740.5/9–1450
Minutes of a Private Conference of the French, British, and United States Foreign Ministers and Their High Commissioners for Germany1
Present:
- Mr. Robert Schuman
- Mr. François-Poncet2
- Mr. Bourbon-Busset
- Mr. Bevin
- Sir Ivan Kirkpatrick
- Mr. Barclay3
- Mr. Acheson
- Mr. McCloy
- Mr. Battle
Mr. Acheson opened the meeting by saying that he wanted to get away from looking at words and papers and run over with the Ministers the main ideas which he had been trying to express. He said that at the meeting last May both Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman had spoken very earnestly on the need for reaching a decision regarding the defense of Western Europe. They had put forth the thought that Western Europe must be defended from the start and had stressed the importance of the US in putting off its decision on what it would do for several years while the British and French bore the brunt. Both has pointed out that in any future war this would not work. They had stressed that if Europe were to be defended from the beginning of any new war, the forces must be there and do the job. The Secretary said that he had been impressed with these ideas and had gotten to work on them with great vigor. He said that he felt tremendous strides had been made in the US and that we had now decided that we would participate with the French and British in the defense of Western Europe from the start.
In going over the matter to determine what was necessary, we had concluded that what we wanted was to preserve peace and not have a [Page 294] war come upon us. If it should come, however, we felt that we must be successful in it. Involved in this was the decision as to where our defense should take place. We have decided that we feel that it should be made as far east as possible. The US then considered the minimum forces required and concluded that without some German participation the simple arithmetic would not work out. We felt that we had no hope of doing the job successfully without German participation.
The Secretary went on to say that we had considered the time element was an important factor. We felt that in order to preserve the peace, we must move forward as a matter of highest urgency. He said that we felt that this was important to prevent a spirit of defeatism in Germany and elsewhere. He said that he hoped we would be able to begin now and within 18 months to two years have an effective force in being in Europe.
The Secretary then said that the US felt that we should get started immediately and on something with real promise. He said that we must come to certain conclusions.
First, those nations which were not on the European continent must realize that they must increase their forces there, with timing and numbers to be worked out as soon as possible. He said that US forces would be greatly strengthened and this would be done promptly.
Second, he said that we should all agree on the principle of a compact, integrated and centrally directed force, which required committing some of all of our forces to the defense of Europe.
Third, at the appropriate time a Supreme Commander would be appointed, but we must get the plan set up and decide on what form the army would take and other questions, such as whether the Germans will go in.
Fourth, in regard to supply, the US will go into some organization to direct the European supply and production effort. He said we realize that assistance from the US will be necessary. The Secretary then said that these were the main ideas which he wished to discuss in order that the Foreign Ministers might plan an approach to the North Atlantic Council and decide what we say there as well as to the public.
Mr. Bevin suggested going through the points one at a time.
Mr. Acheson said that he thought we were all pretty well agreed on the integrated force. There was unanimous agreement on this, point.
The Secretary then said that contributions of forces must be made if the European force was to exist. He said we should make these contributions in the near future and identify them. In this matter [Page 295] the standing group would be of great help. It was agreed that such forces would have to be contributed at an appropriate time.
Mr. Acheson asked if all agreed that there should be a Supreme Commander, which he said was inherent in the concept of an integrated force. There was no disagreement registered, although Mr. Bevin made a comment to the effect that he might be able to agree oil the exact nature of the command set-up but would have to see.
It was generally agreed to set up some kind of group of people to supervise the supply and production efforts. It was also agreed that financing was a vital part of this problem. Mr. Acheson said that it was basic to this consideration that there be some financial assistance from the US.
Mr. Schuman then spoke on the financial problem. He said that he was in agreement on recognizing the importance of the decision of common participation and the importance of getting together details as to what was needed, etc. He said that he was pleased that the program would take place in stages along the lines that Mr. Acheson had suggested in previous meetings. He said that he was in complete agreement that the high priority production program should come first. He then said that it would be helpful to know exactly what help could be expected under the medium term plan. He pointed out that he should know by November when his budget would be prepared since the French fiscal year begins in January.
The Secretary said it was not really possible for the US to say that we would give a certain amount to France and a certain amount to the British, etc. He said that our approach was to first determine the magnitude and then see the difficulties which would come to our friends in carrying out the program. He said we would try to see that no trouble comes to the UK or to France economically which would prevent the attainment of the purpose on which we are engaged. He said when our people could see what was necessary and could show what would befall France and the UK if it undertook programs of the magnitude decided, we could then know what the real difficulties were and we would see what we could do about it.
Mr. Schuman then said that he understood the US needed additional details. The Secretary said that this was true and he thought the sound way to go at it was for the finance people of the two countries to have preliminary discussions in an effort to identify the problem. He urged that the conversations take place as soon as possible.
Mr. Bevin said that the UK got in a “tangle” as between their economy and their war effort. He said that maintenance of the economy was basic to the war effort. He said he appreciated very much the basis on which Mr. Acheson was approaching the matter. He then [Page 296] said that he assumed there would also be bilateral discussions on the problem, which he thought would keep the thing from getting too complex. The Secretary agreed that simplicity and speed should be the keynote.
Mr. Acheson then asked where we stood on Germany. Mr. Schuman replied to the effect that the question of Germany was largely one of manpower since it is agreed that she cannot produce arms. He said that France was ready to permit some indirect participation in the manufacture of certain items (steel and non-end items). He said that matériel was not available in unlimited quantities and that the French believed such as exists should be given to the “Allies” on a priority basis. He said that the French felt that matériel and equipment were first considerations and manpower considerations were secondary. He said he did not feel the question of mobilizing manpower should be considered until the matériel question was dealt with. In Mr. Schuman’s opinion, we should avoid trying to use German manpower too early. We should choose the time carefully before speaking of German units. He said that we should not give the Russians a chance to interpret such a move as aggravating an international situation. He said that only when our strength was such that we could stop any moves which the Russians might take should we discuss the German units question. He said that public opinion might react against us and result in lost ground. He also mentioned Parliamentary difficulties which might develop.
Mr. Schuman referred to the question raised by Mr. Acheson of the effect on German public opinion if Germany were not included. He said that he felt the best way to keep down a spirit of defeatism was to build up strength of the force to a point that Germany would want to go in with us. He said he considered it premature to consider the decision on German units until the NATO was in effect and the main strength had been reached by the powers.
Mr. Schuman then said that he had asked for authorization from his Government to agree to German participation at the proper time. He said that he could not agree even in principle until he received his instructions, although he hoped to have instructions within a few days. He also mentioned the difficulties he would have in agreeing to any amendment of the decision even if he were authorized to agree with the Ministers.
Mr. Schuman then said that he did not feel we should be put in a position of asking the Germans for something. He said that German public opinion must be prepared for its participation in the European defense force effort. He said that if we ask them they will try to bargain. He did not believe that there was a majority in Germany [Page 297] who wanted to participate in defense efforts. He also did not think it likely that there would be such a majority until Western strength was built up.
He said that he felt we were taking some action in agreeing to the substantial increase in the German police. He also said that there were labor units which could be given a military or para-military character. He added that he thought we might consider getting no national units in volumes. He thought each of these steps might be taken before we considered the major question of German participation in a defense force.
Mr. Bevin said he was unable to give any definite answer now. He said that his Government had not made any decision on the question of German units, although he had encountered no formal objection to it in talks prior to the meeting. He also mentioned several difficulties which we would face in deciding to utilize German units, including his fear that we would possibly be giving Russia a reason for starting a war. He urged the creation of the police force and mentioned the similar force which the Russians have started in Eastern Germany. He said he hoped we could settle the police thing without ruling out the question of German units.
In reply, Mr. Acheson said he agreed with much of what Mr. Schuman had said. He agreed that we must be careful in our approach to the Germans and should consider carefully the question of timing and public opinion. He said that he realized neither Mr. Bevin nor Mr. Schuman could take a decision at the moment, but thought it useful to consider some of Mr. Schuman’s points. First, he mentioned the manpower question in relation to matériel. With regard to production, he said it usually started slowly and became accelerated over a period of time, and finally came out in a flood. He said it was not a good concept to wait until we had plenty of equipment before dealing with the manpower problem. He said he thought we might reach the full production level in 18 months to 24 months. He suggested training a small force which could be expanded at a later date to a larger force so as to have men in a state of preparedness to receive the matériel.
Mr. Acheson agreed that we would not want to give the USSR cause to do something they would not otherwise do. He pointed out that Mr. Schuman had said that only when our strength was sufficient to prevent action by the USSR should we take up the German problem.
He said that we are starting now from nothing and the line representing our strength will go up. The USSR is aware of this and the question that they face is whether to let us have time to put them in position where they have no freedom of action. In so far as the USSR [Page 298] starting a preventive war, they are deterred now by the fear of atomic bombing. Another line on the chart would show the effort they make to protect themselves from atomic attack. When our strength line and the line of USSR on atomic bombing cross is the great danger period so far as conflict is concerned. The creation of the German army has little bearing on the matter. It does not really matter to the Russians whether we are building up strength by the creation of a German force or by other means. This is not the real question.
An important element in regard to German public opinion is whether the Germans can participate in the building up of Western strength. If Germany asks to participate, it would be very difficult if the High Commission were not in a position to reply. When we consider the things which Mr. Schuman says we can do now, we cannot be certain that any of them will handle the possibility of external aggression. The police would be important, but whether they be federal or not they would not be able to deal with external aggression. The labor units are also important, but are not the answer to the problem. The Secretary said that he doubted that national units would be well received, or whether we would be successful in recruiting many of them.
Mr. Acheson said that in addition to the time it would take any country to train troops, the problem in Germany involved an even greater period since Germany had no ministry, no list of persons who are draft age, no records of any kind and no organization on which an army could be built. He said that before one German could be called, many months would be required. He then said that the Russians had created a force in East Germany of 50 thousand people which by spring would be 150 thousand. He said this should stimulate us into action of some sort. He said also that we must get the Germans in a position where they are actively doing something for their own defense if we are to guide German opinion effectively.
Mr. Bevin said he wanted to give an answer but could not at the present time. Mr. Acheson replied that we must consider what we say to the NATO powers and to Adenauer.
Mr. McCloy mentioned that Chancellor Adenauer had asked to participate in a German Army.
Mr. Schuman said we must have the European army first before we could reply to Chancellor Adenauer to the effect that we wanted German participation.
Mr. Acheson said we could decide now on German participation without getting it into effect for some time. He suggested we might say to Adenauer at the end of these meetings that we had taken up [Page 299] action to put the force in existence, that we realized it would take him a long time to move very far and suggest that the Germans got to work on the establishment of units. By 1951 we would hope to have a good force in being.
Mr. Schuman said that an announcement now of the decision on this matter would cause the gravest difficulty in France. He mentioned the possibility that our High Commission continue preliminary discussions with Adenauer in preparation for action, but said that it was not possible to communicate to Adenauer an action decision of the NATO powers. He said that the final decision belonged with the Atlantic powers and that while the three Ministers representing occupation powers could authorize certain things, the final voice belonging to the NAT powers.
Mr. Acheson said the public opinion aspect depended a great deal on how the matter is handled. The US believes that an attempt to defend Western Europe without German participation was impossible. He said that it was important in this country not to give the impression that we are attempting the impossible. We suggested we consider whether it could be developed along the lines that we were not doing anything for the Germans but were letting them do something for us.
Mr. Schuman said that French public opinion would not accept the rearmament of Germany when France itself was not armed. It would not accept such an arrangement until the first effect of our rearmament program was seen and felt. He thought that the French Parliament would reverse any decision which might be made now to move ahead with German rearmament. He added that he might be willing to take upon himself the authority for authorizing very preliminary negotiations by the High Commission with Chancellor Adenauer.
The Secretary said that he had never suggested Germany be rearmed while France was not armed. He said we could present the matter to our people to the effect that the German effort would follow other developments. He said he thought it important that we agree to accept the basic principle of the program and agree to keep German rearmament lagging behind that of the other powers.
Mr. Schuman said that he understood this reasoning but thought it impossible to come to a decision without having it leak to the press. This would in France be interpreted as an irrevocable decision which would result in German units receiving materials which France itself needed and France would be on the same footing as Germany. He [Page 300] said that if the decision on principle could be made but not given out for six months or so he might be able to take a definite view, but he did not believe this was possible.
Mr. Acheson said this depended in some measure on what the decision in principle was. He said it might be to the effect that units were to be trained and called but armed only after other things were done.
Mr. Schuman said he had proposed a conditional decision to his Government and hoped to have the answer by Monday. He said that he had read that the Benelux countries favored rearming and he thought that such a stand on the part of the allies in Europe would help solve the French problem.
Mr. Bevin said that he was not in favor of rearming Germany until we are sure of our own strength. He said he thought the situation was now changing so that we would have an effective European force and well organized command and that he saw the matter very differently from the way he would have seen it some months ago. Mr. Poncet said that the High Commission wanted guidance on how to direct German public opinion.
In closing, Mr. Acheson said that the three powers were in great difficulty here. He asked whether we are to get out a comprehensive communiqué at the close of the meeting. He said that all he believed we could say at present was that we had had a useful “go round” and wanted to discuss the problems further with our NAT colleagues. A communiqué of the NAT Council could then come out on Monday. He said that if we had the Foreign Ministers and the NAT meetings and could not say one word about Germany participation it would be a most embarrassing situation. He suggested announcing the formation of the force with some line to the effect that the Council had considered a communication from Adenauer to the effect that the Germans would cooperate in the force and add that the plan comprehended participation of this sort. Mr. Schuman said he would think this over and would not reject it as being impossible.
Mr. Schuman asked whether we could simply give out the fact that the problem was being discussed so that public opinion could be acquainted with the problem without giving it out as a fait accompli. The Secretary replied that this was not enough in his opinion since the fact that the question was under consideration had been known for many months. He repeated his suggestion for the final communiqué in which a reference would be made to Chancellor Adenauer’s willingness to proceed and suggested a statement to the effect that this was contemplated by the plan but that further consideration was necessary [Page 301] with the German Government. He thought some hopeful note of this sort was essential.