Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: SD/A/225/Rev. 1

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

secret

[Washington,] September 14, 1950.

Chinese Representation in the General Assembly

the problem

The problem is to determine the substantive position of the United States on the question of Chinese representation at the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly. (The procedural problems which may arise in the consideration of this subject are discussed in a separate paper.¹)

recommendations

1. Action by the United States Delegation should be consistent with the position taken by the Secretary in his discussion of the matter with the British and French Foreign Ministers on September 14,² subject to any modification upon which agreement may be reached. That position is stated in recommendation 3. As indicated in that recommendation, the United States should favor the seating of the Chinese Nationalists and oppose the seating of the Chinese Communists.

2. The United States would prefer a quick decision on the Chinese representation question as indicated in recommendation 3 as soon as it is raised, so that the Assembly may proceed expeditiously to the election of its officers, its general debate, and its committee discussions without being hampered by a series of Soviet propaganda speeches and diversionary maneuvers on the subject. If the issue is raised by a Soviet motion to exclude the Chinese Nationalists, this would be most likely to lead to a decision favorable to United States interests.

3. The Delegation should take action along the following lines:

a. We should seek to hold the line on the desirability of rapid General Assembly action.

b. Our position in the debate in the plenary should be along the following lines:

The question which confronts the Assembly as to which of two rival claimants should be seated as representative of China is a question which should be decided only after the deepest thought and consideration.

However to give this question the consideration it requires would delay the work of the session and, in view of the importance of Assembly business, involving as it does the crisis in Korea we must not permit that delay to occur.

Therefore the most intelligent alternative is to have a vote at the outset, seat the Nationalist representatives and get on with the business.

While the session is in progress there will be opportunity for members of the United Nations to give further consideration to this question when the Cuban agenda item for study of the problem of United Nations representation is discussed. We think this study should be made so that agreed criteria can be developed and members can apply those criteria to the Chinese question.

One aspect to which Members of the United Nations will doubtless want to give particular attention is the attitude of the Chinese Communist regime towards the purposes and principles of the Charter and its willingness to live up to the obligations of United Nations membership.

If the General Assembly decision is taken on this basis it will provide an incentive to the Chinese Communists to behave properly during the forthcoming months in respect to Korea, Formosa, etc. We should not, however, make a commitment that as a result of this procedure the United States would vote in favor of seating the Chinese Communists.

In order to provide a test of the attitude the Chinese Communists would adopt in the Assembly we are prepared to accept their participation if they request it in Committee I debate on Korea and Formosa and perhaps in the Committee which considers the Cuban agenda item.

4. The United States believes that the decision by the Assembly as to whether the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Communists shall represent China in the General Assembly should be decided by a simple majority vote.

5. If the Soviet bloc should walk out of the General Assembly in consequence of the decision taken on the representation question, the United States should act on the assumption that business will proceed as usual, as has been the case in the Security Council and almost all other United Nations Organs. No concession should be made to bring about a Soviet return.

6. In the unlikely event of a definitive Soviet withdrawal from the United Nations, the “business as usual” policy should be followed until it has been decided what additional measures are desirable.

comment

These recommendations are intended to fall within the general framework of our existing policy on Chinese representation, with such modification as is necessary to meet the special circumstances in the General Assembly. The following points may be specifically noted:

a. Since the Chinese Communists have accredited a Delegation to the Assembly, the representation issue must arise at the beginning of the session, when the Assembly considers the credentials of its members. The Soviets may be expected to demand the exclusion of Chinese Nationalist representatives at the very outset, as they have done in other United Nations Organs.

b. Since the issue arises through the presentation of two sets of credentials, the situation differs from the situation in the Security Council in that the General Assembly will not be considering a move to displace an already seated Nationalist representative, but will be making a decision between two rival claimants for the Chinese seats.

c. It is believed that the status of the Chinese Communists as coconspirators in the North Korean aggression offers us our strongest political argument on this matter in the Assembly.

d. The reference in recommendation 3 to the Cuban agenda item refers to the item placed on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly by Cuba, under the title “Recognition by the United Nations of representation of a Member State.” The United States position on this subject is set forth in a separate paper.³

e. Any action in the General Assembly which resulted in failure to seat the Chinese Nationalists, either temporarily or permanently, would necessarily reflect upon their standing in the Security Council. The Chinese Nationalist vote in the Security Council is important to us, since it may at times be necessary for attainment of the parliamentary majority of seven.

f. The position of the United States that a simple majority vote in the Assembly should decide the Chinese representation question is based on the following reasoning:
Although this question is obviously important, it is not one of the important questions listed in Article 18 of the Charter. As a matter of sound organizational procedure, it is necessary to facilitate decisions of the Assembly on questions which are essentially organizational in nature and it would be an unfortunate practice to permit a minority group of one-third of the Assembly to prevent its proper functioning. This position is analogous to the United States position that a decision on this question in the Security Council is not subject to the veto. Furthermore, unlike the situation in the Security Council, the Assembly may be faced with the problem not of excluding a delegate already seated, but of making a decision between two claimants who, as a matter of procedure, stand on an equal footing until a decision is made. As indicated above, it would be unfortunate if because of the failure to obtain a two-thirds majority neither claimant government could be seated. An additional consideration is the general position of the United States in respect to Assembly decisions that the categories of questions which require a two-thirds majority for decision should be kept to a minimum. The maintenance of this policy is obviously in the best interests of the Organization and the development of the General Assembly as an effective instrument to carry out the purposes of the Charter.

1. Doc. SD/A/234, September 11, p. 275.
2. Informal minutes of the tripartite ministerial meeting between the Secretary of State and the British and French Foreign Ministers on September 14 are scheduled for publication in volume iii. The results of the conversations with respect to the issue of Chinese representation are described in brief in the minutes of the meeting of the U.S. Delegation, September 18, p. 291.
3. Doc. SD/A/C.6/110, September 12, p. 280.