Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: SD/A/234

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

confidential

[Washington,] September 11, 1950.

Procedural Questions Which May Arise in General Assembly Consideration of the Chinese Representation Issue

the problem

On the assumption that the Soviet bloc delegates are present at the opening of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, the Chinese representation issue is likely to be precipitated at the very outset of the meeting. Following the Soviet practice in other United Nations organs, the Representative of the Soviet Union may rise on a point of order and propose a resolution calling for the exclusion of the Chinese National Government representatives and the seating of the Chinese Communists or may take some other action with the same end in view. The Peiping regime has already telegraphed a list of delegates to the Secretary-General, urging him to arrange for their reception, and he has stated that he will do so if the General Assembly accepts the Chinese Communist delegation as the representatives of the Republic of China.

Complex procedural problems may be raised in the course of the discussion on the Chinese representation issue. While it is impossible to predict their precise form, it is desirable to clarify in advance the position of the United States on the principal points which may be anticipated. This paper proposes a course of action on the following questions:

(a) Whether the matter of Chinese representation should be referred to the Credentials Committee or to a Main Committee before action is taken by the Plenary Session, or whether it should be considered immediately in the Plenary Session;

(b) Whether the General Assembly can make a decision on the matter by a simple majority, or whether a two-thirds majority should be required;

(c) Whether the vote on Chinese credentials should be taken in the Assembly by secret ballot;

(d) Whether a hearing should be granted to the Chinese Communist delegation prior to a decision on the representation question;

(e) Whether the delegation of the Chinese National Government should be permitted to vote on matters involving its own credentials; and

(f) Whether the General Assembly can make a decision that neither of the two Chinese delegations shall be seated.

recommendation

It is recommended that the United States Delegation take the following position:

(a) Before the Session is convened, the Delegation should consult with the Temporary President of the General Assembly (General Romulo) and with friendly delegations with a view to obtaining agreement that the expected Soviet motion, if made, should be the first order of business of the General Assembly and should immediately be debated and acted upon by the Plenary Session. (A decision on this point will necessarily be subject to last-minute changes if tactical considerations make this advisable.)

(b) Any decision on the question of seating the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Communists should be made by a simple majority.

(c) The decision should not be taken by secret ballot.

(d) If the Chinese Nationalist Delegation is the only delegation present which claims to represent the Government of China, it should be seated in the General Assembly, and if any objection to this procedure is raised and pressed, the seating should be held to be provisional in accordance with the terms of Rule 29 of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure.

(e) If the Chinese Communists demand that they be heard on this issue, the Delegation should oppose such a hearing. It should oppose a hearing in the plenary on the ground that the facts are already sufficiently clear and that no useful purpose would be served by departing from the normal Assembly practice of hearing only accredited representatives of member states in the plenary session of the General Assembly. The Delegation should also oppose any arrangement for a hearing in the Credentials Committee or any other Assembly committee on this issue, on the ground that no additional information is needed to enable the Assembly to act.

(f) If the Chinese Nationalist Delegation has been permitted to sit in the seats reserved for China during the debate on the representation issue, that delegation should be permitted to vote on motions involving its own credentials.

(g) Although the rules of procedure do not cover this point, it would appear to be within the General Assembly’s competence to decide that for a certain period no delegation should be seated for China.

comment

1. Methods of Procedure

The normal procedure at the opening of a General Assembly session is as follows:

First, the Temporary President makes a formal opening statement, and, on occasion, other notables make formal speeches of welcome;

Second, there is a minute of silent prayer or meditation;

Third, the Temporary President submits to the Assembly a slate for the Credentials Committee of nine members, which has always been approved by the Assembly in a perfunctory manner; its initial report is normally received in a day or two;

Fourth, the General Assembly proceeds to the election of its President and of the Committee officers and Vice Presidents who make up the General Committee;

Fifth, the agenda is adopted: and

Sixth, the general debate begins.

If the Soviet bloc representatives are present, they are likely to demand with great insistence the exclusion of the Chinese Nationalist delegation and the seating of Chinese communists on a point of order, as soon as the Session is opened. The President may entertain the motion, or he might possibly prefer to raise the issue himself at the outset of the session in order to forestall a Soviet propaganda statement and to present the question in a fairer light.

The President might propose that, following the normal course of Assembly procedure, the Soviet motion should be referred to the Assembly Credentials Committee or to one of the main committees of the General Assembly (the Political Committee or the Legal Committee) before action is taken in plenary. Alternatively, he might suggest that the matter be discussed and settled immediately in the Plenary Session. The latter course seems preferable for the following reasons:

a. The matter of Chinese representation is a clearcut issue, and it is difficult to see what would be gained by its reference to one or more committees;

b. Opportunities for propaganda speeches by the Soviet bloc will be minimized if a decision is reached at once. If the matter were referred to a committee there would be three stages of debate—first, in the plenary when the Soviet motion is made; second, in the committee to which the matter is referred; and third, in the plenary when the committee’s report is considered; and

c. The work of the Assembly will be hampered if the matter is not decided before officers of the Assembly are elected and the substantive work of the session begins. Delegations should know whether the Eastern European representatives will be present at the Session and which delegation will represent China before they are asked to select Assembly officers (the USSR and China have invariably been elected to vice presidencies in the General Assembly, and Eastern European representatives have always been included on the General Committee).

2. Size of Majority Required for Decision

The question whether the decision on the Soviet motion or any other motion dealing with the Chinese representation issue can be taken by a simple majority vote or should require a two-thirds majority will undoubtedly arise. Normally, there would be no doubt that a question relating to credentials requires only a simple majority for settlement. However, it may be contended that the decision as to which government represents China is not a simple question of credentials, and that although not specifically listed in Article 18 of the Charter it is in fact an “important” question which should require a two-thirds majority for solution. (A decision on the size of the majority required would be taken by a simple majority vote.)

The position of the United States should be that a simple majority suffices for this decision. The reason for this is not that the matter is not important, but that it is necessary to facilitate decisions on questions which are essentially organizational in nature and that it would be undesirable to permit a minority group which might consist of one-third of the members of the Assembly plus one to obstruct the proper functioning of the Assembly. This position is analogous to our insistence in the Security Council that no permanent member should be allowed to use the veto in the Council’s decision on the same question, since it relates to the organization of the Council. Unlike the situation in the Security Council, the Assembly may be confronted not with an attempt to exclude a delegate already seated, but with the need for a decision between two claimants who, as a matter of procedure, stand on an equal footing until a decision is made. As indicated above, it would be unfortunate if because of a failure to receive a two-thirds majority, neither claimant could be seated.

An additional consideration which bears on this problem is the fact that the United States has always attempted to hold to a minimum the categories of questions which require a two-thirds majority for decision in the General Assembly. The maintenance of this policy is obviously in the best interests of the Organization and the development of the General Assembly as an effective instrument to carry out the purposes of the Charter.

3. Use of Secret Ballot

Rule 87 of the Assembly’s rules of procedure provides, with respect to methods of voting, that “The General Assembly shall normally vote by show of hands or by standing, but any representative may request a roll-call”. The use of the secret ballot is mentioned only in Rule 92, which deals with elections; this rule provides that “All elections shall be held by secret ballot”. Although the Assembly is master of its own procedure and could, by majority vote, decide to use the secret ballot in connection with questions other than elections, the clear intent of the rules is that voting on all questions other than elections should be held in accordance with Rule 87, i.e., by show-of-hands, standing or roll-call vote. The United States should take the position that it would be most undesirable from the organizational point of view to extend the use of the secret ballot, and that there is no reason why any state should not be willing to stand up and be counted on this issue.

4. Seating of Rival Chinese Claimants

If the Chinese Nationalist delegation is the only delegation claiming to represent China which is physically present when the Assembly is convened, the rules of procedure would clearly require that that delegation be seated in the Assembly. If its right to sit is challenged, the seating might be on a provisional basis pursuant to Rule 29 of the General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure.

5. Hearing for the Chinese Communists

The objections to any hearings on this matter may be summarized as follows:

(a) They are unnecessary because the essential facts underlying the problem are already clear to all members of the Assembly, and the issue must now be decided on the basis of political decisions taken by each delegation in the Assembly.

(b) They are undesirable because they will provide an opportunity for Communist propaganda and will seriously delay the organization of the Assembly and the inauguration of its substantive work;

(c) If the Chinese Communists should be heard prior to a decision on Chinese representation, they could not be heard as Government representatives and, hence, could not under normal Assembly practice be heard in Plenary Session. It would be necessary for them to appear before some Assembly Committee. In that event, the Chinese Nationalist delegation would also, presumably, have to be heard, and the Assembly would be presented with the difficult procedural problem of whether to hear the Nationalists on the same footing as the Communists or on some other basis;

(d) If the demands for a hearing of the Chinese Communists should assume serious proportions the President or the Delegation might suggest that the purpose of such a hearing could be served without delaying the Assembly’s proceedings by having the USSR, or some other delegation which has recognized the Chinese Communists, submit a written statement of the Chinese Communists to the Secretary-General for circulation to members as an Assembly document.

6. Voting Rights of Chinese National Delegation

Assuming that the Chinese National delegation has been seated provisionally, it is clear under the terms of Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure that it, like any other delegation provisionally, should have “the same rights as any other representatives until the Credentials Committee has reported and the General Assembly has given its decision”. The rule obviously requires that the Chinese Nationalist representatives should be permitted to vote on the representation question as on every other question which comes before the General Assembly while it occupies the Chinese seats.

7. Possibility of Seating Neither Chinese Delegation

There is nothing in the rules of procedure which would prevent the General Assembly from taking a decision to seat no delegation from China. The policy implications of such a decision are considered in another paper.