740.5/9–550
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State
top secret
[
London,
September 4, 1950.]
1
Personal Message From Mr. Bevin to Mr. Acheson
I am convinced that a real danger exists that we shall be faced, possibly
in a few months’ time, with a crisis in Germany similar to but more
dangerous than that in Korea, arising from an attempt by the Russians,
acting through the East Zone police, to drive us out of Berlin or to
secure the unity of Germany within the Communist orbit.
I feel it is essential that we should examine this question at our
meeting and I therefore ask you to consider the attached paper, the
substance of which I am also communicating to M. Pleven. Our Chiefs of
Staff point out that there is no visible way of providing the forces
needed to defend the territories of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers
without German assistance. His Majesty’s Government are not however
prepared at present to agree to the re-creation of a German Army. We do
not wish to exclude eventual discussion of the incorporation of a German
contingent in the Western defence forces if the United States or French
Governments should wish to discuss it but in our view there are certain
minimum measures which should be taken without delay. These are
summarised in paragraph 3 of the paper. The most important is the
creation of a Federal Police Force for which Adenauer asked on 17th
August.2 The size and armaments of such a Force are for
discussion but it is important that it should be organised on a
sufficiently centralised basis to enable swift and effective action to
be taken in an emergency.
I have given much thought to the question whether the establishment of
such a Force would provoke the very action we want to prevent. Unless we
are prepared to ignore military opinion and to risk Berlin and even
Western Germany being overrun, this danger must be faced some time. It
is better to face it now when the Bereitschaften are less ready for
action than they will be next year and in such a form as is least likely
to provoke Soviet reaction. Moreover, the creation of a gendarmerie will take time. Until it exists and
until we have reorganised the German auxiliary services, our forces
would find themselves liable to be hamstrung in an emergency by loss of
their essential services, and by having to devote themselves to
suppression
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of
Communist-inspired disturbances or cope with mass movements of refugees.
Furthermore, unless we show now that we are prepared to face up to
danger that stares West Germans in the face, we shall lose the
confidence of the Germans and their morale may crack in an
emergency.
The problem of the defence of Berlin may prove to be more urgent and to
need separate action in advance of the other measures I propose.
[Enclosure]
German Association With the Defence of the
West
the problem
In Europe the declared policy of the Western Powers has been
- (1)
- to build up a position of strength in the West;
- (2)
- to incorporate Germany into the Western system, eventually
as an equal partner.
It was recognised that this policy could only be executed in the
teeth of Russian opposition, but the risk was taken in the
expectation that it would be possible in time to build up the
necessary position of strength in the West. It was hoped to achieve
this by the Brussels Treaty and subsequently by the North Atlantic
Treaty. Had this hope been realised, Western policy would be
coherent and the prospects fair. But in the light of recent events
the Chiefs of Staff have come to the firm conclusion (C.O.S. (50)305
of August 18th) that in fact we cannot build up the necessary
strength to assure the defence of the territories of the N.A.T.
Powers without the participation of Germany. The need to provide for
adequate defence has been rendered more urgent by the circumstance
that the rearmament of Germany has already begun in the Eastern
Zone. There is evidence that the Russians are in process of
converting the People’s Police, the Bereitschaften (Alert Units),
into a highly-trained regular German Army of 150,000 men which is to
include a number of armoured divisions It is accordingly clear that
provision will soon have to be made against an attack on Berlin or
on the Western Zone by this new German Army. To meet the threat the
Federal Chancellor in a conversation, on August 17th, 1950, asked
the High Commissioners for authority to raise a special Federal
force of 150,000 volunteers trained and equipped on the model of the
Bereitschaften. In the paper of 18th August the Chiefs of Staff went
further and recommended that the German contribution to Western
defence should consist of local naval forces, a balanced Army of 20
divisions with a reserve of 10 divisions, a tactical air component
of 1,100 aircraft, an air defence force of 1,000
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fighters and a substantial
anti-aircraft force equipped with guided weapons.
2. If the premise is accepted that the threat from the East is real
and urgent and without Germany it cannot be met, the problem is to
find the best method of associating Germany so far as this is
politically and economically practicable with the defence of the
West.
recommendations
- 1.
- It should be recognized that it is not practicable at the
moment to rearm Germany on the scale recommended by the
Chiefs of Staff.
- 2.
- Nevertheless, the United States and French Government
should be urged to agree that the Federal Chancellor should
be told in reply to his request that in view of the threat
of an invasion by the Eastern German Army he may as a first
step raise a federal force of 100,000 volunteers trained and
equipped on the model of the Bereitschaften, the arms to be
supplied by the Western Allies.
- 3.
- A similar force of 3,000 men should be raised in
Berlin.
- 4.
- The proposal to create a gendarmerie on a Land Basis
should be abandoned.
- 5.
- The auxiliary forces serving with the British and United
States armies should be improved and reorganised in
Units.
- 6.
- The German Frontier Customs Police Force should be
improved and slightly expanded.
- 7.
- Germany should make an industrial contribution to Western
strength.
- 8.
- The High Commissioners should be empowered to discuss the
implementation of these steps with the Chancellor and with
German representatives nominated by him.
[Here follows, in the final two-thirds of this enclosure, an argument
in support of the recommendations listed above.]
August 1950.
