740.5/8–3050: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
1280. Eyes only for Secretary. No distribution except as directed by the Secretary.
- 1.
- I have given careful study to Deptel 962, August 22.1 I am now in full agreement with the proposal.
- 2.
- I wish to offer the following comments with regard to one or two
aspects of the problem:
The “estimate of the situation” of the Department’s communication to the Department of Defense especially the sixth and seventh paragraphs would seem to propose and anticipate an eventual high degree of European integration of federation. Reference is made to an increase in the feeling to unite Europe in all fields possible including the military. Although the continental European countries seem to be imbued with the idea of European unity I doubt that the idea has taken the form of political integration. It is, I believe, related more to unity in respect of specific and concrete problems. The Schuman plan is an example of what I mean. The enthusiasm for a united European defense or security force is another example. Moreover, I do not believe that the question of European integration, if this implies political federation, need arise in its comprehensive meaning and significance in connection with the establishment of an European defense force. This is one of the fields in which effective and united action can be most easily achieved because, although it requires a certain surrender of what has been called sovereignty, its purpose is uncomplicated, its objective understandable to the most ordinary mind. Finally there is a very important precedent for the assignment of forces of varying nationalities to a single commander. Similarly, there is precedent for the welding of production programs, shipping programs, the development and use of raw materials and so forth.
- 3.
- The Continental European countries may be anxious to form a real political federation embracing surrender of sovereignty in most of the fields in which sovereignty has been exercised by purely national governments, but I am quite clear that no government whether Socialist, Conservative or Liberal in the UK would associate this country with such a Continental political federation. I am sure that the Socialist government exaggerates the relations between the UK and the Commonwealth as a rationalization and as an excuse for not exercising the leadership which the UK should exercise in European matters and for resisting, if at times it has not, in fact frustrated efforts aimed at European unity in regard to specific and limited matters. The UK can undoubtedly without in any way impairing its relations with the Commonwealth exercise a more vigorous leadership in continental affairs. She can even advocate close European integration if not political federation among the Continental powers. She can associate herself with the European Continental powers or with a federated Western Europe in regard to specific matters of common interest but I am convinced that it would be a great mistake to try to push the UK into a political federation with Continental Europe. [Page 253] This would require her squarely to make a choice between the Commonwealth on the one hand and the European federation on the other. She could not do both any more than as a practical matter at the present moment the US could maintain its integrity as a federal republic with its territories and at the same time become a part of an European political federation. The national interests of the US, in my opinion, will be better served by the preservation of the Commonwealth association with a strong UK than by the disintegration of the Commonwealth which would necessarily be the result of the UK’s becoming a part of a European federated state. Spaak put the matter quite clearly on January 17th of this year when he said at the Penn University: “We do not wish to place Great Britain in the position of having to make a choice between Europe and the Commonwealth because we know perfectly well that if we did she would, quite rightly, choose the Commonwealth. Thus, we do not wish to place her in the position of having to make this choice because we want to keep her with us; and to keep her with us as she is, with her power and her relations with the Common wealth still intact.”
- 4.
- The foregoing does not, however, mean that the UK cannot become associated with the common defense forces and the interrelated procurement and production programs for the security of both Europe and the North Atlantic community in accordance with the statement contained in reftel.
- 5.
- The Department’s proposal would seem to anticipate the immediate establishment of the Cossack plan, leaving open the question of the appointment of a commander for the time being. I do not believe that this plan would be sufficient to make rapid progress in the direction we desire. I think that it is essential that an American commander can be appointed immediately with the authorization such appointment would require actually to command the European defense force to be made up of contingents from the present members of Western Union plus the US and, as soon as may be, from Germany. I am fearful that the Cossack arrangements would result in the frustrations and lack of accomplishment that have attended the Fontainebleau headquarters of Western Union. I believe that the Commander chosen should be an American. While I fully realize that there are objections to an American occupying this position as pointed out in my telegram 784,2 paragraph 5, I am convinced that the advantages of such a selection far outweigh the disadvantages. As to matter of tactics, however, I agree with McCloy that it would be better were the European countries to request US to designate the Supreme Commander.
- 6.
- Mention has been made both in the Department’s message and in comments from Frankfort and Paris concerning the political guidance to be given the EDF and to its “European” character. It seems to me that there is sufficient authority and opportunity under the NAT first for the US to participate in the EDF and, second, to provide the required political guidance. This might be achieved in the first instance by agreement reached between NAT and Western Union under the terms of which NAT on a regional basis would take over the immediate responsibilities for the establishment and command, et cetera of common defense forces and for common procurement and production for the members of the Brussels pact who are also members of NAT without accepting the obligation on the part of the US automatically to go to war. This obligation is purely a technical one but has no practical significance so long as US troops remain on the Continent. Under NAT if any one of its members were attacked, we would in fact be at war.
- Moreover, this sort of arrangement between NAT and western Europe would permit the acceptance of military contingents—I am referring particularly to German contingents—from countries which are not members of NAT if the council invited them to participate. At the same time this sort of arrangement would not preclude the complete coordination between that which is done in western Europe in regard to Europe and that which is done elsewhere. Certainly it contemplates US and Canadian participation.
- This arrangement would avoid the establishment of a new organization and at the same time might satisfy the German distaste for NAT, distaste which in part stems from the fact that Germany is less of a North Atlantic community country than many of the others and that many Germans consider themselves to be more purely European, if not partially middle European, than the people of some of the other members of NAT. The remaining obligations other than those referred to here can remain in the Western Union organization.
- 7.
- I would like again to reiterate what I have repeatedly said, especially in my letter of July 12 and my Embtel 784 of August 8 that I feel convinced that vigorous US leadership and the substantial contribution of US forces, are, when combined with unequivocal commitments on the part of the UK, the elements which will with greatest certainty revive and invigorate the will to fight among European countries and as a result insure in the shortest time creation of an effective European defense.
- 8.
- It seems to me, however, that the deployment of more US divisions in Europe and the assumption of responsibility by an American commander should be associated with commitments on the part of [Page 255] the UK to form more combat units and to place them in Europe. Moreover, it should be contingent upon real and substantive undertakings by some of the continental countries.
- 9.
- If, having assumed this responsibility, having placed more divisions on the Continent of Europe, having persuaded the UK to form more combat units and to deploy more divisions on the Continent, there is not clear and convincing evidence of a resurgence of European will to resist and to fight, we should I think quite frankly tell our Continental European associates that we will have to review our whole policy. For it is certain that the US and the UK alone cannot defend the Continent and that if we undertook to do so, our forces on the Continent in the event of a supreme emergency would probably be swept into prison camps or into the ocean and our own strength to defend that which remains defensible would be seriously impaired.
Sent Department 1280, repeated information Frankfort eyes only for McCloy 185, Paris eyes only for Bruce 339.