Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/9–1550

Memorandum of a Private Meeting With Mr. Bevin, September 15, 1950, 2:40 p. m., by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)

priority

[New York, undated.]

Participants:	The Secretary
	Mr. Bevin
	Sir Oliver Franks
	Mr. Barclay
	Mr. Battle

Mr. Bevin asked to see Mr. Acheson prior to the afternoon meeting of the North Atlantic Council. He said that he had been considering the difficult problem of Germany and had had many telegrams with his Government in London. He said he felt he understood better now what was bothering his Government. He mentioned several things which he said were of great concern to them.

He said the UK political situation influenced the British stand to a large extent, although he realized that that was of no concern to the US. He said that Mr. Churchill had stirred everything up and had made it difficult for his Cabinet to act on the matter.

He said that the British did not want to put themselves in the position of coddling the Germans or of appealing to them for something they wanted. He said that the British felt strongly that the development of an effective police force was the first step to take. He then said he had received messages from his Government which indicated that the UK was agreeable to the principle of German participation. He said that he felt the next stage was to discuss the matter with the Germans. He stressed the need for a lapse of time before the decision was put into effect. He handed Mr. Acheson copies of the two messages, which are attached.¹

Mr. Acheson said that he considered these messages encouraging. He then said that the US was not anxious to get action on part of the package without going through with the entire program. Mr. Acheson said that he thought it would be a good idea for the Council to debate the matter fully and said that he was concerned lest members of the Council were dodging the issue and failing to discuss it frankly.

Mr. Acheson continued to the effect that any action the Council took officially was likely to be in rather vague terms. He said that he felt that this action must be against a background of thorough discussion, or the very vagueness of the Council action would make the action practically pointless. He urged that they all thoroughly understand the problem. He mentioned again the urgency with which the US viewed the problem and said that the US had had the greatest difficulty in moving ahead to the point that we had reached, where we were able to discuss what we had felt the European countries wanted to discuss. He said that, while we were very hopeful of going through with the program, we could not put US troops in a hopeless venture where they would be lost in the first few weeks, and that we must have an army of sufficient size and strength to do the job. He said we were convinced we could do this only with German participation.

Mr. Acheson said that he had told Washington that there were limits to what the British and French appeared to be able to agree to. He said that he hoped that we could get agreement in principle to German participation and to his idea of phrasing it as a reply to Adenauer’s offer. He mentioned again, as he had done several times, the length of time which would be required for Germany to reach a stage where it could begin actually mobilizing units. He said he thought it would be at least 18 months before Germany could get the first person armed.

Later in the afternoon Mr. Jessup discussed with Sir Oliver Franks the papers which Mr. Acheson had been given by Mr. Bevin. Mr. Jessup reported that Sir Oliver had told him that “the exact words were not insisted on; the ideas and their order were.”

[Enclosure]²

We suggest that our objectives should be to reach agreement on the following programme.

In the light of the declared intention of the signatory Powers to resist aggression, the North Atlantic Council should:—

(1) Agree on the necessity for an integrated force for the defence of the West;

(2) Agree that the member countries should immediately start on the build-up of the integrated force to the best of their ability;

(3) Agree on the necessity of a central command organization.
(We hope that it will be possible to carry a resolution in the Council providing for a Supreme Commander, who will be appointed as soon as sufficient forces are contained within the integrated force, and providing as an immediate step for the appointment of a representative of the Supreme Commander to prepare the ground.)

As regards German participation, it seems doubtful whether a definite conclusion can be reached in the Atlantic Council this week. The attitude of His Majesty’s Government is shown in the attached paper,³ and it is hoped that a formula on Germany which will be satisfactory to the French can be worked out when the tripartite meetings are resumed next week.

The Cabinet agreed that the Foreign Secretary might be informed as follows.

1. His Majesty’s Government were in general agreement to the acceptance in principle of German participation in Western defence on the lines and subject to the conditions indicated by Mr. Acheson. These were to the effect that the next stage should be exploration of the matter with the German Government and that in discussions with the Germans we should not adopt a negative attitude but should say that we were very ready to discuss what Germany could do. At the same time it should be understood that while a decision in principle must be taken now some time must elapse before it could be put into effect and material results could ensue from the talks with the Germans.

Importance was attached to the greatest practicable measure of French concurrence.

The first development should be the enlargement of the German gendarmerie.

2. In any statement in the Atlantic Council about German armed forces the subject should not be presented in such a way as to suggest that the Atlantic countries were wooing the Germans.

1. One of these messages is printed as an enclosure, below. The other is apparently the attachment to that message and has not been found in the Department of State files.
2. Message dated September 15 from the British Foreign Office to the U.K. Delegation in New York.
3. See footnote 1 above.