Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: SD/A/C.6/110

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

confidential

[Washington,] September 12, 1950.

Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State

the problem

Cuba has proposed the following item¹ for the agenda of the General Assembly:

“Recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State.”

In its explanatory memorandum² the Cuban Government pointed out that the rules of procedure of the main organs of the United Nations “merely establish procedure for the submission and approval of the credentials of representatives appointed by Member States to each organ; that is, for the verification of the powers of these representatives.” The memorandum states that the Charter makes no provision for deciding the problem that arises “when the United Nations has to decide which government has the right to represent a State in the Organization” … “nor do the rules of procedure of the main organs give any standard by which it may concretely and specifically be solved.” “… the rules referred to are based on the presumption that in each Member State represented on the organ there exists a definite government.”

The Cuban Government suggests that the General Assembly provide a uniform procedure for the whole organization for the solution of the question of the right of a government to send delegates to represent a Member State.³

recommendations

1. The United States representative on the General Committee should support inclusion of the Cuban item in the General Assembly agenda and its referral to one of the main committees for consideration. In view of its nature, the item would normally go to the Legal Committee. If there is a preponderant feeling among other Delegations that the item should go to one of the Political Committees, the United States should concur.

2. The Delegation should seek to have the item placed at such a point on the agenda of the Committee to which the item is allocated as to permit the General Assembly to reach conclusions at the present session on the general considerations applicable to the question raised by Cuba. At the same time, the General Assembly should not act precipitately to place the item ahead of more urgent matters or to allow Assembly consideration of the question in conjunction with the problem of Chinese representation to indicate appeasement with respect to the Korean issue.

3. The United States should express substantive views and support proposals on the Cuban item along the following lines:

(a) The problem of a government’s accreditation of delegates to represent a Member State in United Nations organs should not be confused with the question of diplomatic recognition. Neither voting for the seating of the representatives of a particular government as the representatives of a Member State, nor sitting with such representatives in any organ, can in themselves be construed as diplomatic recognition of that government. A Member of the United Nations is not required to vote for the seating of a particular government’s representatives in the United Nations merely because the Member accords diplomatic recognition to the government in question, although the same considerations may be relevant in regard to both representation and recognition. Conversely, a Member is not required to vote against the seating of a particular government’s representatives merely because the Member does not recognize that government.

(b) The following factors among others should be weighed in determining a question of representation in a United Nations organ:

(i) de facto control of the territory and administrative machinery of the State, including the maintenance of order;

(ii) ability and willingness of the government to discharge its obligations under the Charter;

(iii) General acquiescense of the population as a guide to the stability of the government.

(c) A United Nations organ’s acceptance of the representatives of a government as the representatives of a Member State does not imply approval or disapproval of that government’s policies or of the manner in which it came to power.

(d) Organs of the United Nations, when considering a representation question, should give due weight to the consideration by, and the decisions and recommendations of, the Security Council or the General Assembly on any political question relating to the country whose representation is in issue.

(e) Uniformity among the organs of the United Nations is desirable on questions of representation. To this end, the General Assembly should recommend to the Members of the United Nations principles along the general lines indicated above, to serve as a guide in all United Nations organs on the question of the right of a government to send delegates to represent a Member State. The General Assembly should resolve that its subsidiary organs should be bound by any decisions of the General Assembly, or its Interim Committee when it is not in session, on whether a government should be permitted to accredit delegates to represent a Member State. The General Assembly should recommend to Members that in other bodies of the United Nations generally, when such a question arises, these bodies in making their decisions should take into account such prior decisions of the General Assembly, or its Interim Committee, on the same question of seating a particular government’s delegates as representatives of a Member State. Special attention should be given to the functional commissions and subcommissions of ECOSOC which are composed of particularly qualified individuals who have been nominated specially by Member States and confirmed by ECOSOC.

comment

So far as the procedure for handling the Cuban item is concerned, it is desirable to have the General Assembly complete its consideration of this agenda item before the end of the present session, in order that the results of study may be available for use before next year in dealing with the Chinese representation issue and in order that the General Assembly’s consideration of the Cuban item and any criteria developed by the Assembly may be brought to bear on the policies of the Chinese Communist regime with the least delay. The advantages of completion at this Assembly session of work on the Cuban item are believed to outweigh the advantages to be gained from a year-long study by the Interim Committee or body of independent experts. In view of the close connection between the Cuban item and the issue of Chinese representation, other delegations may wish to have the Cuban item referred to one of the Assembly’s Political Committees rather than to the Legal Committee. Because of its nature, normally the item would be allocated to the Legal Committee. Such allocation at the present session would be advantageous in helping to bring about a more even distribution of work among the various Assembly Committees and prevent overloading of the Political Committees.

Representation an issue separate from recognition

On the substantive aspects of the Cuban proposal, it cannot be stressed too strongly or too often that the question of representation of members in an international organization should be kept separate from the question of diplomatic recognition. From their nature, international organizations cannot function and get ahead with their business unless the problem of representation is kept separate from the manifold issues of diplomatic recognition between one new government and the governments of all the other member states in a particular organization. A distinction between representation and recognition is clearly indicated in Article 12 of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and United Nations,⁴ where it is provided that the right of access of delegates to the Headquarters District shall be independent of the relations between their governments and the United States Government. The organs of the United Nations have in fact been operating on the basis of this principle of separation. For example, at the second session of ECAFE the United States delegate proposed a resolution to seat the representatives sent by the Siamese Government, which was then unrecognized by the United States as the legal government of Siam. The resolution, which was adopted by the Commission, stated that the admission to participation “does not imply any step towards the recognition of the present Siamese Government by Governments members of the Commission”. And at the second session of the General Assembly in 1947, representatives of Ecuador and Nicaragua were seated without objection at a time when the governments sending them had not yet been recognized by the United States or a majority of Latin American states.

Actual control a criterion

Normally, Member States should be represented in international organizations by the governments which actually exercise authority in the respective States. The territories and peoples of the Member States cannot ordinarily be represented in any effective manner by shadow governments with little or no chance of regaining control that they have lost, regardless of the claims such governments may have to be the legal or legitimate governments. The business of international organizations would lose its reality unless in the main the delegates of Member States are in a position to speak for the authorities which really control those States.

Relation of representation issue to substantive question in United Nations political organs

There are, of course, situations in which revolutionary change of government in a United Nations Member comes under the scrutiny of a political organ such as the Security Council or the General Assembly. In an appropriate case, the Council or Assembly might decide upon steps to influence the course of events in the Member State concerned, and might include among those steps decisions or recommendations on diplomatic recognition and on representation in United Nations organs. This type of situation is envisaged in paragraph 3(d) of the recommendations in the present paper. It may be that in the future political organs of the United Nations may make more extensive use of their powers of decision and recommendation to use collective action on representation and recognition as political instruments. It is important that such action, if taken, be made effective through the concert of many nations and through relating the collective action on representation and recognition to the other measures being employed to produce political results. Futile steps with respect to a matter such as representation or recognition are worse than useless. The Spanish case has become an apt illustration of this point.

Attitude toward Charter obligations

The conduct of a government in relation to the obligations of the Charter is relevant in deciding whether to seat the representatives of that government. If the government in question is engaging in conduct which would render a State subject to expulsion, such conduct may be a reason for not seating the government’s representatives.

American experience with recognition policy

As pointed out earlier, questions of the representation of a country in international organizations should be kept separate from questions of diplomatic recognition of a government in that country, although it is nevertheless interesting to note certain features of United States policy on the question of diplomatic recognition. During much of American history, this Government has pursued the policy of basing its diplomatic recognition of other governments on realistic considerations of actual control, wherever a government seemed prepared to discharge international responsibilities. At times other criteria have been introduced, with a view to bringing about particular political results in the foreign country concerned. It was concluded in 1948 in a Policy Planning Staff paper on recognition that the introduction of those other criteria—such as whether a government came to power by constitutional means—has generally been a failure in practice.

Uniformity of representation throughout United Nations organs

Uniformity of representation in the various organs of the United Nations is clearly a desirable feature. The same government should have the power to accredit representatives to all of the organs and bodies of which the state is a member. No one organ of the United Nations is competent to decide for the whole organization which government should be so empowered. However, it would seem that the General Assembly is best suited to institute guidance on this question for the organization as a whole. The General Assembly can recommend a set of principles for the guidance of Members in the Assembly itself and in other organs. The General Assembly can instruct subsidiary organs of the General Assembly to abide by its conclusions, or those of its Interim Committee if it is not in session, in the application to a particular case of the recommended principles on representation. It can properly recommend to Members that their representatives on the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council should give proper consideration to such conclusions of the General Assembly or its Interim Committee on a particular question of representation. The General Assembly might also make appropriate arrangements to have its conclusions brought to the attention of the Security Council for its consideration.

The present position paper has been framed to deal with representation problems in general; it has not been addressed to a particular problem, such as the present Chinese case. Many different and difficult representation problems may arise in the future; there is obvious good sense in the suggestion of Cuba that there should be some orderly and regular method for solution of these problems as they are presented.⁵

1. This was done by letter of July 19 (UN Doc. A/1292).
2. This was forwarded under cover of a letter dated July 26 (UN Doc. A/1308).
3. The relevant public documentation on the Cuban representation item is printed in the fascicule entitled “Agenda Item 61” in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes, volume ii (hereafter cited as GA (V), Annexes, II).
4. Signed at Lake Success, New York, June 26, 1947; for text, see 61 Stat. 756 or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1676. For documentation on the negotiation of this agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. i, pp. 22 ff.
5. The Cuban item on representation was considered first by the Ad Hoc Political Committee and then approved by the General Assembly on December 14 in Resolution 396 (V). It received the support of the United States through all phases of its legislative passage.