740.5/9–1250

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 1

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Dear Mr. Secretary: I am forwarding herewith an expression of US policy and intentions with respect to Western Europe prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which I fully concur.

As you know, the President, after consideration of the views of the National Security Council and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, has approved our joint letter to him of 8 September 1950. This action has been circulated as NSC 82, “US Policy Regarding Strengthening the Defense of Europe and the Nature of Germany’s Contribution Thereto.”2 It is my belief that this approval of NSC 82 constitutes approval of the principles set forth in the attached document.

[Page 291]

I believe that the presentation of these views at your September 15th Council meeting3 could have a profound effect on the Council and thereby on the other governments signatory to the Treaty. I therefore strongly recommend that, if you concur, the enclosed paper be presented as a US view in connection with the most important matter of the voluntary increase in defense forces by the European nations.

I am requesting the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to circulate this paper for the information of the Council in connection with their approval of NSC 82.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Johnson
[Enclosure]

Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff4

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United States Views on Measures for the Defense of Western Europe

1.
The United States Government has given a great deal of consideration to the problem of the defense of Western Europe and to the extent of United States participation therein. It has been readily apparent that this defense can be successfully accomplished only as a combined undertaking. Western Europe cannot by itself in the near future, raise, equip, and maintain the requisite forces to insure this defense; neither can U.S. assistance in the form of forces, equipment or dollars turn the scales without the all-out, honest efforts of all the nations of Western Europe.
2.
The United States is concerned over the scale and vigor of the efforts of the nations of Western Europe towards the guarantee of their own security. The importance of Western Europe to the over-all defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area is recognized and emphatically reaffirmed. However, the extent of U.S. preoccupation with and participation in the defense of Western Europe cannot and should [Page 292] not serve to decrease the efforts of the Western European nations themselves whose very existence is dependent on the success of this defense.
3.
Reduced to essentials, the problem resolves itself into a need for increased effort on the part of all the nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States Government wishes therefore, to enunciate and affirm the following principles:
a.
Support of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area is the primary military commitment of the United States.
b.
The defense of Western Europe is recognized as being of the greatest importance to the defense of the treaty area in general and to the ultimate security of each of the signators in particular.
4.
In concrete implementation of the above principles, the United States Government desires to express the following statements of policies and intentions over and above those measures previously contemplated or effected by the United States:
a.
We are planning to augment the U.S. forces in Europe at the earliest practicable date. Our planning now envisages over-all U.S. forces in Europe on the order of 4 infantry and the equivalent of 1½ armored divisions and 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate naval forces, to be in place and combat ready as expeditiously as possible.
b.
In addition to the above, it is the intention that the United States dispatch to Europe on the outbreak of hostilities, further forces, the size and composition of which will be discussed on the Chiefs of Staff level.
5.
It is contemplated that the initial allocation of the above discussed forces will be to the general area of the Western European Region. This is in the expectation that that region will face the main effort of the enemy and with the recognition that that region, centrally located, is best suited to permit the rapid reinforcement of either the Northern or Southern regions. In other words, the United States Government, while originally allocating these forces to the area of the Western European Region, intends that they should be employed to the best interests of NATO as a whole and does not intend to restrict their utilization to any one area.
6.
In addition to the above commitments with respect to forces, the United States Government recognizes the need for developing arrangements for operational planning, command and coordination of training. We stand ready to take part in discussions on these matters and to participate in any arrangements for their solution.
7.
The foregoing statement has been made as a clarification of the position of the United States Government with respect to the defense of Western Europe. It plans to commit the forces discussed herein in expectation that they will be met with similar efforts on the part [Page 293] of the other nations involved. It is now squarely up to the European signatories to provide the balance of the forces required for the initial defense. Firm programs for the development of such forces represent a prerequisite for the fulfillment of the above commitments on the part of the United States.

  1. This letter and the enclosed paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were circulated to the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury under cover of a brief explanatory note by Council Executive Secretary Lay as document NSC 82/1, September 13, Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Policy and Intentions With Respect to Western Europe (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 82 Series).
  2. Ante, p. 273.
  3. Regarding Secretary Acheson’s expression of United States policy at the fifth session of the North Atlantic Council, September 15, see telegram Secto 17, September 16, p. 308, and telegram Secto 22, September 17, p. 316.
  4. In a memorandum of September 17 to Acting Secretary of State Webb, not printed, Ambassador at Large Jessup observed that this paper was to be brought before the National Security Council meeting scheduled for September 21. Jessup recommended that the views expressed herein be acknowledged as in general accord with NSC 82. As far as the presentation of these views to the North Atlantic Council was concerned, Jessup recommended that Webb briefly state to the National Security Council that the exact manner of presentation of United State views must necessarily toe left to Secretary of State. (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 82 Series)