740.5/9–1250
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
| Participants: | Mr. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister |
| Mr. Bourbon-Busset1 | |
| Secretary Acheson | |
| Mr. Battle |
Mr. Schuman opened the conversation2 by remarking that there had been considerable trouble in the world since the last meeting he had had with the Secretary. The Secretary agreed that there had been considerable difficulty and expressed the hope that there would soon be a change in the Korean situation. Mr. Schuman praised the President and the Secretary for their courage in the Korean case. He said that he considered the steps absolutely necessary in order to preserve the prestige of the United Nations and the Western powers.
Mr. Acheson said that we had worked very hard of late on the French memorandum which had been submitted to us. He said that it had been difficult to prepare answers to all of the questions raised because of the necessity for a full governmental decision. Mr. Acheson then said that the National Security Council and the President had considered many of the problems which face the Foreign Ministers at this meeting and that he hoped that they could make progress on them. He said that the President had agreed to increasing US forces in Europe and that we would proceed as rapidly as possible on this. He pointed out that we were in agreement with the French on its proposal for an integrated staff. We have also considered the French suggestion on command. We agree with that proposal. The Secretary said that we felt that the staff must come first, that the Commander must have something to command before he could take over. In other words, we must have troops in being before a Supreme Commander can be named. The Secretary said that the Commander may or may not be the same man who is Chief of Staff. That would have to be worked out as time went on.
The Secretary said that we had also given careful thought to the French suggestion regarding a production board. It is our thought that we might take the NATO military and supply board and make it a directing and executive body. The board would then deal with European [Page 286] production as a unit. It would analyze existing factories, decide where contracts could be placed, avoid duplication, etc.
The Secretary said that on the financial problems in the French memorandum we were not as far with our thinking as we were in the other matters. He mentioned three steps which he felt we could take. The first of these was to work together and solve while Mr. Schuman was here the high priority production program. The second was to examine the broad financial and economic questions which would emerge during 1951. The third was to consider at the same time by taking a longer period the long-range institutions which could be established to solve the financial problems. The Secretary said he did not want to let the long-range program slow up work on the immediate problems. He said that while Mr. Schuman was here we could make real progress on the problems which would arise during 1951. He suggested that we have discussions as soon as possible to analyze the magnitude of the French effort, the UK effort and the efforts of other countries in the production and the military field. After analyzing these figures and thoroughly understanding them, which we do not at present, we would then have some basis for considering what we should request from Congress in the way of funds or authority. The Secretary said this would involve discussions with ECA, Treasury and other agencies of our Government.
Mr. Schuman asked whether these talks should be tripartite, to which the Secretary replied that we had not completely considered this point. The Secretary said that we might get together several people from our side to discuss this problem.
Mr. Schuman said that he realized it was difficult for us to have a definite position on some of these matters because of the necessity for Congressional action. He said that it was very helpful, however, to know the real intention of the United States. The Secretary said that we hoped by December or January to be able to go to the Congress with a carefully considered plan for what we needed.
The Secretary said that we could over a period of time discuss the development of potential institutions for dealing with the financial problems. He said that to do so now would only slow us up.
Mr. Schuman said that one difficulty was the fact that in France the fiscal year begins in January and the budget must be prepared next week. He said that France would hope to have plans on which they could act clearly in mind as soon as possible. Mr. Acheson said that he was aware of the budget difficulty but thought we might work out some arrangement whereby the French put in their budget and state that it was not as bad as it appeared because US help was expected, although the amount was not yet firm.
[Page 287]Mr. Acheson said that we had also considered where we should go in the defense of Europe. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that we should defend Europe as far east as possible. In this connection, Mr. Acheson said that we had considered the possibility of German assistance. He said that we did not see why we should defend Germany without getting some help from them. We realize only too well that we must not recreate a German national army which would be independent and a powerful separate force. He said that we would think that Germany might contribute units to a European army with the units supplied from the outside so that they could not function alone and separately.
Mr. Schuman asked if we expected this plan to be immediately executed. He pointed out the necessity for creating the European army before we could bring in the German units.
Mr. Acheson agreed that a reasonable time would be necessary to put the plan in operation. He said that the staff would have to be created and that more US troops would be in Europe and that the new French divisions would probably be in existence. He also said that it would take time to get the units together and to arm them, particularly since other countries would have to be given priority.
Mr. Acheson said that we saw a period of great danger in a couple of years and did not want to put off these decisions which seemed so essential. He said that he realized that Mr. Schuman would probably be unable to do much more than discuss the matter today. Mr. Schuman said he was not opposed to such a plan but due to public opinion and the French Parliament, publicity should not be given to the plan too soon. He said that if French agreement was given, it could not be made public for some time. He referred to the traditional French position on this problem and to the psychological difficulty it presented for the French. He said that any discussion on this matter which would become public soon would be very bad.
Mr. Acheson said that we would have to think this through. He said that we believed the next few months will be critical in Germany and thought that a statement might be desirable. He said that if we can say that we are taking steps which will result in our defending all of Western Europe, it will be very helpful in the next critical months in Germany. Mr. Schuman said that a statement that we will defend Western Europe was not a serious problem, but that the difficulty was in associating Germany with this effort. He said that the High Commission had made a statement on August 313 which he thought the Ministers could repeat. Mr. Schuman said further that a minority in [Page 288] France appreciates the importance of Germany in Western defense, but that this is a distinct minority. He said it would be easier to sell in France if the Combined Staff, the Supreme Commander, etc. were in existence and NATO action complete on these matters.
The Secretary said that we must find some solution to this problem. Mr. Schuman said that the creation of a police force would be even more difficult for them. He said this would also present difficulties for the Belgians and the Dutch. The Secretary said we were opposed to the creation of the “Bereitschaften” idea. Mr. Schuman closed the discussion of this subject by urging again that the Ministers not speak out too early on the problem.
[Here follows a closing paragraph on the subject of Indochina.]