Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58 F 33: 320

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret

[Washington,] September 11, 1950.

SFM D–8a

Security of Greece and Turkey

problem

To establish the United States position with respect to the Turkish application for adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty, and to consider whether any further steps should be taken in connection with the general security of Greece and Turkey (and Iran).

recommendations

1. That the Secretary endeavor to obtain the concurrence of the British and French Foreign Ministers upon the following:

(a) Any decision regarding participation by Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should apply also to Greece.

(b) While under present circumstances it would be unwise to extend to Greece and Turkey membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they should be offered the opportunity of being associated with the work of the appropriate military planning bodies subordinate to the Defense Committee. This would permit their participation, where feasible, in coordinating planning against Soviet aggression, and might lessen their disappointment that full membership cannot be granted at this time.

(c) When the decision taken in the Tripartite talks regarding the Turkish application is discussed at the North Atlantic Treaty Council, an endeavor should be made to obtain a decision by the Council as a whole so that a uniform position will be taken by the Treaty members vis-à-vis the Government of Turkey.

(d) Assuming that the United States position is accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty Council, the Turkish authorities should be informed that the development of the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty and of the necessary defensive strength among the Treaty countries has not progressed sufficiently to permit the extension of NAT membership to other countries at this time, but that the matter of Turkish inclusion will be given continuing study. In the meantime, the special status accorded to Turkey and Greece will permit them to participate in military planning by the European countries. A similar line should be taken with the Greek Government.

(e) Upon conclusion of NAT Council consideration of the problem, the Council in its communiqué should make a public statement regarding the extension of the special arrangements for Greece and Turkey.

(f) The mentioning Iran as well as Greece and Turkey. The United States should explain to the Iranians that comparable association of Iran is precluded by the terms of the treaty.

Suggested wording of statements pursuant to (e) and (f) will be formulated.

2. Regarding further steps concerning the general security of Greece, Turkey and Iran:

(a) The United States has under continuing study the question of Greek, Turkish and Iranian military requirements in the light of the changed international situation and the possibility of a satellite attack, which will be met under aid programs to the extent made possible by availabilities. The United States is also giving study to the question of what additional military equipment could and should be supplied to Greece and/or Turkey in case of an attack by satellite forces, or to Iran in event of Russian-inspired revolution. Similar studies by the British and French would be welcomed.

(b) As a means of contributing to Greek security, the United States favors the continuance of UNSCOB in its present form and will instruct its delegation to the General Assembly accordingly. It is hoped that the British and French will do likewise.

discussion

1. North Atlantic Treaty

British, French, and United States representatives have, in preparatory meetings, agreed that the security of the Near and Middle East, and therefore the security of the West, would be endangered if the Soviet Union should gain control of either Greece or Turkey. The United Kingdom and French Governments have a treaty of alliance with Turkey; the United States and United Kingdom Governments have publicly stated and demonstrated in practice their deep interest in the integrity of Greece and Turkey. Representatives of the three governments have therefore concluded that the Soviet Union has every reason to believe that a direct Soviet attack on Greece and Turkey would lead to a general war and that a satellite attack on either country might involve a similar risk. It is believed that the principal motivating factors in the Turkish request are (a) its desire to make more binding this implied commitment as well as direct military assistance in the event of an attack; (b) the conviction that Turkey’s adherence to the pact, with the commitment by the other members to consider an attack against it an attack against all, would constitute an additional deterrent to Soviet aggression; and (c) its desire to participate in defense planning per se and with the hope of obtaining additional arms thereby.

In the Tripartite preparatory discussions, none of the three Governments was prepared to put forward specific recommendations concerning the Turkish application. The United States position necessarily awaited consideration of military and strategic aspects by the Department of Defense. In more recent bilateral discussions with British staff representatives, however, it was indicated that Foreign Office thinking has developed along the following lines: Some form of reassurance to Turkey is required. This reassurance in the British view should, in order of priority, be: (a) a unilateral commitment by the United States to assist in the defense of Turkey; (b) the creation of a new regional pact including Greece and Turkey; or (c) the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty. The British recognize, however, that the United States position must depend upon its ability to commit forces in the event of hostilities, and that the United States could not extend a formal guarantee unless it is in fact prepared to commit some forces in support thereof.

The Department of Defense has indicated that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey as members in the North Atlantic Treaty would on balance adversely affect the progress now being made by that organization. Their inclusion would be desirable only insofar as it would facilitate coordinated military planning for the North Atlantic area and the Eastern Mediterranean area. Maximum benefit might, therefore, be obtained and at the same time the disadvantages minimized by according Greece and Turkey a special status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization short of membership, which would permit participation in coordinating planning against Soviet aggression. This status would be a temporary expedient, the effectiveness of which would depend upon the extent and nature of consultation. The terms of their relationship should provide for the collaboration of Greece and Turkey in appropriate military bodies in the NATO, including concerted military planning, so that a coordinated defense of Western Europe, the Mediterranean and, to a lesser degree, the Middle East might be effected.

The Department of Defense has indicated that a new Middle East security arrangement is militarily unsound at the present time. While the new pact, with United States, United Kingdom, and French participation, would make possible some coordination of military plans for the North Atlantic area and the Middle East, full coordination or execution would be rendered difficult by the absence of a superior authority. The individual countries in the area, with the exception of Turkey, are militarily weak, and joint defense would add little to their security. Further, the military authorities do not favor at this time any statement or action vis-à-vis Greece, Turkey and Iran which might involve commitments of military assistance beyond those already made, since prior commitments prevent now or at any time in the near future more aid to those countries than is now planned, or any effective assistance in the event they are attacked. They would have no objection, however, to the three powers informally assuring Turkey that a Soviet attack upon it would probably mean global war and that we would act accordingly.

In considering Greek and Turkish association with the NAT under arrangements short of full membership, the Department of Defense has applied the term “associate membership” and the Department has considered, in addition to this relationship, a less formal association with NAT military planning bodies.

(a) Associate Membership:

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for associate membership. Article 10 specifically provides that:

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.”

In view of this language, it would seem difficult to provide for formal adherence of associate members without amendment of the Treaty, which in turn would seem to require further parliamentary action by the national legislatures of the present members. Quite aside from its desirability, it would probably take many months to obtain such action.

(b) Association with NAT Military Planning Bodies:

While for the foregoing reasons associate membership is impracticable, it does seem possible to provide for a working relationship between the appropriate military planning bodies of NATO and the corresponding elements in the Turkish and Greek Governments. The terms of reference of the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping provide a precedent in this respect.

Specifically, Paragraph II, 1, of the North Atlantic Council directive to the Ocean Shipping Planning Board provides that:

“Representatives of other countries not party to the Treaty may be invited to participate in the work of the Board whenever appropriate.”

It would seem feasible for the Council to issue a further directive to the Defense Committee authorizing that body to arrange for representatives of European non-members to participate in appropriate phases of the work of the various military planning bodies subordinate to the Defense Committee when this is deemed desirable. The directive could make specific mention of the cases of Turkey and Greece.

It has, therefore, been concluded that the United States position should be to: (a) oppose the admission of Greece and Turkey as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and (b) oppose any alternative arrangement which would require the commitment of United States forces to defend Greece and Turkey (or Iran) in the event of hostilities. While it is recognized that the decision will cause adverse reaction, particularly in Turkey, the offer of the special arrangements for Greece and Turkey in the NATO should reduce to some extent the disappointment. Announcement of this decision should be accompanied by an explanation to the Turks and Greeks that the development of the organization of the NAT and of the necessary defensive strength among the Treaty countries has not progressed sufficiently to permit the extension of full NAT membership to other countries at this time, but that the matter of their inclusion will be given continuing study. All NAT countries should adopt this as a uniform position vis-à-vis the Turks.

The decision to extend the special arrangement to Greece and Turkey should be made public by the NAT Council. In addition, consideration should be given to public statements by the United States, Great Britain, and France, regarding their interest in the security of the area, mentioning Iran as well as Greece and Turkey. Consideration should not be given to granting to Iran similar NAT status at this time on the grounds of geographic ineligibility.

In this connection, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under any arrangements would present complications in Iran. Preparatory discussions with British and French representatives disclose that this aspect is of considerably more importance in United States-Iranian relationships than with regard to British and French relationships with that country. This step might tend further to convince important Iranian opinion, as well as the USSR, that the United States and the Western powers are less interested in the security of Iran than of Greece and Turkey. It is important, therefore, that Iran be adequately reassured in public statements, and it should be made clear that Iran is not being offered the same treatment in the NAT only because of its non-European status and consequently its ineligibility to participate in the Treaty Organization.

There are two important difficulties involved in the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the NATO on a consultative basis, which must be given continuing and careful consideration in the event this course is taken. First, their participation in NAT planning might disclose to them the present weakness of the European defense capabilities and dispel hopes which they might now have as to the ability of European countries to provide adequate assistance to Greece and Turkey in the event of hostilities. Recognition of the true situation prevailing in Europe could have a serious effect upon Greek and Turkish morale. The second difficulty involves security in connection with military planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, however, that adequate security safeguards can be established.

2. Other Security Steps in Connection with Greece and Turkey

The British have stressed the importance of continuing, and wherever feasible, expanding the present program of the supply of military equipment to Greece and Turkey and have suggested that urgent study should be given to the question of what military equipment, over and above that comprised in present programs, could and should be supplied to Greece and Turkey in case of an attack by satellite forces without overt Soviet participation. It has also been suggested that the British, French, and United States delegates to the General Assembly be instructed to support the continuation of a United Nations Special Commission on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in its present form. Items 2(a) and (b) under “Recommendations” reflect the United States position in this connection.

1. Cleared by the Department of Defense; prepared for use in the Foreign Ministers tripartite meetings in New York, September 12–19. For documentation on discussion of the subject in those meetings, see pp. 1108 ff.