740.5/8–3150
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The Turkish Government has from time to time expressed a strong desire to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, and recently submitted a formal request to the British, French and United States Governments, asking that the subject be discussed by representatives of the three governments at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New York in September. We have felt compelled, in view of the urgent nature of the Turkish request and an indication that the British and French also desire to discuss it, to include this matter on the proposed agenda. It is therefore necessary to consider the position which the United States should take in these meetings, which will be held from September 12 to September 14, as well as the position which we should take with the Government of Turkey.
[Page 258]The United States position on this question in previous discussions with the Turks has been that we could not extend our formal security commitments in view of the fact that, although considerable progress had been made in establishing the organizational framework envisaged in the North Atlantic Pact, there still remained the more important problem of implementing the pact by concrete steps designed to strengthen the collective defensive capacity of the treaty nations. Until these objectives have been realized, we have not felt able to consider further extension of our formal security commitments. Representatives of the Department of State and Department of Defense have exchanged preliminary views on the problem, and have agreed that the matter should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration of the military and strategic aspects.
I would like to review briefly considerations affecting this decision from the point of view of the Department of State:
Our decision concerning Turkey will of course directly affect not only our political relations with Turkey, but also with Greece and Iran. All three countries have stressed to us their desire to be included in a security pact which would assure them of United States and British, and possibly other allied, support in the event of aggression against them. The three countries have been linked in previous public statements regarding the concern of the United States for their security, and are linked in Title II of the military aid legislation. It therefore appears that the inclusion of any in special security arrangements with the United States would necessarily entail the inclusion of the others, unless there were logical reasons for their exclusion; otherwise it might appear to them and to possible aggressors that United States interest in their security has lessened. Thus, the inclusion of Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty would, I believe, require for political reasons the inclusion of Greece, although Iran might be excluded on the grounds that it is not a European country. In this event, however, I believe that the Iranians would have to be reassured in some new way of United States interest in order to minimize adverse political and morale effects in Iran and to make our position clear to the Soviets.
It appears that the principal reasons for Turkey’s strong request that it be included in the pact are (a) its desire to participate in defense planning per se and with the hope of obtaining additional arms thereby and the commitment of allied support in the event of war; and (b) the conviction that Turkey’s adherence to the pact, with the commitment by other members to consider an attack against it an attack against all, would deter Soviet aggression. Although Greece is not pressing the matter at present, preferring to wait and see the [Page 259] reaction to the Turkish request, our Embassy in Athens believes that Greek interest in the pact is based upon the same considerations.
The decision regarding the inclusion of Turkey, and thus Greece, in the North Atlantic Treaty involves such considerations as (a) the extent to which their adherence would serve as a provocation to the Soviet Union, (b) the effect as a deterrent against Soviet invasion, (c) the extent to which they would add military strength to the pact countries, (d) the organizational and planning problems involved in the addition of two new countries and from a separate geographic area, and (e) the extent to which the United States and the Western European powers would in fact be able to extend assistance to Greece and Turkey in the event of hostilities. In the latter connection, if the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the pact would necessarily result in their becoming aware of plans which do not contemplate any appreciable direct assistance to them in the event of hostilities, it is likely that the adverse effects would be even greater than the results of their exclusion. Moreover, a specific promise to commit forces to aid these countries without the capability to do so would result, in the event of hostilities, in disillusionment and bitterness which probably would have serious consequences both during and after the war.
Alternatives to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty also have been considered. Among these would be the establishment of a new security pact initially consisting of Greece, Turkey and Iran, under which the United States, Great Britain and France might either enter into reciprocal commitments on the Atlantic Pact model or extend a non-reciprocal commitment assuring the pact countries that they would not tolerate any aggression against them and would provide all possible support. Although this might simplify the organizational and planning aspects of the problem, there remains the important question of the extent to which United States and allied aid, particularly air support, can at this time be promised them in the event of attack.
While it is clear that Turkey will not be completely satisfied with any arrangement short of direct and full participation in some security arrangement underwritten by the United States, it is possible that a compromise might be worked out whereby Turkey, as well as Greece, would attend meetings of a Mediterranean section of the North Atlantic Treaty organization on a consultative basis rather than as full-fledged members. This obviously would be no more than a delaying device, as Greece and Turkey would probably not long remain satisfied and would press for early full membership.
As another alternative, the United States might engage in high-level diplomatic talks with the Turks to persuade them it is not really in [Page 260] their interest to join the pact itself but to indicate that the United States will be prepared to make a strongly-worded non-reciprocal declaration which would make it even clearer that we would not tolerate an invasion of Turkey. Such a unilateral declaration would not place Turkey in a position of assuming a dangerously provocative attitude vis-à-vis the USSR, although the Soviet Government might interpret this action as further evidence of United States “aggressive” intentions and encirclement by the Western powers. It might be made clear to the Turks that United States military aid in the maximum amount possible consistent with our other commitments would be provided. It is believed that such an arrangement with Turkey would require similar policies in Greece and Iran. The British and French are already committeed by treaty to aid Turkey in the event of an invasion. Those governments might also join with the United States in assurances to Greece and Iran.
In view of the early discussions of this matter with the British and French, I would greatly appreciate receiving the views of the Department of Defense as soon as possible. While the subject is at this time basically a political-diplomatic problem, the United States’ answer should reflect military and strategic considerations relating to the defense of the area. Consequently it would be most helpful to the Department to have an opinion as to which of the following courses of action would be advisable from the military point of view: (a) the inclusion of Greece and Turkey, and possibly later Iran, as members of the North Atlantic Treaty; (b) giving these countries, temporarily at least, consultative status in the Treaty organization; (c) the establishment of a new area pact along the lines of the Atlantic Treaty, with United States, United Kingdom and French guarantees either on a reciprocal or non-reciprocal basis; (d) a unilateral nonreciprocal declaration by the United States and possibly the British and French, making it even clearer that we will not tolerate armed aggression against Greece, Turkey or Iran, with assurance to the three countries that United States aid in the maximum amount possible consistent with our other commitments will be provided; or (e) other appropriate courses of action to meet the present situation.
In the light of the military and strategic importance of the area, particularly the Turkish Straits, and political advantages to be obtained by intensifying the determination to resist aggression, I hope that you will consider with reference to (a), (b) and (c) above the question of whether we are now or will in the foreseeable future be in a position to provide sufficient military support to justify our entering into such arrangement, bearing in mind the adverse effects if the United States should fail to live up to any commitments which we [Page 261] might undertake. I would particularly like to have comments on the organizational and planning difficulties involved. Any further general views on the various aspects of the problem would be appreciated.
Officers of the Department of State concerned with the matter stand ready to render any assistance which you may require.
Sincerely yours,