time came, but premature publicity could be disastrous. German police problem distinct from defense and UK favored building central police force to resist attack from Soviet zone or preserve law and order within Federal Republic. Solution police problem should not await solution of other problems.

10. After all nations wishing speak had stated views (only Iceland did not make statement) Secretary made full statement US position,¹ answering points re Germany raised during discussion and making clear US viewed decision on permitting German participation as essential part of over-all US program. US emphasized necessity agreeing in principle to these basic points during present session, said Council should not get lost in discussing details which could be worked out subsequently if we were clear on basic issues.

Secretary emphasized dire consequence of losing Germany to east and need for utmost speed. Noted US proposal to increase troops in Europe if European NAT countries do their part. Proposed creation central military organization, including appointment top command, to train and control component units of European forces. States willingness to reorganize Military Supply Board giving it power to develop centralized program for production and use of equipment. Noted US willingness make funds available to HPPP if countries will assume their share burden. Indicated consideration would be given to further financial cooperation by US if partner nations could convince US that they were doing everything possible for their defense and by additional aid could make substantially greater effort.

Stated basic decision favoring German participation did not involve creation German national army or German general staff. (Also pointed out German police were for internal security whereas basic question was development of strength to resist external aggression.) Stressed time lapse almost two years between induction of German troops and their completed training. Expressed view that decision to create German units should not really interfere with equipment of NATO countries, since during this initial period of equipment scarcity, German needs only training equipment. Noted allocation equipment remains outside German hands. Indicated that if steps initiated in near future to form German units such units would not be ready until after establishment European forces which could receive them as integral part. Discounted alleged provocation of Soviet Union by decision re German participation. Urged Council take basic decision favor German participation.

11. Next meeting scheduled 10:30 a. m., September 16.

Department pass priority Brussels (pass to Luxembourg), Ottawa, Copenhagen, Paris (pass OSR), Rome, The Hague, Olso, Lisbon, London, Heidelberg for Handy, Department of Defense.

Acheson

1. Extracts of his statement are printed in Secto 22, p. 316. The complete text was included in the full verbatim record of this second meeting hut was circulated only for the personal information of the Ministers and their Deputies and did not constitute an official record. The statement, together with the complete records of the September North Atlantic Council meetings, is in the CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 152, NATO September 1950 Meetings, Deputies–Ministers, and the Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95, CF’s 38–42.