320/9–1350: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
confidential
Washington, September
13, 1950—7 p. m.
258. Reurtel 513 Sept 121 we strongly oppose Lie plan to decide now on split session this GA and request you inform Lie our objections this regard, based on foll reasons. See also Deptel 242 Sept 11.2
[Page 286]- 1.
- It wld not attain his principal objective of postponing controversy over Chi representation and thus maintaining 53-nation unity. Issue must arise at outset of session as credentials matter. Decision to seat Chi Nationalists for first half of session wld give Sovs just as much opportunity for disruptive propaganda attacks as decision to do so on any other basis.
- 2.
- Possibly Lie is thinking in terms of not seating either Chi Del at first half of session. This wld present very great difficulties for us. Pls ascertain Lie’s exact intentions this regard.
- 3.
- Sec’s plan to use Cuban agenda item as incentive to Chi Commies to follow reasonable policies Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, etc, seems to us better calculated to attain objective than advance notification to Commies they need expect no consideration from GA until next spring. Our plan leaves flexible date and possibility of reconsideration. Conceivably we might wish reconsideration at end fall session, conceivably later, but in any event it is preferable not to make firm decision on this now.
- 4.
- One technical difficulty with Lie plan is that it provides for immediate reference representation issue to General Comite, before composition GC has been settled. China has always been member GC and we intend as always support it this year, but wld be in difficult position in doing so before GA had determined who wld sit for China.
- 5.
- Although Chi representation is an issue of major importance to GA, it is not only GA issue, and Dept doubts advisability disrupting entire GA schedule and plans visiting Dels for dubious advantages claimed by SYG. Following points seem particularly important to us.
- 6.
- Idea that session devoted to Korea, United Action, Soviet item and few other political items wld be short is in our view completely unrealistic. Without pressure heavy agenda, each part session wld probably be virtually as long as normal session and decisions reached wld very likely be no different.
- 7.
- Prelim survey Secretariat’s proposals re allocation items between halves of session leads us to conclusion these proposals superficial and in some respects not feasible. It must be remembered most GA items, considered individually, are matters of principal concern to one or more Dels. For example, it hardly seems likely that LA states wld agree postpone Spanish issue and in fact this item wld not take more than 4 or 5 Comite meetings. It is doubtful we wld agree postpone Greek item, that Indians wld concur postponement treatment Indians or Arabs matter Egyptian-Libyan border, invitation Arab League attend session, Jerusalem, or above all their refugee item.
- 8.
- Many items suggested for postponement other committees are inconsequential and will in fact take little time. We repeat in this [Page 287] connection that, except for Political Comite, no Comite has as heavy agenda as 1949. Net result postponement items these Comites wld mean that unnecessary amount time wld be spent on Certain items. In addition, we cld not agree postponement some of these items. For example, we think it absolutely essential that Refugee Convention be adopted this GA and opened for signature as soon as possible. IRO terminates Mar. 31, 1951 and the Convention is only tool High Commissioner will have at his disposal to secure legal status refugees who without Convention have no status.
To sum up we do not wish foreclose eventual decision on split session if at ultimately appears necessary, but wld oppose any decision to split session now.
Webb